

# DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAIL 168

---

## Trajectories and Origins

### Survey on Population Diversity in France

*Initial findings*  
*October 2010*

By the TeO research team  
Co-ordinated by Cris Beauchemin, Christelle Hamelle and Patrick Simon





# Trajectories and Origins

## Survey on Population Diversity in France

*Initial findings*  
*October 2010*

# Contents

Introduction	<b>Trajectories and Origins (TeO), a Survey on Population Diversity in France</b>	5
Glossary		7
Chapter 1	<b>The Populations Surveyed</b> <i>Bertrand Lhommeau, Patrick Simon</i>	11
Chapter 2	<b>Migration Is Not Only Immigration</b> <i>Cris Beauchemin, Catherine Borrel, Corinne Régnard</i>	19
Chapter 3	<b>Between Here and There: a Glimpse of “Transnational” Practices in the Population Living in Metropolitan France</b> <i>Cris Beauchemin, Hugues Lagrange, Mirna Safi</i>	25
Chapter 4	<b>Diversity of Linguistic Practises</b> <i>Stéphanie Condon, Corinne Régnard</i>	31
Chapter 5	<b>Educational Attainment of Immigrants and their Descendants</b> <i>Laure Moguérou, Yaël Brinbaum, Jean-Luc Primon</i>	37
Chapter 6	<b>Educational Trajectories and Experiences of Young Descendants of Immigrants in France</b> <i>Yaël Brinbaum, Laure Moguérou, Jean-Luc Primon</i>	45
Chapter 7	<b>Labour market Situation of Persons aged 18-50 by Sex and Origin</b> <i>Bertrand Lhommeau, Dominique Meurs, Jean-Luc Primon</i>	53
Chapter 8	<b>Occupations of Descendants of Immigrants and their Fathers: Is Occupational Inheritance Determined by Geographical Origin?</b> <i>Mahrez Okba</i>	61
Chapter 9	<b>Working Hours and Wages</b> <i>Bertrand Lhommeau, Dominique Meurs, Jean-Luc Primon</i>	69
Chapter 10	<b>The Experience of Migration, Self-perceived Health and Non-Use of Healthcare Service</b> <i>Christelle Hamel, Muriel Moisy</i>	75
Chapter 11	<b>Union Formation between Here and There</b> <i>Christelle Hamel, Bertrand Lhommeau, Ariane Pailhé, Emmanuelle Santelli</i>	83

<b>Chapter 12</b>	<b>Inequalities in Housing Transitions, Perceived Discrimination and Segregation</b> <i>Jean-Louis Pan Ké Shon, Solenne Robello</i>	93
<b>Chapter 13</b>	<b>Spheres of Sociability: Family Relations Versus Social Relations</b> <i>Laure Mogue�rou, Emmanuelle Santelli</i>	99
<b>Chapter 14</b>	<b>Civic Life and Political Participation</b> <i>Vincent Tiberj, Patrick Simon</i>	107
<b>Chapter 15</b>	<b>Nationality and National Belonging</b> <i>Patrick Simon</i>	115
<b>Chapter 16</b>	<b>Religion</b> <i>Patrick Simon, Vincent Tiberj</i>	121
<b>Chapter 17</b>	<b>Discrimination</b> <i>Ya�l Brinbaum, Christelle Hamel, Jean-Luc Primon, Mirna Safi, Patrick Simon</i>	127
<b>Appendix 1</b>	<b>Rules for classification of the survey populations</b>	135
<b>Appendix 2</b>	<b>The authors</b>	139
<b>“Documents de travail” series</b>	<b>List of available issues</b>	143

*Responsibility for any judgements or opinions expressed in this document  
rests solely with their authors.*



# Trajectories and Origins (TeO), a Survey on Population Diversity in France

To implement government policy on promoting equality and combating discrimination for reasons of origin, tools for analysis and monitoring are required. To inform public debate on immigration in this context, more information is needed about the social trajectories and living conditions of migrants and their descendants in French society.

To meet this need for statistical data, INED and INSEE<sup>(1)</sup> joined forces to conduct a special survey on population diversity in France and the issue of discrimination. This extensive survey, entitled Trajectories and Origins (TeO), a survey on population diversity in France, was conducted in metropolitan France between September 2008 and February 2009 on a sample of 21,000 people. Respondents were immigrants, DOM native-borns (ie. persons born in one of the French overseas *départements*), descendants of immigrants, descendants of DOM native-borns, or persons born in metropolitan France without immigrant or DOM-native-born parents. This survey fills a gap in statistical knowledge of these minority populations; although they have been the subject of surveys in recent years, no previous survey has had such a large sample or covered so many areas of social life.

The Trajectories and Origins survey is intended to assess how far migratory origins (from other countries or from overseas France) are liable to affect living conditions and chances of access to the goods, services and rights that establish a person's place in society: housing, education, employment and promotion, public services and welfare provisions, health, nationality and citizenship, etc. The survey addresses respondents' social situations at the time of the survey and looks at their living conditions and experiences. The survey's title refers to "trajectories" in the plural, underscoring the intention to study the life course with respect to all aspects of life in society. The survey places special emphasis on tracking individuals' educational, occupational, residential, conjugal and health trajectories.

The aim of the survey is to examine access to resources by immigrants and their children born in France. It aims to reveal inequalities by separating the results of individual or collective decision-making from the results of contextual constraints of whatever kind: discrimination, housing type, the business cycle, etc. Central to the survey's analyses are the destinies of immigrants' children compared to those of their parents. Do they experience the same social and residential mobility as those of the working classes in the 1960s or is upward mobility an impossible goal for the second generation? And what role does origin play in mobility or lack of it? While it reveals the variety of experiences encountered by immigrants and their descendants, the survey aims to reveal the dynamics of differentiation and homogenisation between and within groups (including persons born French in France). As well as access to resources, the Trajectories and Origins survey also allows to study how

---

(1) \* INED: Institut national d'études démographiques (National Institute for Demographic Studies); INSEE: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies)

those resources are mobilised in different contexts such as education, employment and housing.

One of the survey's main aims is to identify key moments where discrimination occurs in the course of people's lives. It addresses all situations where unjust or unequal treatment can happen: course guidance at school, job seeking, working conditions, relations with colleagues and superiors, looking for a home, medical consultations and administrative procedures. The survey also seeks to measure the experience of racism in public (in the street, shops and leisure venues, in relations with authority figures, etc.) and the sense of belonging to a possibly stigmatised minority.<sup>(2)</sup>

For such an extensive survey a team of 24 researchers, academics and statisticians<sup>(3)</sup> had to be brought together to design the questionnaire and analyse the data, under the supervision of INED and INSEE. More than 500 interviewers gathered the data through face-to-face interviews with respondents. The interviews lasted an hour and a quarter on average. The survey was funded and supported by the following public institutions: Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances (ACSE); Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR); Direction de l'animation, de la recherche, des études et des statistiques (DARES, Ministry of Employment); Direction de la recherche, des études, de l'évaluation et des statistiques (DREES, Ministry of Health); the Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l'égalité (HALDE); the Institut d'aménagement et d'urbanisme Ile-de-France (Île-de-France city planning institute, IAU-Idf); and the comité interministériel des villes.

This book presents a preliminary analysis of the survey. The aim is to present the scientific community and the general public with the survey's first conclusions on the comparative situations of immigrants, their descendants and the mainstream population.<sup>(4)</sup> The analyses developed here provide intermediate results prior to the publication of a more exhaustive work in 2012. After the publication of two articles in *Population & Societies*<sup>(5)</sup> and *INSEE Première*,<sup>(6)</sup> we were dutybound to publish these preliminary results not only for the respondents who were good enough to answer the questionnaire and disclose aspects of their lives to us, but also to inform current public debates in France. We hope these analyses show the richness and potential of the survey and will encourage readers to make use of the database, which is now freely accessible.<sup>(7)</sup>

---

(2) The questionnaire is available on the survey's website, [http://teo\\_english.site.ined.fr/](http://teo_english.site.ined.fr/)

(3) Élisabeth Algava, Cris Beauchemin, Maryline Bèque, Stéphane Bernard, Catherine Borrel, Yaël Brinbaum, Martin Clément, Stéphanie Condon, Christelle Hamel, Hugues Lagrange, Maud Lesné, Bertrand Lhommeau, Dominique Meurs, Laure Moguerou, Muriel Moisy, Mahrez Okba, Arianne Paihlé, Jean-Louis Pan-Ke-Shon, Jean-Luc Primon, Corinne Régnard, Mirna Saï, Emmanuelle Santelli, Patrick Simon, Vincent Tiberj.

(4) See next section for a glossary of the terms used.

(5) Beauchemin C., Hamel C., Lesné M., Simon P. and the TeO team, "Discrimination: a question of visible minorities", *Population & Societies* No. 466, March 2010.

(6) Borrel C. and Lhommeau B., "Être né en France d'un parent immigré", *INSEE Première*, 1287, March 2010.

(7) For more information see the website of the Réseau Quetelet: <http://www.reseau-quetelet.cnrs.fr/>



# Glossary

The term “**mainstream population**” refers to the numerically largest group of persons resident in metropolitan France (mainland France and Corsica): those who are neither immigrants nor DOM native-borns, i.e. persons born in a French overseas *département* (*département d’outre-mer* or DOM), nor descendants of immigrants or DOM native-borns.


The respondents are also distinguished by their individual or family migration history, according to their place of birth (in metropolitan France / elsewhere), their nationality at birth (French or other) and their parents’ countries or *départements* of birth and nationalities at birth. The categories below are mutually exclusive.

## | Persons born outside metropolitan France (In-migrating population)

- **Immigrants:** persons born outside the current borders of metropolitan France and without French nationality at birth. Immigrants make up the largest group in the **in-migrating population** (i.e. all those born outside metropolitan France, regardless of birth nationality and thus including French persons born in overseas *départements*).
- **DOM native-borns:** persons born in one of the French overseas *départements* (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Réunion).
- **Repatriates:** persons with French nationality at birth, born in any of the former French colonies before independence. These countries are Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoro Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Togo and Vietnam. Repatriates are included in the **mainstream population**.
- **Other French nationals born outside metropolitan France:** persons with French nationality at birth, born outside metropolitan France but not in a DOM or a former colony before independence. This group is included in the **mainstream population**.

## | Persons born in metropolitan France

- **Descendants of immigrants:** persons born in metropolitan France with at least one immigrant parent. This population represents the so-called “second generation”. **Descendants of mixed parentage are** persons with one immigrant parent.
- **Descendants of DOM native-borns:** persons born in metropolitan France, with at least one parent born in a DOM.
- **Descendants of repatriates:** persons born in metropolitan France, with at least one parent born French in one of the former French colonies before independence. This group is included in the **mainstream population**.
- **Descendants of other French nationals born outside metropolitan France:** persons born in metropolitan France, with at least one parent who is a French national by birth but was born outside metropolitan France, elsewhere than in a DOM or a former French colony before independence. This group is included in the **mainstream population**.
- **Native-borns with no migrant parentage:** persons born in metropolitan France of French parents who were themselves born in metropolitan France. This category forms the largest group in the **mainstream population**.



*Note* • For the sake of simplicity, this chart does not include specific cases which concern very small numbers of individuals (persons born in metropolitan France or in a DOM without French nationality, individuals with at least one unknown parent, etc.). These specific cases are presented in appendix 1.





# The Populations Surveyed

*Bertrand Lhommeau\**, *Patrick Simon\*\**

The purpose of the Trajectories and Origins survey is to describe population diversity in metropolitan France. The notion of diversity is rather vague and can cover a wide range of characteristics. For our purpose, which is to examine integration trajectories and experience of discrimination, we addressed diversity in terms of migration and origins (whether social, geographical, cultural or religious). The sampling was designed to over-represent minority groups that are hard to study from the main sources of social and demographic statistics owing to small sample size. This enabled us to analyse the situations of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (subdivided between Sahelian Africa<sup>(1)</sup> and West and Central Africa<sup>(2)</sup>), Turkey, Southeast Asia<sup>(3)</sup> and also DOM native-borns living in metropolitan France. The survey's original feature, and one of its main contributions, is that it also allows us to observe immigrants' descendants, who are rarely taken into account in surveys and, when they are, only in numbers too small to address specific origin groups. As with immigrants, some origins of the descendants were over-represented to allow detailed analysis: descendants of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (with the same subdivision between Sahelian Africa and West and Central Africa), Southeast Asia and Turkey, and descendants of DOM native-borns. The survey is nonetheless representative of the whole population living in ordinary households in metropolitan France and aged between 18 and 60, apart from the additional samples of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns, for whom the survey is representative only of those aged 18 to 50. Above the age of 50 the sample did not over-represent the descendants and the numbers are therefore too small to allow detailed analysis.

This chapter describes the main demographic characteristics of the populations surveyed: the population groups and their distribution by gender, age and, where applicable, age of arrival in France. Throughout the analysis, these demographic structures will have a strong impact on the trajectories observed, whether in education, employment, family formation or housing.

---

\* INSEE.

\*\* INED.

(1) Sahelian Africa comprises Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal.

(2) West and Central Africa comprises Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (ex-Zaire), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo.

(3) Southeast Asia here comprises only Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

## 1 | Link with migration: an experience that does not only concern immigrants

The population living in metropolitan France is increasingly diverse as recent immigration waves have been added to the various strata of earlier waves.<sup>(4)</sup> To take account of the imprint left on the French population by immigration over time, we have reconstituted a “link with migration” embracing immigrants and the descendants of immigrants who, though they have not experienced migration themselves, have a direct relationship with that experience through one parent or both. But the experience of migration is not specific to immigrants and descendants of immigrants. Many French nationals have migrated in the course of their lives or come from families that migrated in earlier times (see Chapter 2, Migration: Immigrants and Others). This applies particularly to DOM native-borns, whose migration to metropolitan France, though it crosses no national boundaries, is an experience partly comparable to that of immigration. It also applies to French nationals born abroad, who are far more numerous than is generally realised. People most commonly think of these as French nationals who lived in the former colonial empire, in particular Algeria, who were repatriated after independence. But there are other ways in which French nationals come to live abroad, and this reminds us that France is not only a country of immigration but also to some extent a country of emigration. Such are the populations resulting from this “migratory diversity” which the Trajectories and Origins survey addresses.

Table 1 shows the breakdown between the main groups. Owing to sampling constraints, descendants of immigrants and of DOM native-borns were aged 18 to 50 whereas for all other categories ages 18 to 60 were covered. To allow proper comparison, Table 1 covers only the population aged 18 to 50. Within this age range, the mainstream population represents 76% of the population and the mainstream population without migrant parentage a little under 70%. Immigrants represent 10%, or 2.7 million people, while people with at least one immigrant parent represent nearly 12%, or 3.1 million people. Half of this latter group is of mixed parentage, highlighting the extent of population mixing within one generation. DOM native-borns living in metropolitan France number only 235,000 and descendants of DOM native-borns only 220,000. These are small figures compared to those of French nationals born abroad, repatriates and repatriates’ descendants. The 50-year age limit greatly reduced the proportion of repatriates, most of whom arrived (and were therefore born) before 1962; the youngest of them were over 47 years old at the time of the survey. To have included the 50-60 age group would have doubled the proportion of repatriates in the sample (269,000 in all). Repatriates’ descendants born in metropolitan France and aged 18-60 number 884,000 – a large number, evidencing the importance of the imprint of France’s colonial history on the make-up of its population. But it is doubtless the number of other French nationals born abroad (other than in former colonies) that is surprising. They constitute 1.5% of the population aged 18 to 50 and include slightly over 408,000 people, forming a significant category, as do their descendants born in France.

---

(4) Blanc-Chaléard M.-C., 2001, *Histoire de l’immigration*, La Découverte.

**Table 1 - Population aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France by link with migration**

	Males as % of category	Total as % of overall population	Weighted numbers (thousands)	Unweighted numbers
Immigrants	47	10	2,719	6,373
DOM native-borns	48	1	235	545
Descendants of two immigrant parents	50	6	1,591	4,627
Descendants of one immigrant parent	52	6	1,488	3,483
Descendants of DOM native-born parent(s)	50	1	220	650
Mainstream population, of which:	50	76	20,397	3,186
Repatriates	-	0	-	28
Other French nationals born outside metropolitan France	44	1	408	175
Descendants of repatriates	53	3	849	276
Descendants of other French nationals born outside metropolitan France	47	2	475	184
Mainstream population with no migrant parentage: descendants of French nationals born in metropolitan France	50	70	18,559	2,523
<b>Overall population aged 18-50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>26,651</b>	<b>18,864</b>

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Population aged 18-50 Population  
*Interpretation* • Immigrants represent 10% of the population aged 18-50 resident in metropolitan France. 47% of immigrants are men and 53% are women.  
*Note* • Numbers and sorted categories with fewer than 30 observations are censored because they are not robust.

## 2 | Immigrants and DOM native-borns

The immigrant population is already well known through the census and various other surveys.<sup>(5)</sup> However, it may be useful to remind the reader of the main demographic characteristics of the Trajectories and Origins respondents, as they may explain the differences between origin groups in the analysis below.

From the 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, women accounted for an ever-increasing proportion of the immigration flow. The sharp sex ratio imbalances of the early years of work-related immigration have practically disappeared. This trend is notable for immigration from Algeria, which is now even above parity. It is even more marked for immigration from West and Central Africa, with women constituting nearly 60% of immigrants, and for immigrants from the EU-27 countries (apart from Italy, Portugal and Spain). A high proportion of DOM native-born migrants are women, though this has been the case since the earliest inflows from the DOMs.

Age structure differs sharply between the groups studied. We should bear in mind that the immigrants and DOM native-borns in the survey were aged between 18 and 60 so that we are not observing the whole age range of those who arrived between the wars or shortly after World War II. Nonetheless, we find striking differences between those of Italian and Spanish origin, three-quarters of whom are over 45, and Turkish immigrants, almost half of whom are under 35. The other groups fall between these two extremes: DOM native-borns, immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria are proportionally the youngest (mean ages of 37 to 40.5 years), while immigrants from Portugal and Southeast Asia are found mainly

(5) Borrel C., 2006, "Près de 5 millions d'immigrés à la mi-2004", INSEE Première, 1098.

**Table 2 - Demographic characteristics of DOM native-borns and immigrants**

Département or country of birth	Percentage males	Age distribution in 2008 (%)				Age at arrival in metropolitan France (%)		Weighted numbers (thousands)	Unweighted numbers
		18- 25	26-35	36-45	46- 60	Before age 10	Age 10-16		
Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana	49	14	26	27	33	22	14	203	498
Réunion	44	16	29	22	33	21	10	88	214
<b>All DOM native-borns</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>291</b>	<b>712</b>
Algeria	49	9	25	31	35	25	11	481	889
Morocco and Tunisia	51	13	25	26	36	19	15	679	1,194
Sahelian Africa	47	14	28	32	26	9	6	137	665
West and Central Africa	41	17	30	29	24	12	17	238	736
Southeast Asia	52	3	23	29	45	25	20	116	774
Turkey	54	15	38	28	19	25	15	212	830
Portugal	51	6	9	32	53	33	19	414	847
Spain and Italy	52	2	9	16	73	56	14	216	485
Other EU-27 countries	38	8	22	30	40	11	6	381	754
Other countries	45	12	28	28	32	13	9	710	1,282
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3,583</b>	<b>8,456</b>
<b>Mainstream population</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>37</b>			<b>26,969</b>	<b>3,781</b>
<b>Overall population aged 18-60</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>35</b>			<b>34,699</b>	<b>21,761</b>

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008

Population • Immigrants, DOM native-borns and mainstream population aged 18-60.

Interpretation • 49% of immigrants born in Algeria are men, 25% of them were aged 26-35 and 25% were aged below 10 when they arrived in France.

in the age groups above 35 years (mean ages of 45.5 and 43.4 years, respectively).

Immigrants also differ by period of arrival and age on arrival. The variations are wide (see Chapter 2, Migration: Immigrants and Others). Age on arrival has a major impact on socialisation and future trajectories. Those who have lived in France from an early age experience very different situations from those who arrived as adults. Those who arrived as children are often called “generation 1.5” to indicate their position in between the “first generation” who arrived as adults and the “second generation”, the descendants born in France. Given the cut-off at age 60 in this survey, the great majority of those representing the earliest migration flows are of “generation 1.5”. In the survey, 70% of immigrants from Italy and Spain arrived before age 17, of whom 56% before age 10. Likewise, a large share of immigrants from Portugal arrived as children (52% before age 17). In comparison, quite a high proportion of immigrants from Algeria arrived as adults. This reflects the fact that the flow of immigration from Algeria is still ongoing, whereas it has slowed to a trickle from Italy, Portugal and Spain.

### 3 | Descendants of immigrants and of DOM native-borns

Representing nearly 12% of the population aged 18 to 50 in the survey, descendants of immigrants are on average younger than the mainstream population or immigrants. By definition, descendants of immigrants are born in France after their parents have settled there. There is a relationship between the origin of an immigrant population and the number of their descendants, but this relationship varies considerably



<b>Table 3 - Age distribution of descendants of immigrants or of DOM native-borns by parents' country of origin</b>					
Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrant or DOM native-born parent(s)	Age in 2008				Unweighted numbers
	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-50	
DOM	44	35	18	3	650
Algeria	29	37	28	6	1,306
Morocco and Tunisia	45	37	14	4	1,122
Sahelian Africa	62	30	8	0	480
West and Central Africa	55	31	12	3	333
Southeast Asia	54	30	11	5	573
Turkey	68	28	3	1	447
Portugal	35	41	23	1	933
Spain and Italy	15	26	36	22	1,692
Other EU-27 countries	20	26	33	21	649
Other countries	46	30	17	7	575
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8,110</b>
<b>Mainstream population</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>3,186</b>


*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Descendants of immigrants and of DOM native-borns and mainstream population aged 18-50.  
*Interpretation* • 29% of descendants of at least one Algerian immigrant parent are aged 18-25.

between different migration currents, particularly according to time of immigration wave, immigrants' family formation in France, family reunification and whether they returned to their country of origin. This type of relationship also applies between DOM native-borns and their descendants, who also constitute a young population (44% are 25 or younger).

Figure 1 shows the numbers of descendants of immigrants or of DOM native-borns according to origin of each parent. The descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe are the most numerous, followed by those of immigrants from North Africa. Limiting the field of observation to those aged under 51 further reduces the representation of descendants of the oldest immigration waves, those from Europe. As can be seen from Table 3, nearly 52% of descendants of immigrants from Italy and Spain are over 35, whereas over half of descendants of immigrants from Turkey, Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa are under 25.

The survey population can also be differentiated according to whether both parents were immigrants or only one. As we shall see throughout our analyses, the fact of having two immigrant parents or only one often has a major impact on education, access to work and in many social and cultural behaviours. Patterns differ widely in this respect. For descendants of immigrants from the EU 27 (excluding Italy, Portugal and Spain), 90% are of mixed parentage; for the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, this figure is only 10%. About a third of descendants have mixed parentage (see Glossary) and two-thirds have two immigrant parents. For the descendants of Italian and Spanish immigrants, however, the proportions are reversed: two-thirds with mixed parentage and one-third with two immigrant parents. Taking all origins together, half of all descendants are of mixed parentage, 20% having only an immigrant mother and 30% only an immigrant father.

**Figure 1 - Origin of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns by number of immigrant or DOM native-born parents**



#### 4 | Regional distribution of immigrants, DOM native-borns and their descendants

Among the population aged 18 to 50, over half of DOM native-borns and slightly more than 40% of immigrants live in the Île-de-France region, which is twice the percentage of the mainstream population (Table 4). This relative concentration concerns immigrants from Algeria, Portugal and Southeast Asia. It is highest for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, 60% of whom live in the Île-de-France region. The Duncan Segregation Index (see box) shows how different their territorial distribution is from that of the population as a whole. The current distribution of the oldest migration waves from Southern Europe still bears the traces of the initial settlement in areas near the country of origin: 53% of immigrants from Italy and Spain live in the south of France. Migrants from Turkey are concentrated in the regions closest to the German epicentre of their westward movement, i.e. France's eastern border regions (one-fifth of them in Alsace, Lorraine and Franche-Comté) and the Rhône corridor (a quarter in Rhône-Alpes and Auvergne).

The spatial distribution of immigrants' descendants reproduces, in diluted form, that of immigrants of the same origin. Slightly less than a third of all immigrants' descendants live in Île-de-France – a proportion twice as great as that of the mainstream population but ten percentage points less than that of immigrants. According to the Duncan Segregation Index, 12% would have to change regions to reproduce the distribution of immigrants of the same origin as their immigrant parents. The regional distribution of descendants of two immigrant parents is closer to that of immigrants than to that of the population as a whole, but the reverse is the case for descendants of only one immigrant parent. The descendants of immigrants from Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Algeria present the spatial distributions closest to those of immigrants of the same origin.

**Table 4 - Regional distribution of metropolitan population aged 18-50**

	Île-de-France	Centre North*	Nord - Pas-de-Calais	Alsace, Lorraine, Franche-Comté	North-west**	South-west***	Rhône-Alpes, Auvergne	Paca, Languedoc-Roussillon	Overall	Duncan/ metropolitan pop.	Duncan desc./ native-borns, given origin
<b>Country or département of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>											
DOM	54	11	1	4	6	10	7	7	100	33	
Algeria	40	10	5	8	3	4	17	12	100	24	
Morocco and Tunisia	36	11	4	8	3	8	10	20	100	24	
Sub-Saharan Africa	61	10	3	4	7	5	5	6	100	41	
Southeast Asia	49	9	1	7	5	8	14	6	100	31	
Turkey	27	13	1	20	6	3	24	7	100	29	
Portugal	42	13	2	4	4	13	14	9	100	25	
Spain and Italy	23	7	4	10	3	17	13	23	100	23	
Other EU-27 countries	32	5	8	14	6	9	8	18	100	24	
Other countries	52	7	1	6	5	7	10	10	100	31	
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>23</b>	
<b>Country or département of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>											
DOM	58	10	1	3	8	7	7	7	100	37	6
Algeria	33	10	7	9	3	6	19	14	100	21	8
Morocco and Tunisia	40	13	5	5	3	5	13	16	100	24	10
Sub-Saharan Africa	65	11	2	2	3	4	5	6	100	44	6
Southeast Asia	47	12	2	6	6	9	12	6	100	26	5
Turkey	21	15	1	20	2	4	34	3	100	34	13
Portugal	36	17	3	7	5	14	16	3	100	22	12
Spain and Italy	16	8	3	12	2	13	21	24	100	28	13
Other EU-27 countries	27	13	11	19	5	7	8	8	100	22	17
Other countries	47	9	3	10	3	9	16	14	100	29	8
<b>All descendants of immigrants</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>12</b>
Mainstream population	15	19	7	8	15	11	12	11	100	6	
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0</b>	

\* Centre North includes Bourgogne, Centre, Champagne-Ardenne, Picardie, Basse-Normandie and Haute-Normandie.

\*\* North-west includes Brittany, Pays de la Loire and Poitou-Charentes.

\*\*\* South-west includes Midi-Pyrénées, Limousin and Aquitaine.

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Population of metropolitan France aged 18-50.

Interpretation • 54% of DOM native-borns live in the Île-de-France region. To obtain a regional distribution of DOM native-borns identical to that of the overall population of metropolitan France, one third of DOM native-borns would have to be displaced (see definition of the Duncan index below).

### Box

#### **Duncan Segregation Index**

The Duncan Segregation Index:  $S_{1/2} = 50 * \sum_{i=1}^N |f_i - m_i|$  where N is the number of regions considered (8 in this case),  $f_i$  the percentage of population 1 living in region  $i$  and  $m_i$  the percentage of population 2 living in region  $i$ . This index gives the percentage of people who would have to be displaced from a region for the two groups compared to be identically distributed.



# Migration Is Not Only Immigration

*Cris Beauchemin* \*, *Catherine Borrel* \*\*, *Corinne Régard* \*\*\*

Twenty-one percent of the population aged 18 to 60 living in metropolitan France, or 7.2 million people, have lived outside that territory for at least a year. This figure includes 3.6 million immigrants and 1.7 million people having no in-migrants among their parents. There is a strong link between in-migrants' period of arrival and their geographical origin. Half of all Southeast Asian immigrants arrived within an eight year period, while migration from Algeria has been spread over a longer period, with 90% of Algerians arriving between 1968 and 2004, a time span of 36 years. For most origin groups, half of all immigrants arrived as adults and three-quarters before the age of 30; 89% of in-migrants did not stay in any other country before reaching metropolitan France.

## 1 | Not all migrants are immigrants

Immigrants are not the only people living in metropolitan France who have experienced migration beyond its borders. Nearly 7.2 million people aged 18 to 60 have lived outside metropolitan France for at least a year (Table 1). This migrant population (see box) consists mainly of people not born in metropolitan France. Of these, 50% or 3.6 million are immigrants, born abroad of foreign nationality. In addition there are 260,000 repatriates (4%), born French within the former French colonial empire; 290,000 DOM native-borns (4%); and 660,000 other persons born French outside metropolitan France (9%). The great majority of this latter group are of French nationality, born in foreign countries (e.g. descendants of expatriates). But some migrants are persons born in metropolitan France: 2.4 million metropolitan-borns have lived outside that territory for at least a year. About a quarter of these (630,000) have a parent born outside metropolitan France (410,000 descendants of immigrants and 220,000 descendants of other migrants). This leaves 1.7 million native-born French with no in-migrants among their direct ascendants who have lived abroad for at least a year (7% of this population group).

\* INED.

\*\* INSEE.

\*\*\* SSM-Immigration.

**Table 1 - Migrants living in metropolitan France (aged 18-60)**

		Number of persons who have migrated at least once (thousands)	Percentage of total migrants	Percentage of population that has migrated at least once	Unweighted numbers
Born outside metropolitan France (in-migrants)	Immigrants	3,583	50	100	8,456
	Repatriates	261	4	100	68
	Other French nationals born outside metropolitan France	662	9	100	223
	DOM native-borns	291	4	100	712
Born in metropolitan France	Descendants of immigrants	410	6	11	789
	Other French native-borns with migrant parentage	218	3	13	169
	Other French native-borns with no migrant parentage	1,747	24	7	207
<b>All migrants</b>		<b>7,181</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10,624</b>

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.


Population • Population aged 18-60.

Interpretation • 11% of descendants of immigrants, i.e. 410,000 persons, have lived for at least one year outside metropolitan France. They represent 6% of all migrants.

## 2 | The connection between in-migrants' arrival period and their origin

There is a sharp contrast between migration patterns from Algeria and from Southeast Asia (Figure 1). Algerian migration took place over a longer period: 90% of Algerians arrived between 1968 and 2004, a time span of 36 years. By contrast, 50% of Southeast Asian immigrants arrived in just eight years, from 1977 to 1985 – a highly concentrated period of exile migration. Immigration from sub-Saharan Africa is more recent: 50% of Africans from south of the Sahara arrived after 1995. Immigration from southern Europe – Italy, Portugal and Spain – goes back the furthest. Most of these people

**Figure 1 - Year of in-migrants' first arrival in metropolitan France (aged 18-60)**



Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Population aged 18-60.

Interpretation • For each group, the first date corresponds to the year in which 10% of the surveyed in-migrants had already arrived in metropolitan France (1st decile); the second mark corresponds to the 1st quartile (25% of in-migrants already arrived); the intermediate date corresponds to the median (50%); the following mark to the last quartile (75%); and the 3rd date to the 9th decile (90%): 50% of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa arrived between 1986 and 2001, and 25% arrived after that date.

**“Migration”: some definitions**

The Trajectories and Origins survey provides the data for analysing migration among all persons who were living in metropolitan France in late 2008 and early 2009.

The term “migration” here refers to any entry to or exit from metropolitan France for a stay of a year or more. For each of these migrations, year of entry and year of exit were recorded as well as the place of stay outside metropolitan France, whether foreign country, DOM or COM\*.

The term “migrant” refers to any person who has lived outside metropolitan France for at least a year. This category includes two types of people:

- those who started life outside metropolitan France before settling there. These “in-migrants” may be French by birth (repatriates, descendants of expatriates, DOM or COM native-borns) or not (these are then “immigrants” – see Glossary).
- those born in metropolitan France who had left and then returned (since they were living there at the time of the survey).

\* DOM: *Départements d’outre-mer* (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Réunion).  
COM: *Collectivités d’outre-mer* (other French overseas territories with a different administrative status).

arrived before the mid-1970s.<sup>(1)</sup> For those born French outside metropolitan France, this is quite an old migration wave (50% of 18-60 year-olds arrived before the 1960s) that is connected with France’s colonial past. In-migration by DOM native-borns is more recent, though half of these arrivals took place before 1985.

### 3 | Most migration takes place in adulthood


In most origin groups, 50% of immigrants arrived as adults, but three-quarters came before the age of 30 (Figure 2). A few groups, however, have different profiles. Immigrants from southern Europe, for example, had quite a low average age on arrival (50% of immigrants from Italy and Spain arrived before they were eight). This finding is linked to the nature of the survey population: since only those aged 18-60 in 2008-2009 were interviewed, those who arrived as adults in the 1950s and 1960s were automatically excluded. Those born French in foreign countries also arrived very young: half of them were under four years of age. These were either descendants of expatriates or repatriates entering metropolitan France when the colonies became independent in the early 1960s. Only the youngest of this group were included in the sample. Europeans other than those from Italy, Portugal and Spain were, on average, the oldest of all on arrival. This result probably reflects a particular migration pattern: perhaps older and more highly qualified people migrating for work. A further research stage should confirm or contradict this hypothesis.

### 4 | Few intermediate migration stages

Several studies of international migration highlight the varying complexity of migration trajectories, which can involve a number of stages in transit countries or

(1) The oldest arrived long before that date, but only those aged 18-60 are considered here. Because of the age limit imposed by the sample, the survey cannot give a full picture of the history of migration flows. For further details see Noiriél G., 1988, *Le creuset français*, Paris, Points Seuil, 441 p.

Figure 2 - Age of in-migrants at first entry to metropolitan France (aged 18-60)



a circular succession of return journeys.<sup>(2)</sup> In fact trajectories prior to entry to metropolitan France prove to be fairly simple: 89% of in-migrants came directly to metropolitan France. Slightly more immigrants (born abroad of foreign nationality) than persons born French outside metropolitan France have “complex” migration paths including at least one intermediate period in another country between their country of birth and France: 12% as against 7%. Because it takes into account only stays of a year or more, this measure underestimates the complexity of migration trajectories and transit migrations.<sup>(3)</sup>

## 5 | Circular migration

Apart from the first entry to metropolitan France, what circulation is there between metropolitan France and the rest of the world? The survey gives only a partial answer to this question. It does not measure emigration from metropolitan France because only persons resident there in 2008-2009 were interviewed. But it does give a count of those who had been away and back. Taking both metropolitan French native-borns who have spent at least a year elsewhere and in-migrants who have left and come back, 8% of people aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France at the time of the survey had left for at least a year and come back. The tendency varies between groups. On average, it is far more common among those born French outside metropolitan France (19%) than among immigrants (7%). Possible reasons for the difference are that it is harder for immigrants to come and go (foreign nationals have administrative formalities to complete in order to leave and return), that they have fewer professional opportunities (on average they have perhaps less chance of having an international career), or that few immigrants return to France if they go back to their home country for such a long stay. The likelihood of making such return trips varies according to origin (Figure 3). Among immigrant groups, those whose countries of origin are nearest (Europeans) are most likely to leave and come back. But the practice is also

(2) Simon G., 2008, *La planète migratoire dans la mondialisation*, Paris, A. Colin, 255 p.


(3) The one-year minimum duration is recommended by the UN for defining long-term migration.



widespread among French nationals born outside metropolitan France.


In the other groups, immigrants' offspring are more likely than their parents to leave and return. This difference is particularly striking among those of sub-Saharan African origin: 20% of their descendants had made at least one return trip – five times as many as for the first generation. This result may reflect two factors. Firstly, it is not uncommon for African couples to have a transnational relationship, with the mother and father living in different countries and the child going to and fro between them. Secondly, in African families, the child's education is not the sole responsibility of the parents and quite often a child is entrusted to one of its grandparents, uncles or aunts for a short or long period. This “fostering” system is common in Africa and seems to continue in the host country.<sup>(4)</sup> However, sub-Saharan Africans are not the only group in which minor children stay a while in their parents' home country (Figure 3). In nearly all groups, these return trips had mainly taken place in childhood or adolescence (Figure 4). These findings suggest that research should be done to find

**Figure 3 - Percentage of persons who have made at least one return trip out of metropolitan France**



(4) Barou J., 2001, “La famille à distance : nouvelles stratégies familiales chez les immigrants d’Afrique sahélienne”, *Hommes et migrations*, 1232, pp. 16-25.

out how far these stays outside metropolitan France disrupt the life course of in-migrants' descendants, particularly as regards schooling, further education and employment.



# Between Here and There: a Glimpse of “Transnational” Practices in the Population Living in Metropolitan France

*Cris Beauchemin* \*, *Hugues Lagrange* \*\*, *Mirna Safi* \*\*\*

One-third of those interviewed for the Trajectories and Origins survey agreed that “to be accepted in France you have to forget your origins”. This reflects the assimilationist idea that to integrate, immigrants and their descendants must break their ties with their country of origin. On the other hand co-development policies, currently enjoying a boom in France and the European Union, seek to make migrants the chief players in developing their home countries’ economies. Caught between these contradictory pressures immigrants must choose between here and there. What can be said today of transnational practices among immigrants living in metropolitan France?

## 1 | Immigrants are not the only ones with “transnational” practices

The concept of “transnationalism” took shape in the 1990s to identify the set of social, economic and political practices through which immigrants maintain close links with their countries of origin.<sup>(1)</sup> These transnational lifestyles are considered to have spread thanks to globalisation, which has vastly increased the circulation of information and possibilities for travel and capital transfers between countries. But globalisation does not only affect immigrants. A debate has emerged about the transmission of such practices to their descendants. Furthermore, the extent of this transnationalism should be compared to similar practices among those who are neither immigrants nor descendants of immigrants. In this paper we therefore extend the notion of transnationalism to cover all practices taking place outside metropolitan France among people living there, regardless of their nationality. Not surprisingly,

\* INED.

\*\* CNRS/OSC-Sciences Po.

\*\*\* Sciences Po, OSC, CNRS and LSQ, Crest, INSEE.

(1) Glick-Schiller N. et al., 1995, “From immigrant to transmigrant: Theorizing transnational migration”, *Anthropological Quarterly*, 68(1), pp. 48-63. • Portes A., Guarnizo E. et al., 1999, “The study of transnationalism: Pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2), pp. 217-237.

immigrants have more frequent contact with the world outside metropolitan France than do other population groups (Table 1). In some fields, however, their descendants are proportionally almost as transnational as they are. Thus 9% of immigrants and 7% of their offspring contribute to collective projects for building amenities such as schools, clinics and places of worship in the country of origin. And 14% of immigrants and 13% of their descendants say they want to leave metropolitan France and live elsewhere. But the results for other population groups put the extent of these behaviours in perspective. DOM native-borns, for example, show a similar degree of transnationalism as immigrants and sometimes even higher: 44% want to go and live outside metropolitan France. Of other French nationals born outside metropolitan France (repatriates and those born French in foreign countries), 18% say they want to live outside metropolitan France and they also rate high on other measures of transnationalism. Lastly, those born in France without migrant direct ascendants show how commonplace some practices are outside metropolitan France: 7% of them want to live elsewhere than in metropolitan France and 29% say they have personal contact (by phone, email etc.) with friends or relations living outside metropolitan France. Some transnational activities are mainly practiced by immigrants and to a lesser extent their descendants, particularly on the economic side: financial help to households, ownership of land or real estate.

## **2 | Immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa are the champions of financial transfers**

Not all immigrant groups display the same degree of commitment to their place of origin. Immigrants from Italy, Portugal, Spain and Southeast Asia score lowest (Table 1). Those from Italy, Portugal and Spain make almost no financial transfers, whether personal or collective. Immigrants from Southeast Asia are the group with the fewest personal contacts outside metropolitan France, are least often owners of a house outside metropolitan France, show the least involvement in the political life of their region of origin and express the least desire to leave metropolitan France. The tragic circumstances of emigration from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have resulted in many immigrants making a clear break with their country of origin. As regards the Europeans, their low level of transnational commitment may be due to the good economic situation of their countries of origin (compared to Southern countries), or to the more individualistic nature of social norms in Europe, or to the fact that most respondents who came from Italy or Spain arrived as children. Immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey rank highest in this table. As regards financial transfers, immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa score twice the average for other origin groups, with 34% regularly sending money to a household and 17% contributing to a collective project. Migrants from the Sahel display even more commitment than those from West and Central Africa. Among immigrants from the Sahel, 23% own property outside metropolitan France and 21% have donated to a collective project, compared to 14% property ownership and 15% project participation for those from West and Central Africa. What explains the strength of this collective and personal solidarity? The fact that immigration from these countries is relatively recent may be a factor (see Chapter 2, Migration: Immigrants and Others), as may the fact that households in these countries are poorer, as are the countries themselves. But above all, it may be due to specific social structures that bind individuals closely to their roots. The extended family remains the basic socio-economic unit and the village of origin a touchstone and a place where solidarity is

**Table 1 - Indicators of transnationalism of population living in metropolitan France (%)**

	Desire to leave metropolitan France and live elsewhere	Personal contacts outside metropolitan France by letter, phone or internet	Ownership of property or land outside metropolitan France	Regular financial support to a household outside metropolitan France	Financial contribution to a collective project in the region of origin	Interest in political life in the region of origin
All immigrants	14	88	17	14	9	67
All descendants of immigrants	13	58	4	3	7	5
Native-born with no migrant parentage	7	29	1	1	-	-
<b>In-migrants' country or <i>département</i> of birth</b>						
Algeria	7	86	11	1	7	67
Morocco and Tunisia	1	89	17	15	9	62
Sub-Saharan Africa	24	92	17	34	17	7
Southeast Asia	9	65	2	9	14	45
Turkey	11	93	2	8	13	72
Portugal	19	79	22	5	4	54
Spain and Italy	18	79	6	2	3	66
Other EU-27 countries	16	94	16	9	5	77
Rest of world	16	9	2	16	11	74
DOM	44	89	11	6	7	64
Other French nationals born outside metropolitan France	18	67	8	1	4	47
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of parents of descendants of in-migrants</b>						
Algeria	11	52	4	3	9	56
Morocco and Tunisia	17	69	6	5	12	47
Sub-Saharan Africa	26	7	8	9	16	62
Southeast Asia	17	53	1	2	1	45
Turkey	17	76	6	3	17	64
Portugal	9	6	4	2	4	42
Spain and Italy	9	51	2	1	1	48
Other EU-27 countries	11	54	1	2	2	49
Rest of world	23	68	6	4	1	59
DOM	22	73	4	1	3	58
Other French nationals born outside metropolitan France	12	39	0	2	3	35

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Scope • Population aged 18-50.

Interpretation • 14 % of immigrants would like to leave metropolitan France and live elsewhere.

maintained.<sup>(2)</sup> Migration can be seen as a strategy for diversifying family and community income, through which migrants are “sent out” and are expected, under an implicit understanding, to contribute to the reproduction of the family and the community.<sup>(3)</sup>

(2) Findley S., 1997, “Migration and Family Interactions in Africa”, in Adepoju A., *Family, Population and Development*, London, Zed Books, pp. 109-138.

(3) Guilmo C., 1997, “Migrations en Afrique de l’Ouest, effets d’échelle et déterminants”, in Gastellu J.-M. and Marchal J.-Y., *La ruralité dans les pays du Sud à la fin du XXe siècle*, Paris, ORSTOM, pp. 495-530.

Quiminal C., 1991, *Gens d’ici, gens d’ailleurs : migrations Soninké et transformations villageoises*, Paris, Christian Bourgeois, 222 p.

### 3 | Who is “transnational”?

For the most part, descendants of in-migrants reproduce their parents’ transnational commitments, though to a lesser extent (Table 1). But the factors leading them to invest socially, economically and symbolically outside metropolitan France are often different (Table 2). Only the level of education almost routinely plays a significant and similar role for in-migrants and their descendants. Except for property ownership, the more educated a person is, the more her/his interest focuses beyond metropolitan France. This result should modify certain ideas that contrast integration with transnationalism. The most educated people are the most transnational, but they are also those who have the best potential for integrating in the labour market.

The main difference between the first and second generation is the gender effect. Male in-migrants are almost always more likely than female in-migrants to report transnational practices (Table 2). But this does not apply to in-migrants’ descendants. Women born and growing up in metropolitan France have the same transnational commitment as their brothers.

Nor does income play the same role for the two generations. Among in-migrants, provision of financial help increases with income: those with high or intermediate incomes are more likely to send financial help to households outside metropolitan France, while for the descendants, income has no impact on aid to households. This might be because of a “reactive transnationalism”<sup>(4)</sup> among in-migrants’ descendants, i.e. a defensive reaction against the difficulty of integrating in metropolitan France.

### 4 | Discrimination and transnational practices

The relationship between integration and transnationalism is a complex one. The assimilationist model postulates that relations with the country of origin hamper integration. Conversely, some authors argue that only the most integrated immigrants are in a position to practice the material and political aspects of transnationalism<sup>(5)</sup>. Others have shown that failure to integrate can lead people to fall back on their country of origin, where immigrants and their descendants seek social and economic recognition which they do not find in destination places.<sup>(6)</sup>

The survey provides a basis for exploring this hypothesis by measuring the association between intensity of transnational practices and experience of discrimination, according to origin. It emerges clearly that the more “transnational” people are, the more they report having experienced discrimination (Figure 1). Of descendants of in-migrants who have no links abroad, 10% report having suffered discrimination in the past five years; that figure is six times higher for those who have nine or more transnational practices. In the first generation, reported discrimination increases to a lesser extent according to intensity of transnationalism. This result suggests that, for the second generation even more than for the first, transnationalism reflects a reaction against the discrimination they may suffer in the host society. This hypothesis needs to be validated by more thorough-going empirical analyses.

---

(4) Itzigsohn J. and Saucedo S. G., 2002, “Immigrant incorporation and socio-cultural transnationalism”, *International Migration Review*, 36(3), pp.766-798.

(5) Portes A., 2003, “Conclusion: Theoretical convergencies and empirical evidence in the study of immigrant transnationalism”, *International Migration Review*, 37, pp. 874-892.

(6) Itzigsohn and Saucedo, *op. cit.*

**Table 2 - Factors associated with transnational practices among in-migrants**

	Desire to leave metropolitan France and live elsewhere	Personal contacts outside metropolitan France by letter, phone or internet	Ownership of property or land outside metropolitan France	Regular financial support to a household outside metropolitan France	Financial contribution to a collective project in the region of origin	Interest in political life in the region of origin						
<b>Models for in-migrants</b>												
<i>Sex (ref.: male)</i>												
Female	1.0	1.2	*	0.8	**	0.6	***	0.7	***	0.9	**	
<i>Educational level (ref.: primary)</i>												
Lower secondary	1.1	1.1		0.8	**	1.1		1.2		1.4	***	
Upper secondary	1.0	1.4	*	0.8	*	1.0		1.3		1.6	***	
Higher education	1.3	**	1.7	***	0.9	1.2	*	1.5	***	2.6	***	
<i>Income (ref.: below €800)</i>												
€800-€1199	1.0		1.1		1.1		1.4	***	1.2		1.1	
€1200-€1799	1.5	***	1.1		1.3	**	1.6	***	1.2		1.0	
€1800 and above	1.4	***	1.3		1.2		1.6	***	0.9		1.1	
<i>Age (ref.: 18-25)</i>												
26-35	0.7	***	2.1	***	2.0	***	2.7	***	1.6	**	1.0	
36-45	0.6	***	3.5	***	4.1	***	4.0	***	1.9	***	1.2	*
46-50	0.6	***	5.2	***	6.2	***	5.2	***	1.6	*	1.5	***
<i>Date of arrival in metropolitan France (ref.: before 1974)</i>												
Between 1975 and 1983	1.7	***	2.3	***	2.1	***	4.8	***	4.1	***	1.3	**
Between 1984 and 1997	2.1	***	7.7	***	3.3	***	9.9	***	3.9	***	2.2	***
1998 and after	2.0	***	20.7	***	5.0	***	13.7	***	2.6	***	3.0	***
<b>Models for in-migrants' descendants</b>												
<i>Sex (ref.: male)</i>												
Female	0.9		1.2	***	0.9		1.2		0.9		1.0	
<i>Educational level (ref.: primary)</i>												
Vocational lower secondary	1.0		1.3	***	1.0		1.0		1.3		1.3	***
Upper secondary	1.1		1.7	***	1.4		1.1		1.3		1.8	***
Higher education	1.2		2.3	***	1.3		1.7	*	1.9	***	2.4	***
<i>Income (ref.: below €800)</i>												
€ 800-€ 1199	0.8	**	1.2	*	1.0		1.1		1.0		1.0	
€ 1200-€ 1799	0.8	*	1.1		0.6	*	0.9		0.9		0.8	**
€1800 and above	1.0		1.3	***	0.9		1.1		1.0		1.0	
<i>Age (ref.: 18-25)</i>												
26-35	0.6	***	0.7	***	1.0		2.0	***	1.1		0.9	
36-45	0.4	***	0.6	***	1.0		1.5	*	0.7	**	0.9	
46-50	0.2	***	0.4	***	1.2		1.3		0.5	**	1.0	
<i>Parents' origin (ref.: 2 in-migrants from same country)</i>												
Two in-migrants from different countries	1.1		0.7	***	0.8		0.7		0.6	***	0.7	***
One in-migrant (mother)	1.1		0.5	***	0.3	***	0.3	***	0.3	***	0.6	***
One in-migrant (father)	1.0		0.4	***	0.3	***	0.3	***	0.3	***	0.6	***

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008


Scope • In-migrants (immigrants, DOM native-borns and other French nationals born outside metropolitan France) aged 18-50 (N=7121); and descendants of in-migrants aged 18-50 (N=8760).

Methodology • Logistic models. The results are expressed as odds ratios. All the variables of the model are presented in the table. The results of the “missing data” categories of the income and education variables are not shown.

Interpretation • For each variable, the different categories can be compared with the reference category (Ref.). All other things being equal, a value above 1 indicates that a variable has a positive effect on the risk of having a transnational practice, while a value below 1 indicates a negative effect. The symbols to the right of the value indicate whether the difference between the observed category and the reference category (1 by definition) is statistically significant; The higher the number of asterisks, the greater the significance of the result. If there is no asterisk, the difference with respect to the reference category is not statistically significant.

Legend • \*\*\*: p<0.01; \*\*: p<0.05; \*: p<0.10.

**Figure 1 - Proportion of persons reporting experience of discrimination due to national origin in the last five years by level of transnational engagement**



Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Scope • In-migrants and descendants of immigrants aged 18-50

Methodology • The transnationalism score is the sum of transnational practices, with one point being given for each of the following practices: land or property ownership, investment in a business, regular financial support to a household, participation in a collective project, personal contacts (telephone, etc.), visits to the country, use of media, interest in politics, desire to be buried outside metropolitan France, desire to leave metropolitan France and live elsewhere, sense of belonging to country of origin or parents' country of origin.

Interpretation • 35% of immigrants with a transnationalism score of at least 9 points report experience of discrimination in the last 5 years.



# Diversity of Linguistic Practices

*Stéphanie Condon* \*, *Corinne Régnard* \*\*

The diversity of linguistic practices in France is reflected in the survival of regional languages and patois as well as in the variety of foreign languages spoken by migrants and their descendants.<sup>(1)</sup> The transmission of languages is therefore an important issue in intergenerational relations. For migrants, learning the mainstream language is a key factor for integration, whether for access to the labour market and services or for integrating into new social networks. The Trajectories and Origins survey provides data for examining language transmission practices in the population living in metropolitan France, regardless of origin. It shows that quite a significant proportion of individuals had had a multilingual childhood. These preliminary results concern family multilingualism and the role of French in family language transmission. We also consider immigrants' command of French.

## 1 | Multilingualism in childhood and reception of French in the family

In this study multilingualism is defined as reported reception of two or more languages from parents<sup>(2)</sup> and occurs in all migrant groups. In the survey sample only one in ten of the mainstream population aged 18 to 50 living in metropolitan France said they had been multilingual as children, compared to 39% of immigrants and 49% of descendants of immigrants. Six out of ten DOM native-borns said they were multilingual (Table 1).

Quite a high proportion of immigrants from West and Central Africa, Sahelian Africa and Algeria said they were multilingual as children. There are at least two possible explanations for this. Several languages (e.g. different forms of Arabic and Kabyle in Algeria) or dialects (in sub-Saharan Africa) coexist in these countries, so

\* INED.

\*\* SSM-Immigration.

(1) On the diversity of languages practised in France see Héran F., Filhon A., Deprez C., 2002, "Language transmission in France in the course of the 20th century", *Population & Societies*, 376.

Héran F., Filhon A., Deprez C., 2005, "La transmission familiale des langues", in Lefèvre C. & Filhon A. (eds.), *Histoires de familles, histoires familiales*, Paris, Ined, Cahier de l'Ined 156, pp. 505-569.

(2) "Received" languages are those in which respondents say their parents talked to them when they were children. The questions were as follows: "In what language or languages did your mother (father) talk to you when you were a child?" Two possible answers (so four languages maximum). We therefore use the terms "received languages" and "reception of" a language.

that multilingualism in childhood is quite common. Secondly, most of these countries<sup>(3)</sup> were formerly under French administration and the French language was widely practised and taught for a number of years at least. It may thus have been passed on to the child alongside one or more native languages of the parents' home country or countries.

Multilingualism among immigrants from Portugal, a linguistically homogeneous country, is mainly to be explained by the fact that many of these migrants arrived in France as children, so that it was partly or entirely in French that they were socialised and were taught at school. For other groups, French played a lesser part in the development of multilingualism. Examples are immigrants from Turkey, among whom the Kurdish and Armenian minority languages are found alongside Turkish, and from Southeast Asia, where migrants and their descendants continue to speak Chinese languages.

The multilingualism of DOM native-borns highlights the coexistence of French (the official language) with Creole.

Migrants' descendants are no less multilingual. Six out of ten descendants of immigrants from Sahelian Africa (61%) report a multilingual childhood. Similar proportions are found among descendants of immigrants from North Africa, and slightly lower proportions (52%) among descendants of immigrants from Portugal and Turkey. It is the descendants of immigrants from West and Central Africa that have the lowest rates of multilingualism; most grow up with no other language than French, as we shall see below.

Multilingualism among migrants' descendants is largely due to the use of French in the family during childhood. Descendants of DOM native-borns are in the lead in this regard, having all come from French-speaking families: all (100%) had received French at home and 53% were multilingual in childhood. Among immigrants' descendants, more than eight in ten (and more than nine in ten for descendants of immigrants from Algeria, Italy, Spain and West and Central Africa) received French

**Table 1 - Multilingualism during childhood and reception of French by link to migration (%)**

Département or country of birth of the respondent or of at least one of his/her parents	Migrants			Descendants of migrants		
	Multilingual	Reception of French	Unweighted numbers	Multilingual	Reception of French	Unweighted numbers
DOM	59	85	545	53	100	650
Algeria	55	53	673	57	92	1,306
Morocco and Tunisia	41	31	908	59	86	1,122
Sahelian Africa	55	34	558	61	84	480
West and Central Africa	64	66	651	27	98	333
Southeast Asia	28	17	529	48	82	573
Turkey	23	6	727	52	59	447
Portugal	27	25	547	52	88	933
Spain and Italy	37	21	219	40	93	1,692
Other EU-27 countries	24	30	542	37	97	649
Other countries	33	21	1,019	50	91	575

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
 Scope • Persons aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France.  
 Interpretation • 59% of DOM native-born migrants to metropolitan France had a parent (parents) who spoke at least two languages to them during their childhood.  
 Multilingual = at least two reported childhood languages.  
 Reception of French = presence of French among reported languages received in childhood.

(3) Except Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria.

at home in childhood (Table 1). Descendants of immigrants from Turkey are the exception, with less use of French in the home during childhood. This may partly be because many parents had not sufficiently mastered French to use it at home when their offspring were children.

## 2 | Immigration and command of the French language

Not surprisingly, immigrants had a more fluent command of French as a whole (oral and written)<sup>(4)</sup> at the time of the survey than when they arrived in France (Table 2).

The fact of coming from a French-speaking country has a direct impact on the level of knowledge of the language on arrival. Thus very few immigrants from Portugal (3%), Turkey (3%), Italy and Spain (8%) and Southeast Asia (9%) said they were proficient in French on arrival in France. Because African countries formerly under French administration have retained the use of French, many immigrants from Africa had a very good command of the language when they arrived: West and Central Africa 77%, Sahelian Africa 53% and North Africa 44%. European migrants other than South Europeans are in an intermediate position: quite a high proportion, especially among women (36%), had a command of French before they arrived.

Gender gaps are sharpest among immigrants from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. In these groups fewer women than men said they had a good or very good command of French on arriving in France. This is possibly due to women's under-estimation of their skills as well as differences in education. Higher proportions of women from Italy, Spain and other EU 27 countries said they had a good command of French on arrival.

Improvement in French language skills depends on many factors, including the

<i>Table 2 - Percentage of immigrants with a good or very good level of French at their arrival in metropolitan France and at the time of the survey</i>						
Country of birth	Men			Women		
	Good or very good reported level...			Good or very good reported level...		
	at arrival in France	at time of survey	Unweighted numbers	at arrival in France	at time of survey	Unweighted numbers
Algeria	52	84	330	44	72	395
Morocco and Tunisia	47	77	536	36	64	532
Sahelian Africa	58	73	293	48	58	310
West and Central Africa	82	95	254	73	90	368
Southeast Asia	11	72	347	8	50	336
Turkey	4	38	403	3	37	355
Portugal	3	50	354	4	54	347
Spain and Italy	5	78	168	12	75	180
Other EU-27 countries	21	63	216	36	78	404
Other countries	24	65	513	25	65	654
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>3,414</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>3,881</b>

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Scope* • Immigrants aged 18-60 living in metropolitan France, who arrived after age 3 and for whom French was not received at home or was not the only language received during childhood.  
*Interpretation* • 52% of immigrant men from Algeria reported having a good or very good level of French (speaking, understanding, reading and writing) at the time of their arrival in France, and 84% at the time of the survey.

(4) This practice is analysed for immigrants aged 18-60 living in metropolitan France, who arrived after the age of three and did not receive French at home or for whom French was not the only language received in childhood.

level on arrival, the context in which French is used, duration of stay and age on arrival. Obviously, the proportion who have improved is lower for those groups in which a high proportion knew French well on arrival. Thus many men and women from Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey had made progress in French (oral especially, but also written) (Table 3). Taking French classes had probably been a great help, at least for immigrants from Turkey, 42% of whom had taken classes. Age on arrival is determinant in this regard since going to school in France, even for a few years, gives a command of written French that is hard to achieve for immigrants who arrive at a later age and have not learned French in their country of origin.

Although men and women still differed in fluency at the time of the survey, women from North and sub-Saharan Africa had made progress in written French as often as the men, and more often in spoken French. Women's progress in spoken French is largely to be explained by the need to practise French not only in their neighbourhood and with the administration, but also with teachers and the parents of their children's classmates – in short, in their role as mediators. Once the women have learned French outside the home, French is more often used in the family setting as the children grow up.

**Table 3 - Percentage of immigrants who improved their level of French between their arrival in metropolitan France and the time of the survey**

Country of birth	Men			Women		
	have improved *...			have improved *...		
	their written French	their spoken French	Unweighted numbers	their written French	their spoken French	Unweighted numbers
Algeria	33	41	330	32	45	395
Morocco and Tunisia	36	44	536	35	51	532
Sahelian Africa	22	30	293	26	43	310
West and Central Africa	12	12	254	16	15	368
Southeast Asia	71	82	347	62	81	336
Turkey	76	87	403	73	88	355
Portugal	83	92	354	87	93	347
Spain and Italy	87	87	168	80	83	180
Other EU-27 countries	54	62	216	52	54	404
Other countries	61	68	513	60	66	654
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>3,414</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>3,881</b>

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Scope* • Immigrants aged 18-60 living in metropolitan France, who arrived after age 3 and for whom French was not the only language transmitted by their parents during childhood.  
 \* The improvements concern all immigrants who report a level of spoken French (speaking and understanding) and written French (reading and writing) at the time of the survey which is higher than the level at their arrival in France.  
*Interpretation* • 33% of immigrant men from Algeria have improved their spoken French (speaking and understanding) since their arrival in France, and 41% have improved their written French (reading and writing).

### 3 | Inherited languages: family languages of immigrants' descendants

The rates of multilingualism among immigrants' descendants (detailed in section 1) show the extent to which foreign languages are maintained in the family setting. The linguistic inheritance of descendants with two immigrant parents is markedly different from that of descendants of mixed couples (Table 4).

More than half of descendants with at least one immigrant parent reported that one or both of their parents talked to them in a foreign language when they were children. This proportion is over three-quarters for descendants with two immigrant

parents, with the notable exception of descendants of immigrants from West and Central Africa, 72% of whom were raised exclusively in French. Exclusive use of a foreign language was only reported by a minority of descendants of immigrants: about one in five of those whose parents came from Italy, Spain, Morocco, Portugal, sub-Saharan Africa or Tunisia, and a third of those whose parents came from Southeast Asia or Turkey. These parents talked to their children in their main language of communication, that of their region of origin. Their age on arrival in France and their level of knowledge of French undeniably play a part in the maintenance of foreign languages.

In these families as in others, the use of French becomes gradually more habitual, both because the children are using it to address each other and their parents, and because one or both parents are becoming more fluent in the language. The data do not tell us how the different languages alternate in different conversational contexts between parents and children.<sup>(5)</sup> However, respondents who had said they had received two languages were asked to say which was the most used in the family. Between 40% and two-thirds of descendants who were multilingual in childhood said it was the language other than French that was most used. The highest proportions in this regard are for descendants of parents from Turkey (69%) and Southeast Asia

<b>Tableau 4 - Languages spoken by parents to descendants of immigrants (%)</b>				
Country of birth of both parents of descendants of immigrants	Languages used by parents			Unweighted numbers
	French only	One or more other languages only	Combination French/ other language	
Algeria	17	11	72	883
Algeria - France	73	1	26	426
Morocco and Tunisia	11	19	70	830
Morocco and Tunisia - France	73	1	26	293
Sahelian Africa	15	20	65	386
Sahelian Africa - France	60	1	39	95
West and Central Africa	72	2	26	211
West and Central Africa - France	88	0	12	123
Southeast Asia	11	30	59	371
Southeast Asia - France	70	2	28	202
Turkey	27	33	40	448
Portugal	14	19	67	633
Portugal - France	79	1	20	302
Spain and Italy	26	19	55	596
Spain and Italy - France	73	0	27	1,110
Other EU-27 countries - France	62	2	36	673
Other countries	22	20	58	237
Other countries - France	67	0	33	342
<b>All descendants of immigrants</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>8,161</b>
<b>Mainstream population</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3,020</b>
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>21,761</b>

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Scope* • Persons aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France.  
*Interpretation* • 72% of descendants of immigrants of Algerian origin reported that their parents spoke to them in French and in another language (mainly Arabic and/or Berber) during their childhood.  
*Note* • The category "Spain and Italy" signifies "Having two parents born in Spain or two parents born in Italy", and the category "West and Central Africa - France" signifies one parent born in France and one born in West or Central Africa.

(5) See Deprez C., 1994, Les enfants bilingues : langues et familles, Paris, Didier, Credif ; Filhon A., 2009, *Langues d'ici et d'ailleurs. Transmettre l'arabe et le berbère en France*, Paris, INED, Cahier de l'Ined, 163.

(66%). Portuguese is mentioned as the most commonly used language in the family by 55% of descendants of immigrants from Portugal who also received French. Frequent contact between the family and a contact circle or neighbours from the same country as the parents can reinforce the use of a foreign language in the family.<sup>(6)</sup>

Multilingualism in childhood concerns a wide range of situations,<sup>(7)</sup> from oral use in the family only to command of the written language, learned from taking classes or from various media. For those who learn a foreign language from their family, the level of command reported at the time of the survey varies according to the main foreign language received and whether or not the parents are a mixed couple. Thus 68% of descendants of two immigrant parents born in Algeria who learned Arabic at home say they speak it well and 15% can write it, while 57% of those who learned Berber say they have a good command of it but only 5% can write it (Berber classes are not widely available). Regular visits to the parents' country of origin helps immigrants' descendants learn their parents' language. Of those with two immigrant parents from Portugal who learned Portuguese in the family, 83% speak it easily and 60% can also write in it. Of those with two parents from Turkey who learned Turkish at home 96% speak it well and 81% can write it. Access to classes greatly helps in acquiring a level of proficiency in the written language; about half of these two groups had taken classes. Descendants of two parents from sub-Saharan Africa or from Southeast Asia who received a foreign language language or dialect at home report similar levels of command of that language: in both cases 54% say they speak the language well and a quarter (25% and 27% respectively) say they understand it but have difficulty speaking it.

Mixed parentage is a decisive factor for transmission of both French and a foreign language in the family (Table 4). In this survey there were too few descendants with one parent born in France who had received a foreign language in the family to allow an analysis of the level of command of that language. Exceptions were those with one parent born in Spain, Italy or another country of the EU 27.

Of those who had received Spanish in such families, 64% had reached a good level, including 46% who could write it (60% had taken classes). Of those who received German, 87% had taken German classes, 82% spoke it well and 51% could write it. Almost all descendants having received English could write it. English, German and Spanish are taught at school and regarded as useful for education and in the labour market; with parental transmission, half the descendants learned the language in the family.

---

(6) Simon P., 1996, "Pratiques linguistiques et consommation médiatique" in Tribalat M. (ed.), *De l'immigration à l'assimilation: enquête sur les populations d'origine étrangère en France*, Paris, La Découverte-INED, pp. 188-213.

(7) See Condon S. and Régnard C., "Héritage et pratiques linguistiques des descendants d'immigrés en France", *Hommes et Migrations*, October 2010, forthcoming.

## Educational Attainment of Immigrants and their Descendants

*Laure Moguérou* \*, *Yaël Brinbaum* \*\*, *Jean-Luc Primon* \*\*\*

In recent years successive publications on the social destiny of immigrants in France have highlighted the improving educational levels of new cohorts. At the same time the school careers and educational levels of immigrants' children have been a subject of debate for several decades. The Trajectories and Origins survey provides the data needed to reconstitute the educational levels of these different populations by comparison with the mainstream population and to improve understanding of what happens in the labour market afterwards.

The analysis shows that educational levels vary widely according to origin, depending on the period of arrival of the migration flow concerned and the reason for admission. These differences also reflect the degree of progress in formal education in the countries of origin. However, immigrants' educational levels do not exactly mirror prevailing levels in their countries of origin. Migrants – women especially – prove to be better qualified than non-migrants. It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that migrants are disproportionately selected from among the better educated.

The differences between the mainstream population and the immigrant population are greater than those between the mainstream population and immigrants' descendants. But among descendants of immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey the proportion of men with low or no qualifications is almost twice as high as for the mainstream population. The educational advantage of girls over boys, first highlighted in the 1990s among the general population, is confirmed among immigrants' descendants regardless of origin, except for those whose parents came from Turkey.

---

\*Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense (UPO), associate researcher, INED.

\*\*Université de Bourgogne, IREDU, associate researcher, INED.

\*\*\*Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (UNS), researcher, URMIS

## 1 | The proportion of those in higher education at the time of the survey varies according to their link with immigration

The results shown below concern persons aged 18-50 who had completed their initial education. The aim is to show the variation in educational levels according to sex and country or region of origin of the respondents or their parents. These data do not exactly reflect the education levels achieved by the entire population because at the time of the survey a significant proportion of the respondents were still studying.<sup>(1)</sup>

From the survey, 10% of the population of metropolitan France aged 18-50 are students. This is the case for 7% of immigrants, 16% of descendants of immigrants and 20% of descendants of DOM native-borns. These differences partly reflect the considerable differences in age between sub-populations, resulting from the history of migration flows into metropolitan France. The median age (the age that splits a population into two equal parts) is 36 for the mainstream population. For immigrants it is 37, but it falls to 31 for descendants of immigrants and 27 for descendants of DOM native-borns. Since the latter two sub-populations are much younger than the immigrants or the mainstream population, it is logical that more of them should have been students at the time of the survey.<sup>(2)</sup> As a result, for these two groups the proportion leaving the education system early appears higher than in reality.

## 2 | Immigrants' educational levels are rising

Table 1 shows the breakdown of immigrants and DOM native-borns aged 18-50 compared to the mainstream population according to the highest qualification achieved in initial education. Respondents are divided into five main groups: those with no qualifications (including those who never went to school), those with low qualifications (primary or lower secondary school certificates), those with vocational lower secondary qualifications (CAP-BEP), those who have completed upper secondary school (baccalauréat or equivalent), and those with a degree in higher education.<sup>(3)</sup>

The percentage of persons with no qualifications or only primary or lower secondary school certificates (CEP, BEPC) is 17% in the mainstream population but 39% on average among immigrants aged 18-50 (65% among immigrants from Sahelian Africa, 60% among those from Turkey, 57% among those from Portugal, 45% among those from Morocco and Tunisia and 43% among those from Algeria). So the variation according to origin is wide.

One reason for this wide variation is that different migration flows arrived in different decades. Among immigrants aged 18-60 who arrived in France before 1974 aged 17 or over, 76% have low or no qualifications and only 11% have degrees in higher education. By contrast, among immigrants in the same age range who emigrated in the same conditions but after 1998, only 40% have low qualifications (primary or lower secondary school) or none and 34% have a degree in higher education (Table 2). The educational level of immigrants has thus risen over time, a

---

(1) Furthermore, the proportion of persons continuing their studies does not exactly match the proportion of persons declaring themselves students or apprentices when asked to define their main situation at the time of the survey. For some of them their studies are not their main activity, while others have completed their initial education but are pursuing adult education or in-house training.

(2) Taking all groups together, 20% of 18-35 year olds were continuing their initial education, whereas fewer than 1% of those aged 36-50 were still in education.

(3) These groupings are comparable to those given by INSEE for the census and labour force surveys.



**Table 1 - Educational level of immigrants and DOM native-borns aged 18-50 who have completed their education, by country/département of birth**

Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns	No qualification	Primary/lower secondary (CEP, BEPC or equivalent)	Vocational lower secondary (CAP-BEP or equivalent)	Upper secondary ( <i>baccalauréat</i> or equivalent)	Degree in higher education	Total	Unweighted numbers
<b>DOM</b>	16	10	28	16	30	100	512
Males	19	10	35	14	23	100	244
Females	14	10	21	19	36	100	268
<b>Algeria</b>	27	16	18	16	24	100	647
Males	25	14	18	18	25	100	316
Females	30	19	17	13	22	100	331
<b>Morocco and Tunisia</b>	33	12	17	13	25	100	868
Males	29	9	20	14	27	100	424
Females	37	15	14	11	22	100	444
<b>Sahelian Africa</b>	44	21	8	9	18	100	505
Males	32	14	10	13	30	100	224
Females	52	26	7	6	10	100	281
<b>West and Central Africa</b>	15	18	15	22	30	100	575
Males	9	10	16	22	42	100	224
Females	19	24	15	21	22	100	351
<b>Southeast Asia</b>	25	11	16	19	30	100	519
Males	24	9	17	19	31	100	261
Females	26	13	15	18	28	100	258
<b>Turkey</b>	34	26	15	15	9	100	704
Males	33	21	18	18	10	100	381
Females	36	32	11	12	9	100	323
<b>Portugal</b>	37	20	28	9	7	100	540
Males	39	18	29	8	5	100	263
Females	34	22	26	10	9	100	277
<b>Spain and Italy</b>	17	9	27	15	32	100	216
Males	14	11	32	20	23	100	97
Females	19	8	22	11	39	100	119
<b>Other EU-27 countries</b>	7	6	10	23	54	100	515
Males	12	10	16	23	40	100	171
Females	5	4	6	23	62	100	344
<b>Other countries</b>	19	10	9	21	42	100	928
Males	17	8	11	22	42	100	387
Females	20	12	7	20	41	100	541
<b>All immigrants</b>	25	14	16	16	29	100	6,017
Males	24	12	18	17	28	100	2,748
Females	26	16	13	16	29	100	3,269
<b>Mainstream population</b>	9	8	29	19	34	100	2,820
Males	10	8	33	17	32	100	1,337
Females	9	8	25	21	37	100	1,483
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	12	9	27	18	33	100	16,321
Males	13	9	31	17	30	100	7,674
Females	11	9	24	20	36	100	8,647

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Population aged 18-50 not in education at the time of the survey.

Interpretation • 9% of persons aged 18-50 in the mainstream population have no qualifications.

**Table 2 - Educational level of immigrants aged 18-60 who arrived in France as adults, by period of arrival**

Period of immigration	No qualification	Primary /lower secondary (CEP, BEPC or equivalent)	Vocational lower secondary (CAP-BEP or equivalent)	Upper secondary ( <i>baccalauréat</i> or equivalent)	Degree in higher education	Total	Unweighted numbers
Before 1974	44	32	6	7	11	100	522
Between 1975 and 1983	42	17	7	12	22	100	1,057
Between 1984 and 1997	29	17	7	16	31	100	1,824
In 1998 or after	25	15	7	19	34	100	2,080
<b>Overall</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>5,483</b>

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Immigrants aged 18-60 who arrived at age 17 or above, not in education at the time of the survey.

Interpretation • 44% of immigrants who arrived before 1974 had no qualifications.

**Table 3 - Educational level of immigrants aged 18-50 who arrived in France as adults, by first residence permit obtained**

First permit obtained	No qualification	Primary /lower secondary (CEP, BEPC or equivalent)	Vocational lower secondary (CAP-BEP or equivalent)	Upper secondary ( <i>baccalauréat</i> or equivalent)	Degree in higher education	Total	Unweighted numbers
Refugee	33	16	11	24	16	100	442
Student	2	2	3	10	84	100	537
Worker	31	15	7	19	27	100	665
Spouse of French national	26	15	8	22	28	100	697
Family reunion	40	24	8	14	13	100	706
Other situations	26	22	9	18	25	100	820
<b>Overall</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,867</b>

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Immigrants aged 18-50 who arrived at age 17 or above, not in education at the time of the survey.

Interpretation • 33% of immigrants aged 18-50 who arrived in France as adults with refugee status had no qualifications.

fact that INSEE has regularly confirmed from population census data.<sup>(4)</sup>

Another cause of the differences according to origin is the reason for admission: 40% of those arriving at age 16 or over under family reunion provisions, mainly to join a spouse, have no qualifications. That figure is 33% for those admitted as refugees and 31% for those admitted as workers. By contrast, 84% of immigrants who came to France to study had a degree in higher education at the time of the survey (Table 3).

A third reason for the disparities is the progress made in formal education in the countries of origin, as attested in the global “education for all” monitoring reports published by Unesco.<sup>(5)</sup> That said, there is no comparison between the educational levels of immigrants and the prevailing levels in their countries of origin, in Africa especially. According to the DHS/EDS surveys<sup>(6)</sup> conducted in Morocco in 2004, Senegal in 2005, Mali in 2006 and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2007, the

(4) For example INSEE, 2005, *Les immigrés en France*.

(5) For example EFA Global Monitoring Report 2010 on Education for All, Unesco, 2010.

(6) Demographic and Health Survey / *Enquêtes Démographiques et de Santé*. Since 1984, the DHS programme has been measuring, analysing and disseminating information on health, AIDS and nutrition through more than 200 surveys in 75 developing countries. These surveys also record the educational levels of the populations surveyed. The data from these surveys are available on the programme’s website: [www.measuredhs.com](http://www.measuredhs.com)

percentage of the population aged 20-49 with no qualifications was respectively 48%, 59.7%, 73.4% and 27.7%. According to the Trajectories and Origins survey, 33% of immigrants from Morocco aged 20-49 who were not students or school pupils when they arrived had no qualifications at the time of the survey. The corresponding figures for immigrants from Sahelian African and West and Central Africa are 43% and 16%.

Like earlier sources,<sup>(7)</sup> the data from the Trajectories and Origins survey seem to attest that migrants are on average a more educated group than non-migrants in the society of origin. Another indication of this is the high proportion of those with a degree in higher education. Nearly one-third of immigrants (29%) have a qualification higher than the *baccalauréat*. This figure is especially high for immigrants from northern, central and eastern Europe (54%). It is also high for those from Southeast Asia (30%) and West and Central Africa (30%).

Disparities between men and women also vary according to origin. In the mainstream population slightly fewer women than men (20% vs. 22%) have low or no qualifications. This gender difference is reversed among immigrants from Africa and Turkey; in this group the women are more likely than the men to be poorly qualified or unqualified: sub-Saharan Africa (78% vs. 46%), Algeria (49% vs. 39%), Morocco and Tunisia (52% vs. 38%), Turkey (68% vs. 54%). Women in the mainstream population or from Portugal or Europe EU 27 are more likely than the men to have a degree in higher education, although for women from Portugal the percentage is still very low (9%).

Despite persistent education inequalities between men and women, the gender gaps found among immigrants living in metropolitan France are far narrower than those prevailing in their countries of origin. According to Unesco,<sup>(8)</sup> out of an estimated worldwide total of 75,000,000 children not attending school, 35,000,000 are in sub-Saharan Africa, where 55% of them are girls, and 5,000,000 are in Arab countries, where 61% are girls. This includes 1,215,000 (54% girls) in Burkina Faso, 1,245,000 (55% girls) in Niger, 793,000 (59% girls) in Mali, 513,000 (51% girls) in Senegal, 224,000 (71% girls) in Benin, 243,000 (53% girls) in Congo, 389,000 (59% girls) in Guinea and 429,000 (51% girls) in Morocco. The hypothesis that migrants come proportionately more from among the better educated is born out for women as much as for men, if not more.

### **3 | The educational advantage of girls over boys, first highlighted for the general population in the 1990s, is confirmed among immigrants' descendants**

The gap in educational levels between the mainstream population and immigrants' descendants is narrower than that between the mainstream population and immigrants themselves (Table 4). The educational advantage of girls over boys, highlighted in the 1990s from general population surveys<sup>(9)</sup> and for descendants of North African immigrants,<sup>(10)</sup> is confirmed for immigrants' descendants as a whole: in all groups except those whose parents came from Turkey, the girls are better qualified than the boys.

---

(7) Héran F., 2004, "Five Immigration Myths", *Population and Societies* No. 397.

(8) Unesco, 2010, *op. cit.*

(9) Marry C., 2001, "Filles et garçons à l'école : du discours muet à la controverse des années 1990", Laufer J., Marry C. & Maruani M. (eds.), *Masculin-féminin : questions pour les sciences de l'homme*, PUF.

(10) For example: Gaspard F., 1996, "De l'invisibilité des migrantes et de leurs filles à leur instrumentalisation", *Migrants-Formation*, 105.

**Table 4 - Educational level of persons aged 18-50, descendants of one or two immigrants or of DOM native-borns, by parents' country/département of birth**

Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns	No qualification	Primary/lower secondary (CEP, BEPC or equivalent)	Vocational lower secondary (CAP-BEP or equivalent)	Upper secondary ( <i>baccalauréat</i> or equivalent)	Degree in higher education	Total	Unweighted numbers
<b>DOM</b>	10	7	27	22	33	100	502
Males	12	7	35	19	27	100	237
Females	7	8	19	26	40	100	265
<b>Algeria</b>	22	11	28	18	20	100	1,119
Males	25	12	29	16	18	100	503
Females	19	11	27	21	22	100	616
<b>Morocco and Tunisia</b>	16	10	23	20	31	100	849
Males	20	12	26	16	27	100	376
Females	12	9	20	25	34	100	473
<b>Sahelian Africa</b>	15	12	26	22	25	100	334
Males	19	14	27	20	20	100	162
Females	10	10	25	24	31	100	172
<b>West and Central Africa</b>	16	8	14	22	41	100	186
Males	21	5	18	16	39	100	84
Females	12	10	11	26	41	100	102
<b>Southeast Asia</b>	10	9	18	16	48	100	337
Males	13	4	22	15	47	100	172
Females	7	14	13	17	49	100	165
<b>Turkey</b>	25	11	30	18	15	100	340
Males	25	7	36	16	17	100	165
Females	26	14	24	22	14	100	175
<b>Portugal</b>	13	7	35	17	28	100	792
Males	16	8	39	17	20	100	406
Females	9	6	30	17	38	100	386
<b>Spain and Italy</b>	14	11	32	17	26	100	1,576
Males	16	9	34	17	23	100	772
Females	11	13	29	18	30	100	804
<b>Other EU-27 countries</b>	11	10	22	18	39	100	562
Males	8	10	28	19	35	100	277
Females	14	10	16	18	42	100	285
<b>Other countries</b>	11	5	21	21	42	100	375
Males	8	5	13	19	56	100	191
Females	9	5	17	20	49	100	184
<b>All descendants of immigrants</b>	15	10	28	18	29	100	6,470
Males	17	10	31	17	25	100	3,108
Females	13	10	24	20	33	100	3,362
<b>Mainstream population</b>	9	8	29	19	34	100	2,820
Males	10	8	33	17	32	100	1,337
Females	9	8	25	21	37	100	1,483
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	12	9	27	18	33	100	16,321
Males	13	9	31	17	30	100	7,674
Females	11	9	24	20	36	100	8,647

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Population aged 18-50 not in education at the time of the survey.

Interpretation • 19% of female descendants of Algerian immigrants aged 18-50 at the time of the survey left school with no qualifications.

#### **4 | Male descendants of immigrants are significantly less qualified than men in the mainstream population**

Among descendants of immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey, the proportion of men with no qualifications or low qualifications (primary or lower secondary school certificates) is almost twice as high as for the mainstream population. At 20% and below, degrees in higher education are less frequent among descendants of immigrants from Algeria and Turkey than in the mainstream population (>30%). More than a third of descendants of immigrants from Portugal (39%), Turkey (36%) and DOM native-borns (35%) had obtained only vocational secondary school certificates (Table 4).



# Educational Trajectories and Experiences of Young Descendants of Immigrants in France

*Yaël Brinbaum* \*, *Laure Moguérou* \*\*, *Jean-Luc Primon* \*\*\*

The Trajectories and Origins survey provides data for reconstituting educational trajectories from the path taken on leaving lower secondary school (*collège*) or high school (*lycée*) and for understanding experiences of school from the sense of injustice and/or discrimination expressed by respondents. What is particular about this study is that it provides statistical data on the schooling of descendants of immigrants of different origins and different migration waves, recent or less so, which have been little studied. Here we consider only those who were 18 to 35 years old in 2008 and had been schooled entirely in France. This is in order to appreciate the diversity of immigrants' descendants' school trajectories and how they have been treated by an education system with democratised mass schooling.<sup>(1)</sup> The results show differences in school trajectories according to sex and parents' country of origin. The sense of injustice at school mainly concerns the process of their orientation (to different tracks) at the end of lower secondary for some groups and suggests discrimination linked to origin. These trajectories affect children's subjective experience of school and subsequently have an impact on their access to the labour market.

## 1 | Qualifications obtained by descendants of immigrants aged 18 to 35

Have the descendants of immigrants benefited from the democratisation of schooling in the same way as the mainstream population? Do inequalities in level of education generate differentiation in trajectory in secondary education?<sup>(2)</sup> Are educational

---

\*Université de Bourgogne, IREDU (CNRS), associate researcher, INED.

\*\*Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense (UPO), associate researcher, INED.

\*\*\*Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (UNS), researcher, URMIS

(1) "Descendants of immigrants" refers to those with either one or two immigrant parents.

(2) Duru-Bellat M., Kieffer A., 2001, "The democratization of education in France: controversy over a topical question", *Population, An English Selection* 13-2, pp. 189-218.

**Table 1 - Highest qualification obtained by descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns aged 18-35 by origin and sex (%)**

Département or country of birth of parents		No qualification	Lower secondary (BEPC)	Lower secondary vocational (CAP, BEP)	Upper secondary (baccalauréat)	2 years higher ed.	3+ years higher ed.	Total	Unweighted numbers
DOM	Males	13	6	33	21	17	10	100	182
	Females	2	8	20	32	21	17	100	177
Algeria	Males	19.5	12	27	20.5	12	8	100	296
	Females	16	10	22	27	13	12	100	331
Morocco and Tunisia	Males	19.5	12	23	19	12	14	100	290
	Females	10	6	21	31	17	16	100	343
Sahelian Africa	Males	19	10	31	23	11	6	100	129
	Females	6	11	25	27	19	12	100	143
West and Central Africa	Males	24	6	24	20	6	19	100	53
	Females	11	6	13	32	11	27	100	63
Southeast Asia	Males	14	5	24	14	19	25	100	147
	Females	9	7	14	24	19	27	100	137
Turkey	Males	27	8	40	11	3	11	100	152
	Females	26.5	12	24	23.5	11	3	100	162
Portugal	Males	14	6	39	19	12	10	100	294
	Females	7	3	25	17	28	20	100	247
Spain and Italy	Males	10	8	30	22	17	13	100	297
	Females	8	9	18	24	22	20	100	300
Other EU-27 countries	Males	5	6	9	27	20	34	100	92
	Females	7	11	7	23	21	31	100	98
Other countries	Males	9	5	22	23	19	22	100	132
	Females	7	5	8	20	13	47	100	91
All descendants of immigrants	Males	15	9	28	20	14	14	100	1,882
	Females	10	8	20	25	18	19	100	1,915
Mainstream population	Males	8	7	25	24	17	19	100	559
	Females	6	6	22	23	21	21	100	578
All metropolitan population	Males	10	7	26	23	16	18	100	2,948
	Females	8	6	22	23	20	21	100	2,992

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-35 who attended school in France and who have completed their initial education. Persons with a primary school certificate (CEP) are very few in number and included in the “no qualifications” group.

Interpretation • Among male descendants of DOM native-borns who have completed their initial education, 13% have no qualifications, and 6% have a BEPC lower secondary qualification.

trajectories similar or do they differ according to country of origin? Table 1 shows detailed levels of qualification for those aged 18-35 who were schooled in France and had completed their education. Many children of immigrants left the education system without any qualifications (13% compared to 8% for the mainstream population). This rate varies widely according to the parents’ country of birth. It is particularly high (27%) for descendants of immigrants from Turkey, and somewhat lower but still high for descendants of immigrants from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (18% for those of Algerian descent, 15% for Moroccan and Tunisian and 16% for West and Central African). Next come descendants of immigrants from Portugal (11%) and Southeast Asia, followed by those from Italy and Spain, with figures close to the mainstream population. Regardless of origin, some immigrants’ children leave school with only lower secondary (BEPC) qualifications (5-11%).



In all origin groups, girls do better at school than boys: fewer leave school with no qualifications and they generally have higher qualifications than the boys. About 27% of both girls and boys with at least one parent originally from Turkey leave school with no qualifications. This figure is also high for boys whose parents came from West and Central Africa (24%) or the Sahel (19%), Morocco or Tunisia (19%) or Algeria (19%).

The gap between immigrants' children and children of the mainstream population continues when comparing qualifications. Over 38% of descendants of immigrants from Turkey and Portugal took short-duration vocational courses (CAP and BEP diplomas), compared to a quarter of the mainstream population (and 31% and 27% for descendants of immigrants from Sahelian Africa and Algeria respectively). And whereas boys taking vocational training take the short CAP or BEP curricula, the girls take a vocational or technological *baccalauréat*.

These vocational qualifications are also prized by daughters of immigrants from Portugal (who also more frequently have a degree in higher education than boys of the same group). More girls than boys have obtained a *baccalauréat*; the gap is particularly wide among descendants of immigrants from Turkey, West and Central Africa, Morocco and Tunisia. Access to the general *baccalauréat* is markedly higher in the mainstream population than in the other groups. Among descendants of immigrants from Southeast Asia (both sexes) and girls of West and Central African origin, a large proportion obtain a university degree or *grande école* diploma.

Given the social differences between sub-groups and the difference between immigrants' descendants and the mainstream population in the percentage from working-class backgrounds, the impact of social and family origin should also be taken into account. Most descendants of immigrants come from working-class families (through their father's positions): 65% compared to 41% of young people in the mainstream population. Over 70% of descendants of immigrants from North Africa, Turkey and Portugal have manual worker fathers. These social origins help to explain the levels of education achieved.

## 2 | Educational trajectories: tracks in secondary and higher education

Educational trajectories can be reconstituted through the survey's many questions about educational tracks chosen after lower and upper secondary school. Most children, regardless of origin, go on to upper secondary school (*lycée*) from lower secondary (*collège*). Those who leave school early are especially daughters of immigrants from Turkey (11% vs. 3% of girls in the mainstream population) and sons of immigrants from Algeria (9% vs. 3% for the mainstream population) (Table 2).

Descendants of immigrants are less frequently guided into the general education tracks than young people of the mainstream population.<sup>(3)</sup> Only among those with parents from Southeast Asia is the percentage of students guided into these tracks (61%) much higher than in the mainstream population (44%). A higher percentage also go on to higher education (Table 3). Directions taken after *collège* vary according to sex and origin.<sup>(4)</sup> In almost all groups, the proportion of girls who go into the general education tracks is equal to or higher than that of the mainstream population

---

(3) Vallet L.-A., Caille J.-P., 1996, "Les élèves étrangers ou issus de l'immigration dans l'école et le collège français. Une étude d'ensemble", *Les Dossiers d'Éducation et Formations*, 67, French Ministry of Education.

(4) Brinbaum Y., Kieffer A., 2009, "Trajectories of immigrants' children in secondary education in France: differentiation and polarization", *Population, English Edition*, 64(3), pp. 507-554.

**Table 2 - Educational track after lower secondary school of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns aged 18-35 by origin and sex**

Département or country of birth of parents		General tracks	Technological tracks	Vocational tracks (in a <i>lycée</i> )	Apprenticeship*	No further schooling	Total	Unweighted numbers
DOM	Males	33	16	43	6	2	100	248
	Females	53	16	28	1	2	100	250
Algeria	Males	32	16	40	4	9	100	370
	Females	41	16	36	2	5	100	429
Morocco and Tunisia	Males	35.5	20	34	6.5	4	100	394
	Females	51	14	31	1	3	100	497
Sahelian Africa	Males	28	16	47	3	6	100	169
	Females	35	21	41	2	1	100	230
West and Central Africa	Males	40	15.5	42	2	0	100	113
	Females	53	20	24	0	3	100	128
Southeast Asia	Males	57	13.5	25	4	0	100	266
	Females	65	11	22	2	1	100	243
Turkey	Males	28	17	42	9	4	100	189
	Females	27	13	48	1	11	100	218
Portugal	Males	24	18	43	13	2	100	350
	Females	46	15	32	6	1	100	314
Spain and Italy	Males	36	21	30	10	3	100	348
	Females	49	13	31	4	3	100	353
Other EU-27 countries	Males	61	17	16	4	2	100	131
	Females	65	12	19	0	5	100	141
Other countries	Males	44	20	32	3	1	100	229
	Females	73	8	15	2	2	100	168
All descendants of immigrants	Males	36	18	35	7	4	100	2,559
	Females	50	14	31	2	3	100	2,721
Mainstream population	Males	40	14	31	12	3	100	726
	Females	46	14	31	5	3	100	739
All metropolitan population	Males	39	15	32	11	3	100	3,897
	Females	48	14	31	5	3	100	4,085

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-35 who attended school in France. Students still attending lower secondary school are excluded.

Interpretation • Among male descendants of DOM native-borns, 33% followed a general track, 43% followed a vocational track (in a *lycée*) and 6% went into apprenticeship.

\* In an apprentice training centre (*centre de formation en apprentissage, CFA*).

(46%), with the notable exception of girls whose parents came from Sahelian Africa (35%) and Turkey (27%).

In vocational education (other than apprentice training centres) boys are always over-represented compared to girls, particularly among descendants of DOM native-borns and of immigrants from West and Central Africa. For example, only 24% of daughters of immigrants from West or Central Africa were in vocational secondary streams compared to 42% of sons. The reverse trend applies to children of parents from Turkey: 48% of the girls but 42% of the boys. Traditionally, boys whose parents came from Portugal have more often opted for apprenticeships, with rates comparable to the mainstream population.

As regards access to higher education, the gaps seem wider among immigrants' descendants than between them and the mainstream population (Table 3). Only 25% of descendants of immigrants from Turkey have gone on to higher education, a little

**Table 3 - Access to higher education of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns aged 18-35 by origin and sex (%)**

Département or country of birth of parents	Males	Females	Overall	Unweighted numbers
DOM	39	55	46	350
Algeria	37	44	41	567
Morocco and Tunisia	44	55	50	603
Sahelian Africa	33	51	41	254
West and Central Africa	42	55	49	113
Southeast Asia	57.5	68	62	280
Turkey	22	28	25	266
Portugal	30	60.5	43	519
Spain and Italy	43	56	49	570
Other EU-27 countries	68	74	71	184
Other countries	53	75	62	217
All descendants of immigrants	41	55	48	3 573
Mainstream population	48	58	53	1 091
All metropolitan population	47	58	52	5 619

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Persons aged 18-35 who attended school in France and who have completed their initial education.  
*Interpretation* • 41% of descendants of Algerian immigrants (37% of males and 44% of females) have pursued their studies beyond secondary level.

more than those of Portuguese origin (43%), sub-Saharan African (44%) and Algerian (41%). For the mainstream population this figure is 53%. These differences stem from differences in the tracks followed in secondary school, which in turn partly reflect differences in social origin between sub-groups.

At entry to higher education the gender difference is very marked, with a gap of as much as 20 percentage points between boys and girls of the same origin. Among descendants of immigrants from Portugal, many more girls than boys have gone on to higher education (60% vs. 30%). These figures are 52% vs. 35.5% for descendants of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, 55% vs. 39% for descendants of DOM native-borns, and 68% vs. 57.5% for those with parents from Southeast Asia, even if the percentage receiving higher education is high in that group. Overall, immigrants’ descendants’ access to higher education has increased, but many still drop out or leave without a qualification.<sup>(5)</sup>

### 3 | Experience of school: a sense of injustice regarding the process of track choice<sup>(6)</sup>


Differences in schooling according to origin need to be seen in relation to children’s experiences of school track choices. On average, 14% of descendants of immigrants report “having been less well treated” when deciding on the track to follow<sup>(7)</sup> – about three times as many as in the mainstream population. This sense of injustice is particularly marked among descendants of immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia

(5) Primon J.-L., 2008, “Abandon des études universitaires et insertion professionnelle des étudiants en France” in Charle C. & Soulie C., *Les ravages de la “modernisation” universitaire*, Syllepse.

(6) Track choice at the end of lower secondary education.

(7) This question, referring to the entire school career in France, was formulated as follows: “Do you personally think you were treated differently from other pupils during the process of track choice?” with choice of answering “treated better”, “the same” or “less well treated”. These results confirm the study by Brinbaum Y. and Kieffer A., 2005, “D’une génération à l’autre, les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées : ambition et persévérance”, *Éducation & Formations*, 72, pp. 53-75.

(23%), Turkey (22%), Sahelian Africa (24%), West and Central Africa (20%) and Algeria (20%). The main motive given as a possible reason for this unfavourable treatment is “origin”, followed by “skin colour”. These children experience injustice at school as ethnic or racial discrimination. This negative perception, which calls into question the impartiality of the school, can lead to a loss of legitimacy for the education system. <sup>(8)</sup>



Within the mainstream population, there is little sense of injustice regarding school track choices, either among boys or among girls. The gender difference is more marked among descendants of immigrants and of DOM native-born. Regardless of origin, women express this sense of injustice less frequently than men. It is true that girls do better at school and less frequently leave without qualifications. Among the women, those who most often express this sense of injustice are descendants of immigrants from Sahelian Africa (22%), West and Central Africa (18%), Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (17%) and Turkey (17%).

#### 4 | Choice of school and school segregation

The Trajectories and Origins survey provides a glimpse of the school strategies of the respondents’ parents, including their choice of or avoidance of schools for their children’s primary and secondary education.<sup>(9)</sup> Avoidance strategies are most common in mainstream population families (30%) (Table 4) and less so among immigrant families from Turkey (16%), Sahelian Africa (18%), West and Central Africa (20%)

(8) Zirotti J.-P., 2006, “Les jugements des élèves issus de l’immigration sur les décisions d’orientation scolaire et les conditions de leur scolarisation”, *Cahiers de l’Urmis*, n°10-11.

(9) See for instance Van Zanten A., 2001, *L’école de la périphérie. Scolarité et ségrégation en banlieue*, PUF, Le lien social, 274 p.

**Table 4 - School avoidance and educational segregation of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns aged 18-35 by origin and sex (%)**

Parents' country or <i>département</i> of birth	Share of individuals who...	
	...did not always attend the school in their catchment area	... reported attending a <i>collège</i> with a moderate or high proportion of immigrants
<b>DOM</b>	23	58
Algeria	21	59
Morocco and Tunisia	24	56
Sahelian Africa	18	68
West and Central Africa	20	60
Southeast Asia	22	52
Turkey	16	57
Portugal	22	49
Spain and Italy	23	38
Other EU-27 countries	31	29
Other countries	29	49
<b>All descendants of immigrants</b>	21	51
<b>Mainstream population</b>	30	17
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	28	23.5

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-35 who attended school in France.

Interpretation • 23% of descendants of DOM native-borns did not always attend a school in their catchment area, and 58% reporting attending a lower secondary school (*collège*) with a moderate or high proportion of immigrants.

or Algeria (21%). These groups have less choice among schools and as a result their children go to schools with high proportions of immigrants' children (51% on average compared to 17% for the mainstream population). Owing to residential segregation, immigrants' descendants do not go to the same schools as the children of the mainstream population.<sup>(10)</sup>

(10) Felouzis G., Liot F., Perroton J., 2005, *L'apartheid scolaire*, Paris, Seuil.



# Labour Market Situation of Persons Aged 18-50 by Sex and Origin

*Bertrand Lhommeau\**, *Dominique Meurs\*\**, *Jean-Luc Primon\*\*\**

This chapter discusses the employment situation of immigrants and descendants of immigrants. It addresses the issue through a preliminary exploitation of the data from the Trajectories and Origins survey on the labour market situations of immigrants and their descendants. We present the results for the entire survey population aged 18-50 and a preliminary analysis of differences in unemployment risk between the different categories and the mainstream population. Unemployment rates among immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and sub-Saharan Africa are particularly high, and even higher among the descendants of immigrants from these regions. Age differences between groups have an effect, but it is not the only one: analysis shows that, all else being equal and after many structural effects have been taken into account, some of these groups have higher unemployment rates than the mainstream population. This “objective” result agrees to a large extent with perceptions of discrimination; the groups hardest hit by unemployment are the ones who most often say they have suffered unfair rejection of a job application within the past five years.

## 1 | Persons aged 18-50, by origin and labour market situation

Table 1 shows a breakdown of the population aged 18-50 according to general labour market situation, distinguishing between the employed population (those in work whether waged or not, part time or not, and including apprentices), the unemployed, students and other economically inactive persons (see Box).

The employment rate (employed persons as a percentage of an entire population group) is not surprisingly, higher among men (average 81%) than among women (average 72%). As regards origin, the highest employment rates are those for immigrants from Spain, Italy and Portugal. This is partly due to a structural effect: immigrants from these countries are, on average, older than the rest. For the men, the lowest employment rates are found among immigrants’ descendants, particularly the descendants of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (53%), Southeast Asia (60%),

\* INSEE.

\*\* INED and Economix, Université Paris 10.

\*\*\* URMIS, Université de Nice.

Morocco and Tunisia (61%), Turkey (67%) and Algeria (69%), whereas employment rates are significantly higher among descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe (Portugal (82%), Spain and Italy (86%) or other countries of the European Union (81%). These rates are very similar to that of the mainstream population (81%). For women, the ranking by origin is somewhat different: the lowest employment rates are among women immigrants from Turkey and their descendants (a little over 33%). Next come women immigrants from Algeria (48%), Morocco and Tunisia (49%). As with the men, the highest employment rates are those for descendants of immigrants from European countries (Southern Europe and EU-27).

*Table 1 - Economic activity of persons age 18-50 by origin*

	Males						Females					
	In employment	Unemployed	In education	Other inactive	Unemployment rate	Un-weighted numbers	In employment	Unemployed	In education	Other inactive	Unemployment rate	Un-weighted numbers
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>												
DOM	85	6	6	2	7	259	81	6	6	7	7	286
Algeria	77	15	5	4	16	327	48	13	6	33	21	346
Morocco and Tunisia	81	11	4	3	12	442	49	13	6	31	21	466
Sub-Saharan Africa	75	15	8	3	17	514	58	12	11	19	18	695
Southeast Asia	83	11	1	5	12	267	66	10	3	21	13	262
Turkey	81	10	3	6	11	389	34	7	6	53	18	338
Portugal	93	4	2	1	4	268	76	9	1	14	11	279
Spain and Italy	95	3	0	2	3	97	81	5	2	12	6	122
Other EU-27 countries	83	11	5	2	12	185	71	7	4	18	9	357
Other countries	79	9	9	3	10	434	58	11	9	22	16	585
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2,923</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>3,450</b>
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>												
DOM	74	9	15	2	10	307	71	8	15	5	10	343
Algeria	69	17	9	5	20	582	56	14	13	17	20	724
Morocco and Tunisia	61	17	16	5	22	487	56	12	20	12	18	635
Sub-Saharan Africa	53	21	23	3	21	370	55	10	29	7	15	443
Southeast Asia	60	11	27	2	16	299	66	5	25	3	8	274
Turkey	67	19	13	1	22	213	35	18	20	27	34	234
Portugal	82	7	7	4	8	469	78	4	11	6	5	464
Spain and Italy	86	6	4	4	7	829	77	7	6	11	8	863
Other EU-27 countries	81	6	9	4	7	317	71	6	10	13	8	332
Other countries	67	6	25	1	9	300	62	5	24	9	8	275
<b>All descendants of immigrants</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3,866</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4,244</b>
<b>Mainstream population</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1,522</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1,664</b>
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8,877</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9,987</b>

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France.

Interpretation • 85% of male DOM native-borns aged 18-50 were in employment and 6% were unemployed at the time of the survey. The unemployment rate for the active population in this category is 7% (6/(85+6)).



### **Definitions of economic activity and unemployment**

The questionnaire in the Trajectories and Origins survey does not allow for an exact measure of economic activity and unemployment under the ILO definitions used by INSEE for its Labour Force survey. In the Trajectories and Origins survey, respondents initially gave their general labour market situation. They were then asked whether they were currently working and whether they were looking for work or for another job. From these three questions the following categories were drawn up. They are similar, though not identical, to the ILO categories used in the INSEE employment survey:

The population in employment comprises persons aged 15 and over who report being in one of the following situations:

- practising an occupation (waged or not), even if part time;
- helping a family member in their work (even if unpaid);
- apprentice or paid intern;
- seeking employment while working part time;
- student or retired but in employment.

The unemployed are persons aged 15 and over who are not in employment, as defined above, are not working and report being unemployed (whether or not they are registered at a job centre), unless they explicitly report that they are not looking for work.

The scope of our study is limited to persons aged 18-50.

The rates by origin are not exactly the same as those published on INSEE's website, which are based on other sources. Even so, the Trajectories and Origins survey results are entirely consistent with those of the Labour Force surveys\* and earlier surveys using other sources\*\*.

\* Algan Y., Dustmann C., Glitz A., Manning A., 2009, "The economic situation of first- and second-generation immigrants in France, Germany, and the UK", *CREAM, Discussion Paper Series*, 22(09).

\*\* Meurs D., Pailhé A., Simon P., 2006, "The persistence of intergenerational inequalities linked to immigration: labour market outcomes for immigrants and their descendants in France", *Population, English Edition*, 61(5-6), 645-682.

Another feature that emerges from this table is that the proportion of students is markedly higher among descendants of non-European immigrants than in the mainstream population. For example, 27% of male and 25% of female descendants of immigrants from Southeast Asia, and 23% of male and 29% of female descendants of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa are students, compared to 8% and 10% for the population as a whole. This is mainly due to age differences, because these sub-populations, whose parents arrived in the most recent immigration waves, are younger than the other categories and over 90% of students are less than 26 years old.

## **2 | Unemployment rates of persons aged 18-50 by sex and origin**

The unemployment rate (Table 1, column 6) represents the percentage of labour market participants (i.e. excluding students and other inactives) who are out of work and seeking work. Its range is very wide: it is lowest among male immigrants from Italy and Spain (3%) and Portugal (4%); these figures are well below that for the mainstream population (8% for men, 10% for women). The highest rate is among women descendants of immigrants from Turkey (34%). It is over 20% for men in 4 of the 21 groups (descendants of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, Morocco, Turkey and Algeria) and among women in 4 groups (immigrants from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and descendants of immigrants from Algeria and Turkey). For

descendants of immigrants from European countries, whether men or women, it is below 10% and below that of the mainstream population.

For the male population, a comparison of unemployment among immigrants and among immigrants' descendants shows that the unemployment rate is generally higher among the descendants, with the exception of descendants of immigrants from EU countries. With economically active women, however, the trend is reversed: women descendants of immigrants have lower unemployment rates than immigrant women, except for those whose parents came from Italy, Spain and Turkey. Women descendants of immigrants from Turkey have the highest unemployment rate of all (34%) and a very low rate of economic activity: 53% compared to 83% for women in the mainstream population.

Whereas female unemployment is higher than male in both the mainstream population and the immigrant population (except for EU immigrants), among descendants of immigrants it is sometimes equal to male unemployment (e.g. Algeria and others) and often lower, as with female descendants of immigrants from Southeast Asia (8% of women vs. 16% of men), sub-Saharan Africa (18% vs. 21%), Morocco and Tunisia<sup>(1)</sup> (18% vs. 22%) and Portugal (5% v. 8%). However, it would be premature to conclude that women descendants of immigrants find it easier to find a job than do their male counterparts, because on the one hand many of them are economically inactive and those who report being active (whether employed or not) are a selected group; on the other hand, of the economically active population, female descendants of immigrants have a higher average level of education than the men.

### 3 | Relative unemployment risk according to origin


Differences in unemployment rates according to origin are partly due to sub-population composition, particularly differences between groups as regards age structure, levels of qualification, family situation and geographical location. To analyse these effects, we calculated the relative risks of unemployment compared to the mainstream population taking into account age, sex, qualifications, family situation (living in a couple or not, with or without children) and place of residence (Île-de-France or not; sensitive urban area or not). Figure 1 shows the statistically significant coefficients of this regression. An analysis was performed for all economically active persons and for economically active persons aged 30 and under. A coefficient of less than 1 means that the group studied has a relative unemployment risk below that of the mainstream population; with a coefficient of more than 1, the relative risk is higher.

Immigrants from Portugal and their descendants (men and women) are exceptional in having an unemployment risk only half that of the mainstream population. For immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia or sub-Saharan Africa and descendants of immigrants from Algeria, the risk of unemployment is more than twice that of the mainstream population.

If we take only those under 30 years of age, the gaps compared to the mainstream population are narrower, because part of the “excess” unemployment was due to the young age of the descendants. But even in this age bracket unemployment risk is significantly higher than among the mainstream population for descendants of immigrants from Turkey (1.3), sub-Saharan Africa (1.8), Morocco and Tunisia (1.6) and Algeria (1.8), and for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (1.7) and Algeria (1.9).

(1) Frikey A., Murdoch J., Primon J.-L., 2004, “Les débuts dans la vie active des jeunes après des études supérieures”, CEREQ, NEF.

**Figure 1 - Relative risk of being unemployed with respect to the mainstream population**



Note that for population groups in this age bracket, there is little difference in unemployment risk between immigrants and descendants. These results are consistent with those of other studies using different data bases, e.g. Dupray,<sup>(2)</sup> Frickey<sup>(3)</sup> and Silberman.<sup>(4)</sup>

#### 4 | Respondents reporting unfair rejection of a job application in past five years

All respondents in the Trajectories and Origins survey were asked whether, in the preceding five years, they had been unjustly turned down for a job. On average, 7% of men and 9% of women said this had happened to them. The question is a subjective

(2) Dupray A., Moullet S., 2004, “Quelles discriminations à l’encontre des jeunes d’origine maghrébine à l’entrée du marché du travail en France”, in Maruani M., Meulders D., Silvera R., Sofer C. et al. (eds.), *Marché du travail et genre dans les pays du Maghreb*, Brussels Economic Series, Editions du DULBEA.

(3) Frickey A., Murdoch J., Primon J.-L., 2004, “Les débuts dans la vie active des jeunes après des études supérieures”, CEREP, NEF.

(4) Silberman R., Fournier I., 1999, “Les enfants d’immigrés sur le marché du travail, Les mécanismes d’une discrimination sélective”, *Formation Emploi*, 65, pp. 31-55.

one, eliciting the sense of having been discriminated against. Table 2 shows the percentages who answered “Yes” to this question, according to origin. The proportions are much higher among non-European immigrants and among immigrants’ descendants.

Although the percentage reporting perceived discrimination are of the same order of magnitude for both sexes regardless of origin, in many cases fewer women than men did so, and the difference is wide among descendants of Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian immigrants. This may be because the women have less difficulty finding work than their male counterparts. But it may also be because more of the women are inactive or studying, so that they are less exposed than the men to rejection by potential employers.

In the second part of Table 2 we limit the field to those who had actually been seeking work at some time in the previous five years; this includes employed persons who had changed jobs at least once, the unemployed, and inactives who had been employed within the previous five years. The percentage of positive replies for this set is 11% for men and 13% for women. But here again, the proportions are much


<b>Table 2 - Percentage of respondents reporting unfair rejection of a job application</b>						
	Age 18-50			Persons exposed to the risk*		
	Males	Females	Unweighted numbers	Males	Females	Unweighted numbers
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>						
DOM	13	10	545	18	15	307
Algeria	24	19	673	31	28	405
Morocco and Tunisia	19	15	908	23	20	538
Sub-Saharan Africa	22	24	1,209	26	29	858
Southeast Asia	6	7	529	11	12	255
Turkey	9	5	727	11	8	443
Portugal	3	6	547	6	11	219
Spain and Italy	1	5	219	3	9	85
Other EU-27 countries	5	10	542	7	14	301
Other countries	13	11	1 019	16	14	643
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6,373</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>4,054</b>
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>						
DOM	16	14	650	19	17	493
Algeria	21	19	1,306	29	24	878
Morocco and Tunisia	27	19	1,122	32	23	869
Sub-Saharan Africa	24	17	813	27	20	708
Southeast Asia	10	9	573	12	11	489
Turkey	17	14	447	19	15	360
Portugal	8	6	933	11	9	585
Spain and Italy	4	8	1,692	6	14	835
Other EU-27 countries	3	6	649	6	9	332
Other countries	14	4	575	16	6	441
<b>All descendants of immigrants</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8,110</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>5,497</b>
<b>Mainstream population</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3,186</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>1,703</b>
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>18,864</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>12,054</b>

\* Persons who have been in a position to seek work over the last five years.  
Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
Population • Persons aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France.  
Interpretation • 13% of men born in a DOM and aged 18-50 reported unfair rejection of a job application in the last five years. Among those who had been unemployed in the last five years, 18% felt that a job application had been unfairly rejected.

higher for non-European immigrants, DOM native-borns and descendants of DOM native-borns.

This field is not a perfect measure of exposure to the risk of job application rejection. A person may take a job for lack of anything better and feel they have been excluded from other posts or promotions. Nonetheless, there seems to be a certain correspondence between the degree of over-exposure to unemployment risk as measured in the previous section and the reporting of unfair rejections. Of the population exposed to this risk, those who least frequently report having suffered such discrimination were immigrants from Portugal, Italy and Spain, descendants of immigrants from Italy and Spain, and men from the mainstream population. The highest percentages (over 25% positive responses) are found among immigrants from Algeria (30%), sub-Saharan Africa (men 26% and women 29%), and male descendants of immigrants from Algeria (29%) and sub-Saharan Africa (27%).

The frequency of reporting unfairly rejected job applications depends on structural effects, as with the risk of unemployment analysed above. To be young and to work in a series of short-term jobs is automatically to be more often looking for work, and so more exposed to the risk of rejection than older people who are in stable jobs and looking to improve their occupational position. We therefore calculated the relative risk of reporting unfair rejection of a job application for the economically active



population when such structural effects are taken into account. We took the same specifications as in the previous paragraph.

In no other group is the risk of reporting unfair job application rejection as low as in the mainstream population. Of the groups with higher unemployment risk than the mainstream population, some more frequently report having suffered such injustice; they are mainly immigrants from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa and descendants of immigrants from these regions. Once the structural effects are taken into account, DOM native-borns and descendants of DOM native-borns are significantly more likely to report unfair rejection, although their unemployment risk is not significantly higher than that of the mainstream population. As we suggested earlier, it may be that this question of perceived discrimination goes beyond the problem of finding work when unemployed but also includes particular difficulty in finding a “better job”, and that this concerns DOM native-borns and their descendants more than others.

# Occupations of Descendants of Immigrants and their Fathers: Is Occupational Inheritance Determined by Geographical Origin?

*Mahrez Okba* <sup>\*(1)</sup>

The Trajectories and Origins survey has provided an opportunity to compare the jobs currently occupied by descendants of immigrants with those that were held by their fathers when the former were 15 years old. It has also allowed us to study changes in social mobility from one generation to another. Immigrants' fathers' jobs are largely determined by their geographical origins, although low-skilled occupations predominate, especially those involving manual labour. A high proportion of the sons of immigrants are also manual workers, although they more frequently to gain access to skilled manual jobs than their fathers. Like men in the mainstream population, they nonetheless enjoy greater occupational mobility than their fathers, partly reflecting changes in the job market (reduction in the number of unskilled jobs, tertiarization) and rising levels of qualifications. As a result, they more frequently work in the intermediate occupations or as managers/professionals than their fathers. While the daughters of immigrants are predominantly employed as clerical/sales workers, as are women in the mainstream population, they nonetheless hold intermediate occupations in roughly the same proportions as the sons of immigrants. The geographical origins of their fathers have little impact on the occupational outcomes of sons and daughters of immigrants when the fathers are manual workers.

## 1 | The fathers of descendants of immigrants are often manual workers...

In order to study “intergenerational” social mobility, we have focused our analysis on respondents who were born in France to an immigrant father (and possibly an immigrant mother, too), examining the occupations of the fathers when the respondents were 15 years old as well as those of the respondents themselves at the

---

(1) This chapter is dedicated to C.V., E.O. and G.O.

time of the survey. Most of the immigrant fathers<sup>(2)</sup> included in the analysis belong to the working class, for two thirds of them are manual workers, compared with just 39% of the mainstream population. Percentages are highest for immigrant fathers from North Africa and southern Europe. By contrast, the figure for fathers born in Europe (excluding the countries of southern Europe<sup>(3)</sup>) or Southeast Asia is not much higher than the one for the fathers of respondents belonging to the mainstream population.

A closer look at these manual workers reveals that the fathers of descendants of immigrants are far more frequently unskilled than the fathers of respondents belonging to the mainstream population. While roughly only a third of “mainstream fathers” in the manual labour workforce are unskilled, this proportion rises to roughly 47% for immigrant fathers born in Algeria, Sahelian Africa or Turkey, and over half for those born in Southeast Asia. The picture is somewhat different for immigrant fathers born in southern Europe, as the proportion of skilled workers is almost as high as it is for mainstream fathers (approx. two-thirds).

## 2 | ...though less so if they belong to more recent migration trends

The older the migrant wave, the higher the proportion of fathers of descendants of immigrants who are manual workers. Ninety-seven percent of fathers from Spain or Italy, 91% of fathers born in Algeria, 83% of fathers born in Portugal and 78% of fathers born in Morocco or Tunisia arrived in France prior to the suspension of labour immigration in 1974, compared with just 59% of fathers born in Sahelian Africa, 47% of fathers born in Turkey and 31% of fathers born in Southeast Asia.

The overwhelming majority of immigrant fathers are wage employees, as are mainstream fathers (87%). The fact that virtually none of them are farmers, even though many of them come from rural backgrounds, especially in the case of less recent migration trends (North Africa, Spain, Portugal and Italy) is easily explained by the fact that this occupation is often handed down from father to son – something which migration makes impossible. Immigrant fathers of Turkish origin are more frequently self-employed (27%), probably reflecting the role played by “ethnic niches” in employment integration. As for immigrant fathers of Southeast Asian origin, they more often work in the intermediate occupations or as managers/professionals. They also tend to have more qualifications, with 22% holding a diploma that represents at least two years’ higher education.

## 3 | For immigrants’ sons, skilled manual labour represents the first rung on the ladder of occupational mobility

Despite the tertiarization of the French economy and decline in industry that has taken place in the space of a “generation”, manual labour continues to account for a high proportion of the jobs occupied by immigrants’ sons, though nothing near as high as for their fathers. Out of all the immigrants’ sons who were either in employment or had been at the time of the survey, 43% were manual workers, compared with only 34% for mainstream respondents. This figure can be broken

---

(2) Hereafter, the term “descendants” will apply solely to persons whose fathers were immigrants.

(3) The term “Europe” encompasses the 27 member states of the European Union, excluding Spain, Portugal and Italy. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia form “Southeast Asia”. “Sahelian Africa” comprises Senegal, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad.



**Table 1 - Immigrant fathers: most often unskilled manual workers**

	Father's occupational category											Unweighted numbers
	Farmer	Self-employed	Manager/professional	Intermediate occupation	Clerical worker:			Manual worker:			Unknown	
					total	skilled	unskilled	total	skilled	unskilled		
<b>Descendants of an immigrant father</b>	1	12	4	7	6	3	3	67	41	26	3	5,124
<b>...born in:</b>												
<i>Algeria</i>	1	10	1	5	7	3	4	73	39	34	4	977
<i>Morocco and Tunisia</i>	1	12	3	5	6	2	4	71	43	28	3	732
<i>Sahelian Africa</i>	0	6	8*	5*	12	3	9	64	34	30	6	292
<i>Southeast Asia</i>	5	11	10	16	9	7	2	47	20	27	3	261
<i>Turkey</i>	0	27	2*	2*	2	1	1	63	33	30	4	299
<i>Portugal</i>	0	12	1*	6	2	1	1	78	53	25	1	691
<i>Spain and Italy</i>	2	16	3	9	4	2	2	65	43	22	1	1,171
<i>Other EU-27</i>	3	8	13	14	8	6	3	48	31	17	6	279
<i>Other countries</i>	1	12	13	12	14	11	4	41	27	13	8	422
<b>Descendants of DOM native-borns</b>	0	5	7	16	25	21	5	40	29	11	7	495
<b>Mainstream population</b>	7	13	10	16	12	10	2	39	27	13	3	2,760
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	7	13	10	15	11	9	2	42	28	15	3	15,546

\* Data not significant.

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Individuals aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France who have completed their education and are employed, or have been employed, at the time of the survey.

The occupation recorded is that of the father when the respondent was aged 15. The criterion used to define unskilled clerical occupations (Chardon, 2001) is the skill level required by the individuals who hold them. A job is defined as skilled if specific training is required before taking up the position. For manual workers, unskilled occupations are defined on the basis of the INSEE definitions of occupations and occupational categories (codes 67, 68 and 69 of PCS 2003).

Interpretation • 73% of Algerian fathers (of descendants of immigrants) were manual workers (39% skilled and 34% unskilled), 6.7 % were clerical workers, 6.7 % held intermediate occupations, 10% were self-employed, 1.3% were managers/professionals and 0.5% were farmers.

down into 62% for descendants of immigrants of Turkish origin, 46% for the descendants of Portuguese and Algerian immigrants, and 41% for the descendants of immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia (Table 2). That said, those descendants of immigrants who are in a manual occupation hold skilled jobs more frequently than their fathers: 74% versus 62% for their fathers. One of the earliest forms of social or occupational mobility for immigrants' sons therefore appears to be their greater likelihood of becoming skilled manual workers than their fathers.

Intermediate occupations come a close second to manual labour, accounting for around a fifth of all jobs held by the male descendants of immigrant fathers, with minor variations according to origin. It is only among the sons of immigrants from Turkey, Southeast Asia and Sahelian Africa that a smaller proportion work in the intermediate occupations. Only a small percentage of immigrants' sons become clerical/sales workers (ranging from 7% for the sons of Turkish immigrants to 20% for the descendants of men born in Morocco or Tunisia), the exception being the male descendants of immigrants of African origin. This relative weakness is related not so much to their status as descendants of immigrants as to gender specificity, as this type of occupation is generally the preserve of women. Although there are fewer managers/professionals among the sons of immigrants (12% on average) than among men in the mainstream population (17%) there are fewer still among their fathers (just 4%). The descendants of immigrants from Southeast Asia are something of an exception here, as 32% of them are managers/professionals.

**Table 2 - Descendants of immigrants: more often skilled manual workers and in intermediate occupations**

	Farmers	Self-employed	Managers/ professionals	Intermediate occupations	Clerical and sales workers			Manual workers			Un- weighted numbers
					total	skilled	unskilled	total	skilled	unskilled	
<b>MALES</b>											
Sons of an immigrant father	0*	7	12	22	17	7	9	43	32	11	2,457
...born in:											
Algeria	0	6	8	22	18	6	12	47	35	11	439
Morocco and Tunisia	0	9	8	23	20	7	13	41	30	12	324
Sahelian Africa	0	2	6	16	29	14	15	47	31	17	138
Southeast Asia	0	4	32	15	14	7	8	35	20	16	138
Turkey	0	12	6	14	7	0	7	62	43	19	159
Portugal	0	6	10	24	15	6	9	46	35	11	344
Spain and Italy	0*	8	14	23	14	7	6	42	31	11	590
Other EU-27 countries	0	5	22	21	14	8	6	39	34	5	140
Other countries	0.5*	4	16	24	23	10	13	32	23	10	215
Sons of DOM native-borns	0	3	9	30	26	14	12	32	22	9	234
Mainstream population	3	7	17	26	14	7	7	34	25	9	1,315
All metropolitan population	2	7	16	25	14	7	8	36	26	10	7,509
<b>FEMALES</b>											
Daughters of an immigrant father	0	3	9	22	55	26	29	11	4	6	2,637
...born in:											
Algeria	0	3	7	17	58	25	33	14	5	10	538
Morocco and Tunisia	0	2	10	22	57	28	30	10	5	4	408
Sahelian Africa	0	0	5	27	62	34	28	7	5	1	154
Southeast Asia	0	0	20	31	39	12	27	10	6	4	123
Turkey	0	2	1	10	57	25	33	31	11	20	140
Portugal	0	5	9	18	59	29	30	9	3	6	347
Spain and Italy	1	5	7	24	54	26	28	9	4	5	581
Other EU-27 countries	0	2*	15	25	47	24	24	10	3	7	139
Other countries	0	0	19	36	40	24	16	4	2	2	207
Daughters of DOM native-borns	0	3	10	29	52	33	20	6	4	2	269
Mainstream population	1	3	13	24	49	25	23	10	4	6	1,445
All metropolitan population	1	3	12	23	50	24	25	11	4	7	8,037
<b>OVERALL</b>											
Sons and daughters of an immigrant father	0	5	11	22	35	16	19	27	19	9	5,124
...born in:											
Algeria	0	5	8	19	39	16	23	30	19	11	977
Morocco and Tunisia	0	5	9	22	38	17	21	26	18	8	732
Sahelian Africa	0	1	5	21	44	23	21	29	19	10	292
Southeast Asia	0	2	27	22	26	9	17	24	14	10	261
Turkey	0	8	4	12	28	10	18	49	29	20	299
Portugal	0	6	9	21	36	17	19	28	20	9	691
Spain and Italy	0	7	11	23	32	16	16	27	19	8	1,171
Other EU-27 countries	0	4	19	23	29	15	14	26	20	6	279
Other countries	0	2	18	30	32	17	15	18	13	6	422
Sons and daughters of DOM native-borns	0	3	10	30	39	23	16	19	14	6	495
Mainstream population	2	5	15	25	31	16	15	22	15	8	2,760
All metropolitan population	2	5	14	24	32	16	16	24	15	8	15,546

\* Data not significant.

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Individuals aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France who have completed their education and are employed, or have been employed, at the time of the survey.

The occupation recorded is that of the father when the respondent was aged 15. The criterion used to define unskilled clerical occupations (Chardon, 2001) is the skill level required by the individuals who hold them. A job is defined as skilled if specific training is required before taking up the position. For manual workers, unskilled occupations are defined on the basis of the INSEE definitions of occupations and occupational categories (codes 67, 68 and 69 of PCS 2003).

Interpretation • 47% of male descendants of an immigrant father born in Algeria are manual workers (35% skilled and 11% unskilled), 22% hold intermediate occupations, 18% are clerical workers, 8% managers/professionals, 6% self-employed, and 0% farmers.


The average ages of male descendants of immigrants vary considerably according to their fathers' geographical origins. The oldest (40.4 years) were born to immigrants of European origin (Spanish or Italian: 38.3 years), while the youngest are the sons of Turkish (26.3 years), Asian (28.8 years) or African (29.1 years) immigrants. These differences are due largely to the length of time since their parents' migration. As the likelihood of promotion increases with age, it comes as no surprise to learn that there are more managers/professionals or members of the intermediate occupations among the sons of immigrants of European origin than there are among those of immigrants of Turkish or African origin. Age is not, however, the only explanatory factor. For example, a great many sons of immigrants of Asian origin are managers/professionals, even though their fathers arrived in France relatively recently. In their case, as in that of descendants of European immigrants, their relatively strong presence in the managers/professionals category can be attributed in part to higher levels of qualifications. Thirty percent of Asian male descendants of immigrants and 20% of European descendants of immigrants have a post-graduate qualification, compared with 19% of the mainstream population, 17% of descendants of immigrants of Moroccan or Tunisian origin and 10% of the sons of Spanish or Italian immigrants. This over-representation of managers/professionals among the descendants of immigrants from Southeast Asia could be linked to the occupational background of their fathers, who are far more frequently managers/professionals than fathers of different geographical origins.

#### **4 | The majority of immigrants' daughters are sales/clerical workers**

The distribution of female descendants of immigrants across the occupational categories is somewhat different from that of male descendants of immigrants. Fifty-five percent of them are sales/clerical workers, 22% hold intermediate occupations, 11% are manual workers and 9% are managers/professionals. Here we have evidence of the over-representation of women in the sales/clerical work category, regardless of their geographical origins. Their occupational inheritance would appear to be somewhat weaker. Many immigrants' daughters become sales/clerical workers regardless of their fathers' occupations. The concentration of sales/clerical workers and manual workers is far higher for female descendants than for male ones. These two occupational categories alone account for 65% of all jobs for the daughters of immigrant fathers versus 59% for the sons. This figure is particularly high for the daughters of Turkish immigrants, as 88% of them are either sales/clerical workers (57%) or manual workers (31%).

The proportion of immigrants' daughters employed in the intermediate occupations (22%) is similar to that of immigrants' sons. Both far more frequently obtain these sorts of jobs than their fathers (7%). Like immigrants' sons the daughters of immigrants of Asian or European origin stand apart from the rest on account of their strong presence in the manager/professional category. Like their male counterparts, this difference in their occupational status can be explained by their father's occupation and date of arrival in France, their age and, above all, their level of qualification. Thus, 35% of female descendants of immigrants of Asian origin and 26% of female descendants of European immigrants obtain a post-graduate qualification, compared with 19% of the mainstream population and 13% of the daughters of immigrants of Algerian or Portuguese origin.


**Figure 1 - Distribution of immigrants' sons by father's occupational category and according to father's origin**



Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Interpretation • 42% of the sons of immigrant fathers born in Spain or Italy who are manual workers are themselves manual workers, 27% are in intermediate occupations, 12% are managers/professionals, 12% are clerical workers and 7% are self-employed. The sons of immigrants are aged 30-50. The sons of immigrants of Turkish, African and Asian origin are not represented because their numbers are very small in this age group.

**Figure 1 b - Distribution of immigrants' daughters by father's occupational category and according to father's origin**



Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Interpretation • 8% of the daughters of immigrant fathers born in Spain or Italy who are manual workers are themselves manual workers, 58% are clerical workers 19% are in intermediate occupations, 7% are managers/professionals, and 8% are self-employed. The daughters of immigrants are aged 30-50. The daughters of immigrants of Turkish, African and Asian origin are not represented because their numbers are very small in this age group.

## 5 | The sons and daughters of manual workers: similar occupational outcomes regardless of geographical origins?

Fifty-six percent of the sons of manual workers aged 30-50 years are employed in a different occupational category from that of their fathers, regardless of whether the latter are immigrants. For the sons of immigrants, the highest figure is for those whose fathers come from Spain or Italy (58%) and the lowest is for those whose fathers are from other European countries (45%). The sons of North African or Portuguese immigrants are only half as likely to be manual workers as their fathers. The escape route from manual labour often takes the form of intermediate occupations, especially in the case of the descendants of immigrants of Spanish, Italian or Portuguese origin. The descendants of manual workers of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian origin, on the other hand, tend to opt for jobs as sales and clerical workers.

The daughters of immigrant manual workers enjoy less occupational mobility than the sons. A large majority of them become sales and clerical workers (59% vs. 56% for the mainstream population). Their presence in the manager/professional and intermediate occupations is similar to that of their counterparts in the mainstream population, if not slightly greater for the descendants of immigrants of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian origin. However, they less often end up as managers/professionals than the sons of immigrants whatever their fathers' geographical origins.

Like those of the mainstream working class population, the occupational outcomes of the sons and daughters of immigrant manual workers can be ascribed partly to structural changes in the economy and the job market. Between 1973 and 2008, there was a noticeable fall in the proportion of manual workers in the labour force and an attendant rise in the proportion of sales/clerical workers, managers/professionals and posts in the intermediate occupations. The newly created jobs in these expanding occupational categories were therefore partly filled by individuals of more varied social origins, thereby enabling the sons and daughters of manual workers to gain easier access to the higher occupational categories.



# Working Hours and Wages

*Bertrand Lhommeau \**, *Dominique Meurs \*\**, *Jean-Luc Primon \*\*\**

Are the working hours and hourly wages of immigrants, DOM native-borns and their descendants any different from those of the mainstream population? We begin by investigating part-time work, looking at whether it is voluntary or involuntary. For equivalent individual and job characteristics (social category and nature of employment), we find that involuntary part-time work varies little according to origin. We go on to show that, with a few exceptions (EU-27 immigrants and their children), immigrants and descendants of immigrants are, on average, paid a lower hourly wage than members of the mainstream population (Table 1). This gap relating to the wage-earners' origins is then analysed in the light of various possible explanatory factors, including individual characteristics, job characteristics, immigrant-specific characteristics (language skills, nationality, arrival in metropolitan France) and, lastly, occupational category. After controlling for structural effects linked to the first two factors, the wage gap between immigrants and the mainstream population disappears for women and is significantly reduced for men. It nonetheless persists among male immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, and is more marked for them than for their children.

## 1 | Women's voluntary and involuntary part-time work by origin

Eighty-eight percent of economically active men and 92% of women work as wage employees in their main jobs (excluding home helps and business owners). Overall, immigrants and their descendants are no different from the mainstream population in this respect. That said, salaried employment is far less frequent among male Turkish immigrants and their sons (74% and 83%, respectively).

The overwhelming majority of men in employment work full-time (97%). As could be expected, part-time working is far more frequent among salaried women (28%), although figures vary widely, ranging from 30% or more for female immigrants from Algeria, sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey and Portugal, as well as for women in the mainstream population, to just 11% of jobs held by female descendants of a DOM native-born (Figure 1).


\* INSEE.

\*\* Université de Paris 10 (Economix), associate researcher, INED.

\*\*\* URMIS, Université de Nice (URMIS).

In 17% of cases, female employees have “chosen” to work part-time. In other words, respondents state that they have no wish to work more hours, mainly for family reasons; part-time working does not necessarily equate with low job status. When it is involuntary, i.e., when female employees would like to work longer hours but are prevented from doing so, the reasons are mostly to do with the job market and employability. Figure 1 illustrates the distinction between voluntary and involuntary part-time work according to geographical origins. For immigrant women of Algerian and sub-Saharan origin and their daughters, as well as for immigrant women from Morocco, Tunisia and even Portugal, part-time work is more a question of underemployment (Figure 1).

This interpretation has been confirmed by the use of an unordered polytomous model<sup>(1)</sup> to estimate the probability of doing voluntary part-time work or involuntary part-time work rather than full-time work (used as a benchmark here), calculated for all female employees aged 18-50 years. In our model of voluntary part-time work, family configuration accounts for much of the variance, in that the more children there are, the greater the probability of their mother doing so-called “voluntary” part-time work rather than a full-time job. Female unskilled sales/clerical workers are also twice as likely as female unskilled manual workers to seek part-time work on a voluntary basis. No other employability characteristics (age, French nationality,



(1) The risk model introduced the following variables: detailed origin (21 modalities), family composition (5 modalities), educational level (3 modalities), four age groups, French nationality or not, living in a sensitive urban area or not, living in Île de France or not, level of French language skills (2 modalities), economic sector (3 modalities) and occupational category (6 modalities).



qualifications) have any influence on this probability. When we control for these two effects, we find that the probability of voluntarily working part-time is lower for immigrant women of African origin (2.4 times lower for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, 1.9 times lower for those from Morocco or Tunisia) and, to a lesser extent, for the daughters of immigrants from Algeria, Portugal, Spain and Italy, as well as for DOM native-borns and their daughters (twice as low for the last two categories). These women are therefore less likely to reduce their working hours when they have children than women in the mainstream population.

In our model of involuntary part-time work, family configuration plays a far smaller role, although it continues to exert some influence, in that women bringing up one or several children on their own and women with three or more children who live with a partner are more often involuntary part-timers. Conversely, employability and working conditions play quite a decisive role here, as the older and more qualified they are, the less likely women are to be forced to work part-time rather than full-time. The risk is also lower if they are proficient French speakers or have French nationality. Lastly, women who work as managers, skilled sales/clerical workers or in the intermediate occupations are the least exposed to the risk of involuntary part-time work, while working in the tertiary sector increases this risk. After controlling for these factors, only two origin groups stand out from the mainstream population, with immigrant women from Turkey and DOM native-borns being more than two times less likely to be involuntary part-timers than women in the mainstream population.

## 2 | Origin-related wage gaps persist after controlling for individual and job characteristics

Turning our attention to origin-related hourly wage gaps across the entire population of salaried men and women, we find that, with one or two exceptions (immigrants from EU-27 member states other than Spain, Portugal or Italy, and their descendants), the average hourly wage of immigrants and their children is lower than that of the mainstream population (Table 1). The greatest disparities are for immigrants from Africa and Turkey, and also for their sons. The wages of immigrants' daughters, other than those of Turkish origin, are very similar to those of women in the mainstream population.

Structural effects (age, qualifications, sector, etc.) mean that a direct comparison of hourly wages between groups of different origins is not sufficient. Table 1 therefore provides various wage gap estimates in relation to the mainstream population after correcting for each of these structural differences. Separate analyses were conducted for men and women. We constructed five successive models, introducing an extra control variable into each fresh model. In the first column, the respondents' origin is the only variable taken into account. The gaps are therefore raw, unweighted effects. We can see that, on average, the hourly wages of Algerian immigrants are 13% lower than those of the mainstream population (written as a log). When the respondents' age, qualifications, family composition and place of residence are taken into account (Model 2), the gap widens still further (-16%), reflecting the fact that, on average, the Algerian immigrant respondents are older than the mainstream population respondents and have a flatter wage profile. We can observe the same pattern for all immigrants from the African continent. The third model builds on the second one by incorporating factors linked to migration, namely French nationality, level of French language skills and age on arrival in France. Once these criteria have

been controlled for, the gap becomes far smaller (-7%) for male immigrants of Algerian origin. Model 4 incorporates the characteristics of the jobs they occupy, while the final specification is occupational category. The reduction in the coefficient between Models 4 and 5 indicates that the hourly wage gap can be attributed partly to occupational segregation and to difficulty gaining access to the better paid categories, all individual characteristics being equal. Once this final specification has been added, eight points of the 13 percentage point wage gap between male

**Table 1 - Effects of origin on hourly wage (logarithm):  
gross effect and effect after controlling for observable characteristics**

Specification of the earnings equation Origins	Males					Females					Unweighted numbers
	Gross effect	Controlled for other observable characteristics				Gross effect	Controlled for other observable characteristics				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
<b>Country or département of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>											
DOM	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.08	-0.06	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	421
Algeria	-0.13	-0.16	-0.07	-0.07	-0.08	-0.11	-0.09	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	368
Morocco and Tunisia	-0.10	-0.13	-0.05	-0.05	-0.07	-0.16	-0.10	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	514
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.15	-0.24	-0.14	-0.15	-0.12	-0.15	-0.09	0.03	0.00	-0.01	717
Southeast Asia	-0.04	-0.10	-0.05	-0.07	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.02	0.00	352
Turkey	-0.18	-0.10	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.21	-0.08	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	335
Portugal	-0.02	0.01	0.09	0.03	0.02	-0.11	-0.05	0.01	0.02	0.04	422
Spain and Italy	0.00	-0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.07	0.02	162
Other EU-27 countries	0.14	0.05	0.16	0.13	0.05	0.15	0.02	0.14	0.12	0.05	336
Other countries	-0.03	-0.12	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.08	0.04	0.03	0.02	573
<b>Country or département of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>											
DOM	-0.10	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	394
Algeria	-0.13	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	720
Morocco and Tunisia	-0.14	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	531
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.16	-0.09	-0.09	-0.08	-0.06	-0.01	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.04	330
Southeast Asia	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	240
Turkey	-0.14	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.17	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.07	170
Portugal	-0.12	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	638
Spain and Italy	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	1,245
Other EU-27 countries	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	438
Other countries	-0.08	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	280
Mainstream population	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	2,129

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Population of wage employees (excluding apprentices and persons still in initial education) aged 18-50 and having reported their working hours. The parameters non significant at the 5% level are shown in red.  
*Interpretation* • As an unweighted average, DOM-born male wage employees earn 9% less than male wage employees in the mainstream population (model 1 for men) This difference remains unchanged after controlling for individual characteristics (model 2).  
*Model (1)* • Wage (log) by country or region of origin (21 modalities)  
*Model (2)* • Model (1) including the following individual characteristics: Age, age squared, educational level (6 modalities), conjugal status, number of children, residence in Île-de-France region, residence in a sensitive urban area.  
*Model (3)* • Model (2) including the following individual characteristics: French nationality, fluency in French language, age at arrival in France.  
*Model (4)* • Model (3) including the following individual characteristics: economic sector (7 modalities) and company size (5 modalities), years in current employment, years in current employment squared.  
*Model (5)* • Model (4) including the occupational category (5 modalities).

Algerian immigrants and men in the mainstream population remain unexplained. This means that even when respondents occupy comparable posts, there is still an unexplained wage difference between the former and the latter, just as there is for male DOM native-borns, as well as for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia.

The figures printed in red in Table 1 indicate that the differences observed did not differ significantly from zero (i.e. no significant hourly wage gap between respondents and the mainstream population). The visual impression given by the table with regard to female immigrants is that migration-related characteristics – in reality, their age on arrival in France, as the other two are not significant – account for a large proportion of the variance (Model 3).

We can also see that the unexplained gaps are wider for immigrants than for their descendants.<sup>(2)</sup> Once all the control variables have been introduced, the wage gap disappears, except for the sons of immigrants from Algeria or sub-Saharan Africa, who continue to be paid less than their peers in the mainstream population, and in both cases the wage gap is only half the size that it is for their fathers.

Finally, a variant of Model 5 (not shown in the table) distinguishes for men and by origin between descendants with either one or two immigrant parents. This reveals that only when both immigrant parents come from sub-Saharan Africa, Algeria and also Portugal are their sons paid lower hourly wages than men in the mainstream population. When only one of the parents is an immigrant, there is no significant difference between the wages of descendants of immigrants and those of the mainstream population, whatever the former's origin. However, given the rather small size of the sample here, this particular result should be treated with caution.

---

(2) Aeberhardt, R., Fougère, D., Pouget, J., and Rathelot, R., 2010, "Wages and employment of French workers with African origin", *Journal of Population Economics*, 23(3), pp. 881-905.  
Boumahdi, R., and Giret, J.-F., 2005, "Une analyse économétrique des disparités d'accès à l'emploi et de rémunérations entre jeunes d'origine française et jeunes issus de l'immigration", *Revue Économique*, 56(3), pp. 625-636.



# The Experience of Migration, Self-perceived Health and Non-Use of Healthcare Services

*Christelle Hamel\**, *Muriel Moisy\*\**

While recent studies of immigrants' health increasingly systematically take gender and wage inequality into account, nationality and country of birth and/or origin are often absent, either because the relevant data are not available or because the researchers simply choose not to show them. Specifically designed to study population diversity in France, the Trajectories and Origins survey collected information about migration trajectories and current living conditions in different spheres of daily life from a particularly large sample. For these reasons, it can shed useful light on the health of immigrants and DOM native-borns. In this chapter, we present the initial findings of our investigation of the self-perceived health of respondents aged 18-60 years living in France. DOM native-borns were included in our multivariate analysis because of their considerable geographical mobility, which may well influence health perceptions.

Immigrant men are 30% more likely to report being in impaired health than their same-age counterparts in the mainstream population.<sup>(1)</sup> This figure rises to nearly 80% for immigrant women. Being either economically inactive or unemployed, on a low income and not having a high-school diploma are some of the most significant factors in explaining the differences in health perceptions between immigrants and the mainstream population. As for country of origin, it is immigrants from Turkey, North Africa and Portugal who most often report being in poor health. Age and socioeconomic characteristics being equal, male and female immigrants who have lived in metropolitan France for more than thirty years also report being in poorer health. This fits the popular hypothesis that health declines in the receiving country due to less favourable social situations.

---

\* Sociologist

\*\* Demographer.

(1) The term "mainstream population" is defined in the chapter on "The populations surged" and the glossary.

## 1 | Nearly a quarter of all immigrants report being in poor health

When they are asked the question “What is your general state of health?”, 22% of immigrants aged 18-60 years reply that their health is impaired (i.e., “fair”, “poor” or “very poor”), compared with just 16% for the mainstream population. This result confirms a finding already highlighted in the literature.<sup>(2)</sup> In immigrant and mainstream populations alike, self-perceptions of poor health increase considerably with age. Health perceptions also differ according to gender, especially in the immigrant population (Table 1). Thus, more than one young (18-30 years) immigrant woman in ten reports being in poor health, as opposed to just one immigrant man out of 20. This gap persists, albeit narrowing slightly, among older adults, with percentages of 47% and 33%, respectively. While there are few differences between immigrants and the mainstream population with regard to reports of chronic diseases<sup>(3)</sup> or functional limitations, gender-related differences persist in both populations, with approximately one man in five, whether an immigrant or a member of the mainstream population, reporting a chronic disease, compared with one woman in four. Answers to questions about state of health, chronic diseases and, to a lesser extent, functional limitations, nonetheless need to be interpreted with caution, in that they inevitably have an element of subjectivity, arising both from differences in social class and from cultural differences.

## 2 | The gap in self-perceived health narrows for immigrants and members of the mainstream population of equivalent socioeconomic status

Given the differences in health perceptions between men and women, linked to the latter’s more frequent contacts with the healthcare system, we decided to analyse the determinants of their respective declarations separately. We found that immigrant men are more than a third more likely report poor health than their same-age counterparts in the mainstream population (Model 1 in Table 2), although this percentage is still noticeably lower than the figure for immigrant women, who are almost twice as high to report poor health than their mainstream population peers (odds ratio, OR = 1.8).

Nonetheless, when level of education, job status, household income, occupation and social category and social security cover are taken into account, the greater probability of immigrant men reporting poor health ceases to be significant. This means that their more frequent reporting of poor health can be ascribed to their social conditions and less favourable living conditions in France. Thus, an immigrant man is far more likely to report poor health if he never went to school or only has a primary school certificate or lower secondary school diploma, if he is unemployed or economically inactive (excluding students and senior citizens), has a net household income of less than €2,500 per month, or is a manual worker or sales/clerical worker. Unlike men, for equivalent age and socio-economic characteristics, immigrant women are still more likely to report poor health, although the gap is noticeably smaller (OR falls from 1.8 to 1.3). Being a homemaker worsens self-perceptions of health, though not as much as never attending school or having no qualifications, in

---

(2) Dourgnon, P., Jusot, F., Sermet, C., Silva, J., 2008, “La santé perçue des immigrés en France”, *Document de travail*, no.14, IRDES, pp. 1-22, [www.irdes.fr](http://www.irdes.fr)

(3) The question was formulated as follows: “Are you currently suffering from one or more chronic diseases? A chronic disease is a disease which lasts (or will last) a long time or which returns (or will return) regularly”.

which case immigrant women are 2.2 times as likely to report poor health as women with at least a high-school diploma, all other things being equal. For men, this figure is far lower (1.6). Moreover, being a recipient of French universal healthcare coverage (*couverture maladie universelle*, CMU) or state medical aid (*aide médicale*

**Table 1 - Reported health status of immigrants and DOM native-borns by sex and age**

		Report impaired health (%)	Report at least one chronic disease (%)	Report severe or moderate functional limitations (%)	Unweighted numbers	Weighted numbers
<b>MALES</b>						
DOM native-borns	Age 18-30	2	9	4	70	37,414
	Age 31-40	13	17	10	94	39,861
	Age 41-50	22	24	14	95	36,557
	Age 51-60	43	29	24	73	24 972
	Total	18	19	12	332	138 804
Immigrants	Age 18-30	5	6	4	663	336,203
	Age 31-40	11	10	9	1,093	464,470
	Age 41-50	21	20	16	1,167	480,745
	Age 51-60	33	30	24	1,041	431,699
	Total	18	17	14	3,964	1,713,117
Mainstream population	Age 18-30	5	9	4	561	3,636,888
	Age 31-40	11	16	11	476	3,084,135
	Age 41-50	14	26	17	485	3,411,516
	Age 51-60	30	30	22	266	3,106,357
	Total	15	20	13	1,788	13,238,296
All metropolitan population	Age 18-30	5	10	5	3,667	4,838,552
	Age 31-40	12	16	11	2,847	4,096,621
	Age 41-50	15	25	17	2,353	4,273,831
	Age 51-60	30	30	22	1,403	3,847,277
	Total	15	19	13	10,270	17,056,281
<b>FEMALES</b>						
DOM native-borns	Age 18-30	8	19	9	81	41,977
	Age 31-40	15	20	7	96	40,549
	Age 41-50	21	24	10	109	38,939
	Age 51-60	41	32	29	94	30,703
	Total	20	24	13	380	152,169
Immigrants	Age 18-30	11	11	6	821	417,199
	Age 31-40	17	16	9	1,287	496,506
	Age 41-50	28	26	19	1,342	524,154
	Age 51-60	47	40	32	1,042	432,037
	Total	25	23	16	4,492	1,869,896
Mainstream population	Age 18-30	9	19	10	562	3,637,471
	Age 31-40	10	18	9	535	3,188,796
	Age 41-50	17	25	15	567	3,438,762
	Age 51-60	30	36	31	329	3,465,634
	Total	16	25	16	1,993	13,730,663
All metropolitan population	Age 18-30	9	18	10	3,669	4,914,153
	Age 31-40	12	18	10	2,848	4,202,594
	Age 41-50	19	25	15	2,360	4,325,503
	Age 51-60	31	36	31	1,404	4,200,401
	Total	17	24	16	10,281	17,642,651

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Men and women aged 18-60.

Interpretation • 5% of male immigrants aged 18-30 report impaired health ("fair", "poor" or "very poor").

**Table 2 - Probability for immigrants of reporting impaired health\* by sex, age and socioeconomic status**

		MALES				FEMALES			
		MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 1		MODEL 2	
		odds ratio	Pr > Chi squared	odds ratio	Pr > Chi squared	odds ratio	Pr > Chi squared	odds ratio	Pr > Chi squared
Age	Age 18-30	0.3	<.0001	0.2	<.0001	0.4	<.0001	0.3	<.0001
	Age 31-40	0.6	<.0001	0.6	<.0001	0.6	<.0001	0.6	<.0001
	Age 41-50	1	Ref.	1	Ref.	1	Ref.	1	Ref.
	Age 51-60	2.0	<.0001	1.7	<.0001	2.1	<.0001	1.8	<.0001
Link to migration	Immigrant**	1.3	0.0006	1.1	0.5838	1.8	<.0001	1.3	0.0018
	Mainstream population	1	Ref.	1	Ref.	1	Ref.	1	Ref.
Highest qualification	No schooling / no qualification			1.6	<.0001			2.2	<.0001
	Primary / lower secondary			1.5	0.0005			2.1	<.0001
	Lower secondary vocational			1.3	0.037			1.6	<.0001
	Upper secondary or above			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
Employment status	In employment			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	Homemaker			1.3	0.6603			1.6	0.0666
	Other inactive			11.9	<.0001			11.3	<.0001
	Unemployed			1.9	<.0001			1.7	<.0001
	Retired			1.0	0.9802			1.4	0.3023
	Student / Apprentice			1.1	0.7936			1.1	0.6589
Monthly household income	< €1200			1.8	<.0001			1.6	<.0001
	€1200-1799			1.3	0.0229			1.5	<.0001
	€1800-2499			1.2	0.0642			1.3	0.0174
	€2500-3999			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	€4000+			0.8	0.068			0.6	0.0004
	Don't know/refusal			0.8	0.2275			1.0	0.7947
Occupational category	Farmer			1.4	0.4115			0.6	0.3577
	Self-employed			1.5	0.0402			1.0	0.9163
	Manager/professional			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	Intermediate occupation			1.6	0.0151			1.0	0.9271
	Clerical/sales worker			1.9	0.0016			1.1	0.4112
	Manual worker			2.2	<.0001			1.3	0.1681
	Occ. cat. unknown			1.7	0.1583			0.9	0.6435
Social security	Social security			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	Universal coverage (AME-CMU)			1.1	0.3543			1.6	<.0001
	No coverage / don't know			0.5	0.0695			0.5	0.0446

\* Impaired health is defined here as being in “fair”, “poor” or “very poor” health.

\*\* DOM native-borns are not included with the immigrants.

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Men and women aged 18-60.

Interpretation of model 1 • The reference population comprises men and women of the mainstream population aged 41-50. Compared to men aged 41-50 in the mainstream population, twice as many men aged 51-60 with the same characteristics report impaired health rather than good health (OR=1.986).



*d'état*, AME) increases women's probability of reporting impaired health (OR = 1.6), an observation that is not matched in men.

### 3 | Of all immigrants, men and women of Turkish origin most frequently report being in poor health, after controlling for age and social characteristics

Unlike Models 1 and 2, Models 3 and 4 (Table 3) distinguish between immigrants and DOM native-borns according to their country or *département* of origin, looking separately at men and women. In Model 3, only age and origin are taken into account. As regards men in their forties, male immigrants from Turkey are nearly three times as likely (OR = 2.8) to report poor health as their counterparts from Spain or Italy, who represent the reference population here. For female Turkish immigrants, this probability is only slightly lower (OR = 2.5). Other populations with poorer self-perceptions of health include male immigrants from Southeast Asia (OR = 2.1) and Portugal (OR = 2), and women from North Africa (OR = 2.2 for female immigrants from Morocco or Tunisia and OR = 1.9 for female immigrants from Algeria). It is worth noting that DOM native-born men report being in poor health twice as frequently as immigrants from Spain or Italy, the reference population – a result which is not replicated for women.

Even after we have taken their social and economic situation in France into account (Model 4), as well as their birth country, differences in health perceptions persist for male immigrants from Turkey, Southeast Asia and Portugal, as well as for DOM native-borns. Among women, these differences only persist for women from Portugal and Southeast Asia. Moreover, the results of our multivariate analysis highlight the effects of age on arrival in metropolitan France and date of migration – two determinants that are rarely included in health surveys conducted in France. The probability of reporting poor health is significantly lower for female immigrants and DOM native-borns who arrived in metropolitan France when they were children (OR = 0.6) or adolescents (OR = 0.8). The same is true for men, albeit to a lesser extent.

Nonetheless, this observation is tempered by the length of time subsequently spent in metropolitan France. All other things being equal, those who arrived within the last five years are far less likely to report poor health (-60% for men and -30% for women). This finding reflects the selective nature of migration, in that it is the healthiest individuals in the sending country who decide to migrate. Conversely, living in metropolitan France for more than thirty years increases self-perceptions of poor health by nearly 60% for men and 50% for women, all other things being equal, thereby supporting the hypothesis that the deterioration in immigrants' health stems chiefly from the fact that they endure tougher living conditions in France than the mainstream population.<sup>(4)</sup>

---

(4) Fassin, D., 1998, "Peut-on étudier la santé des étrangers et des immigrés?", *Plein Droit*, 38.  
Jusot, Fl. et al., 2008, "La santé perçue des immigrés en France", *Document de travail*, no.14, IRDES, pp. 1-22, [www.irdes.fr](http://www.irdes.fr)  
Dourgnon et al., 2008, "La santé perçue des immigrés en France. Une exploitation de l'enquête décennale santé 2002-2003", *Questions d'économie de la santé*, 133, pp.1-6.

**Table 3 - Probability for immigrants and DOM native-borns of reporting impaired health\* by sex, age, origin, time since migration and socioeconomic status**

		MALES				FEMALES			
		MODEL 3		MODEL 4		MODEL 3		MODEL 4	
		odds ratio	Pr > Chi squared	odds ratio	Pr > Chi squared	odds ratio	Pr > Chi squared	odds ratio	Pr > Chi squared
Age	Age 18-30	0.2	<.0001	0.3	<.0001	0.3	<.0001	0.4	<.0001
	Age 31-40	0.5	<.0001	0.6	0.0005	0.5	<.0001	0.7	0.0021
	Age 41-50	1	Ref.	1	Ref.	1	Ref.	1	Ref.
	Age 51-60	2.0	<.0001	1.3	0.0489	2.3	<.0001	1.6	<.0001
Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns	DOM	1.99	0.0017	1.661	0.0426	1.18	0.4019	0.947	0.8015
	Algeria	1.8	0.0076	1.3	0.2142	1.9	0.0005	1.1	0.5818
	Morocco and Tunisia	2.0	0.0006	1.4	0.1259	2.2	<.0001	1.3	0.1408
	Sahelian Africa	1.1	0.6704	0.9	0.6888	1.6	0.0145	0.9	0.593
	West and Central Africa	1.1	0.5968	1.1	0.736	1.6	0.0143	1.0	0.9146
	Southeast Asia	2.1	0.0004	1.8	0.0147	1.9	0.0008	1.5	0.0524
	Turkey	2.8	<.0001	2.0	0.0046	2.5	<.0001	1.4	0.1455
	Portugal	2.0	0.0006	1.8	0.0119	1.8	0.0007	1.4	0.0741
	Spain and Italy	1	Ref.	1	Ref.	1	Ref.	1	Ref.
	Other EU-27 countries	0.7	0.181	0.9	0.804	0.5	0.0012	0.6	0.0333
Other countries	1.1	0.7676	1.2	0.4366	1.1	0.6712	0.9	0.6944	
Age at arrival in metropolitan France	Child (age 0-9)			0.7	0.0773			0.6	0.0001
	Adolescent (age 10-18)			0.8	0.1428			0.8	0.0272
	Young adult (age 19-30)			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	Over 30 (age 31-60)			1.1	0.7687			1.3	0.089
Years spent in metropolitan France	0 to 5 years			0.4	0.0004			0.7	0.0272
	6 to 10 years			0.8	0.2361			1.0	0.8724
	11 to 20 years			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	21 to 30 years			1.3	0.1351			1.4	0.0045
more than 30 years			1.6	0.0239			1.5	0.0227	
Highest qualification	No schooling/no qualification			1.3	0.032			1.8	<.0001
	Primary / lower secondary			1.3	0.063			1.9	<.0001
	Lower secondary vocational			1.2	0.2279			1.5	0.0027
	Upper secondary or above			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
Employment status	In employment			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	Homemaker			2.3	0.2251			1.4	0.2375
	Other inactive			17.4	<.0001			10.8	<.0001
	Unemployed			2.1	<.0001			1.6	0.0003
	Retired			1.6	0.3542			1.3	0.4877
	Student/apprentice			1.1	0.8591			1.3	0.4215
Monthly household income	< €1200			1.7	0.0005			1.4	0.009
	€1200-1799			1.2	0.1219			1.5	0.0005
	€1800-2499			1.1	0.2731			1.2	0.1074
	€2500-3999			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	€4000+			0.7	0.0844			0.6	0.0009
Don't know/refusal			0.8	0.172			1.0	0.9015	
Occupational category	Farmer			2.0	0.3349			1.6	0.5461
	Self-employed			1.7	0.0274			1.3	0.3405
	Manager/professional			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	Intermediate occupation			1.7	0.0183			1.3	0.3278
	Clerical/sales worker			2.1	0.0019			1.5	0.0794
	Manual worker			2.4	0.0001			1.7	0.0291
	Occ. cat. unknown			1.7	0.2868			1.2	0.5366
Social security	Social security			1	Ref.			1	Ref.
	Universal coverage (AME-CMU)			1.1	0.4392			1.7	<.0001
	No coverage / don't know			0.5	0.116			0.8	0.4245

\* Impaired health is defined here as being in "fair", "poor" or "very poor" health.

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Men and women aged 18-60.

Interpretation of Model 3 • The reference population comprises male immigrants from Spain or Italy aged 41-50. Compared to this reference population, men aged 51-60 are almost twice as likely (OR=1.986) to report impaired health.

#### **4 | Few noticeable differences in healthcare use or non-use between immigrants aged 18-60 years and the mainstream population, but considerable gaps according to origin and gender**

As a whole, immigrants aged 18-60 years do not differ particularly from the mainstream population when it comes to healthcare use. Noticeable differences, however, start to emerge when we look at origins. Male and female immigrants from Sahelian Africa are most likely to forego healthcare. As for immigrants of other origins, figures vary according to gender. Thus, immigrants from Turkey have the lowest rate of use (76%) among men, whereas among women, the lowest rates are recorded for immigrants from Sahelian Africa or Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Table 4 shows that more immigrants are in receipt of CMU or AME than members of the mainstream population: 8% versus 3% among the male population and 13% versus 4% among the female population. The small proportion of DOM native-borns who are entitled to CMU contrasts markedly with the far higher rate of CMU beneficiaries in the DOMs themselves.

In terms of healthcare consumption, a higher proportion of women than of men have consulted a health professional at least once in the previous twelve months, regardless of origin (Table 4). This rate oscillates between 88% and 96%, compared with 76% to 88% for men. Regarding non-use of healthcare services, here once again, female DOM native-borns and immigrants have a noticeably higher rate than men, with the exception of female immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia (11% vs. 13% for men) or Turkey (8% vs. 10% for men). More generally, the proportion of immigrants who have foregone healthcare over the previous twelve months is lowest among those from Southeast Asia or Europe.

The majority do not necessarily forego healthcare for financial reasons. Among the male population, barely more than one out of five Southeast Asian immigrants cite this reason, as opposed to more than six out of ten immigrants from Sahelian or West and Central Africa. Among the female population, it is Turkish immigrants and DOM native-borns who least frequently forego healthcare solely for financial reasons, with just 31% and 43% citing this reason, as opposed to 77% of female immigrants from West and Central Africa – a population which also has a high proportion of female CMU beneficiaries (21%), on a par with women immigrants from Sahelian Africa (21%), Turkey (17%) and Algeria (17%).

**Table 4 - Use and non-use of healthcare by immigrants and DOM native-borns aged 18-60 by sex and country or département of birth**

Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns	Percentage of individuals who report impaired health	Share of beneficiaries of universal coverage	Has consulted a health professional at least once in the last 12 months (%)	Has foregone healthcare in the last 12 months (%)	of which purely for reasons of cost (%)	Unweighted numbers
<b>MALES</b>						
DOM	18	6	79	13	60	332
Algeria	20	13	83	12	36	413
Morocco and Tunisia	21	7	81	13	62	591
Sahelian Africa	12	10	77	13	64	329
West and Central Africa	12	8	82	10	61	302
Southeast Asia	26	7	81	7	22	398
Turkey	22	10	76	10	55	446
Portugal	26	<1	85	8	42	419
Spain and Italy	20	1	88	10	29	235
Other EU-27 countries	11	8	88	7	53	270
Other countries	12	10	82	10	37	561
All male immigrants	18	8	83	10	30	3,964
Mainstream population	15	3	89	9	36	1,788
All metropolitan population	15	4	88	10	37	10,281
<b>FEMALES</b>						
DOM	20	4	96	15	43	380
Algeria	30	17	92	15	57	476
Morocco and Tunisia	31	15	95	11	51	603
Sahelian Africa	23	21	88	15	56	336
West and Central Africa	20	21	91	15	77	434
Southeast Asia	33	4	89	6	54	376
Turkey	29	17	92	8	31	384
Portugal	37	3	94	13	50	428
Spain and Italy	28	4	94	11	53	250
Other EU-27 countries	12	7	94	12	48	484
Other countries	20	14	92	8	49	721
All female immigrants	25	13	93	11	53	4,492
Mainstream population	16	4	96	12	53	1,993
All metropolitan population	17	5	96	12	52	11,480

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Men and women aged 18-60.

Interpretation • 6% of DOM-born male respondents aged 18-60 report being beneficiaries of universal health coverage.

# Union Formation between Here and There

*Christelle Hamel*\*, *Bertrand Lhommeau*\*\* , *Ariane Pailhé*\*,  
*Emmanuelle Santelli*\*\*\*

For several decades, not just in France but in the rest of Europe, marriage has been losing ground to cohabitation, and the age at which first-time couples are formed has risen considerably, as a result of longer years spent in education and job scarcity. This new model of living together, attesting to a shift in the relationship between women and men and a desire for greater sexual equality, first emerged in Scandinavian countries before gradually spreading southwards. Today, nearly half the French adult population is unmarried. Immigrants living in metropolitan France come from an extremely wide range of geographical zones. In some of these, unions may be formed very much on the model that prevails in France today, while in others marriage may be almost universal and age at first marriage may still be very young. What, then, is the matrimonial status of immigrants and DOM native-borns compared with the mainstream population? To what extent does migratory context influence couple formation? And what about the descendant relatives of immigrants, who are born and socialized in metropolitan France? Lastly, what are the origins of their partners?

## 1 | Immigrants often form couples at a younger age

The Trajectories and Origins survey has provided an opportunity to investigate immigrants' current marital status. For each migration wave and age group, we can measure the proportions of immigrants and DOM native-borns living with a partner in the same housing unit (either married,<sup>(1)</sup> in a civil partnership or in a consensual union) and those who are not. For the latter, we can distinguish further between those who have a “stable, dating relationship”, in other words a girl- or boyfriend they see regularly, and those who do not. In each age group, the overall proportion of immigrants living with a partner is virtually the same as it is for the mainstream population: approximately 30% of 18-25 year olds, nearly 70% of 26-30 year olds and approximately 75% of 31-60 year olds (Table 1). However, the pace of couple

\* INED.

\*\* INSEE.

\*\*\* CNRS (MODYS) INED associate researcher.

(1) The spouses of a small proportion of married immigrants reside in their country of origin.

formation varies considerably according to the migration wave. Thus, while more than 50% of immigrants from Turkey and Portugal form their first union between the ages of 18 and 25 years, immigrants of other origins do so somewhat later, as fewer than 40% of them in the 18-25 years age group live with a partner. Algerian and Sahelian African immigrants form couples even later than members of the mainstream population.

Country of origin influences union formation not just in terms of timing but also in terms of the type of union. Immigrants far more frequently live in marital union than members of the mainstream population, who more frequently live in consensual unions or, to a lesser extent, in civil partnerships. This difference is particularly striking among young adults (18% of immigrants aged 18-25 years are married, compared with just 4% of their peers in the mainstream population). This preference for marriage can be explained not only by the fact that greater value is placed on the institution of marriage in some countries of origin, but also by various administrative considerations. For instance, the difficulties faced by immigrants seeking a residence permit can prompt Franco-foreign couples to marry, even though they might have preferred just to live together. Lastly, although the proportion of over-30s who neither live with a partner in the same dwelling nor have a stable, dating relationship is slightly higher for the mainstream population than it is for immigrants (22% vs. 17%), some groups are nonetheless characterized by rather higher proportions of single people, most notably immigrants from West and Central Africa (29%) and DOM native-borns (29%). Some migration waves have similar celibacy rates to those of the mainstream population, even though marriage is virtually universal for the relevant age groups in the countries of origin. This is particularly true for immigrants of North African origin. This high proportion of individuals who have never been married may result from a form of selection (it is single individuals who migrate), the difficulty of forming a couple after migrating, or the loosening of ties as a result of migration. It may also reflect a poorer position in the “marriage market”, due in part to the fact that immigrants from the African continent have greater difficulty finding a stable job (see chapters on employment). In any event, it shows just how much migration can overturn the norms and structural conditions governing couple formation.

For immigrants of all other origins, remaining single beyond the age of 30 years is far less frequent than it is in the mainstream population. It concerns just 10% of immigrants from Turkey, 14% of Portuguese immigrants and 17% of Spanish or Italian immigrants. It is similarly low for immigrants from other European countries.

## **2 | The descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns less frequently live with a partner than their counterparts in the mainstream population**

What is the marital status of the descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns who were born and socialized in metropolitan France? Unlike the immigrants themselves, they less frequently live with a partner than their same-age counterparts in the mainstream population, regardless of the nature of that union: 21% (vs. 27% in the mainstream population) of 18-25 year olds, 54% (vs. 68%) of 26-30 year olds and 71% (vs. 74%) of 31-50 year olds. Nor is there a higher number of stable, dating relationships to compensate for this reduced frequency of living with a partner. This overall gap can be traced back to the country of origin; descendants of immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa remain single for longer and have still not caught their peers up by the age of 30. This delay in forming their first union can be attributed

**Table 1 - Marital status of young persons aged 18-25 by origin**

	Living with a partner			Not living with a partner		Total	Unweighted numbers
	Married*	Civil partnership	Consensual union	Stable dating relationship**	Not in a stable dating relationship		
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>							
DOM	0	0	37	19	44	100	76
Algeria	15	0	5	17	63	100	63
Morocco and Tunisia	25	1	10	24	40	100	113
Sahelian Africa	19	0	2	28	52	100	72
West and Central Africa	8	1	17	26	49	100	91
Southeast Asia	-	-	-	-	-	100	24
Turkey	49	0	3	10	38	100	96
Portugal	11	0	41	18	30	100	33
Spain and Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Other EU-27 countries	13	1	24	18	44	100	43
Other countries	8	0	12	21	59	100	122
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>661</b>
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of the descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>							
DOM	2	2	16	28	53	100	297
Algeria	12	0	9	17	62	100	408
Morocco and Tunisia	11	0	4	23	62	100	523
Sahelian Africa	8	0	5	25	62	100	320
West and Central Africa	2	0	10	24	63	100	195
Southeast Asia	3	1	13	31	52	100	360
Turkey	16	0	6	22	56	100	279
Portugal	5	2	27	30	36	100	311
Spain and Italy	3	2	21	28	46	100	255
Other EU-27 countries	5	2	19	21	53	100	64
Other countries	3	1	15	25	56	100	230
<b>All descendants of immigrants</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,068</b>
<b>Mainstream population</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>709</b>
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>4,811</b>

\* The “married” category includes the small number of couples where the husband does not live in France.

\*\* Couples in stable dating relationships are not living together.

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-25.

Interpretation • 37% of DOM native-borns aged 18-25 live in a consensual union.

partly to the greater difficulty they have finding a job, insofar as economic insecurity hampers access to a “place of one’s own” which, today, is a precondition for forming an autonomous couple.

The descendants of immigrants tend to opt for marriage rather than cohabitation, or consensual union. The proportion of live-in partners is almost twice as high among 18-25 year olds and 26-30 year olds in the mainstream population. That said, the figures vary considerably according to the parents’ country of birth. For instance, in the 26-30 years age group, more than half of the descendants of Turkish immigrants and a third of the descendants of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisians immigrants are married. Conversely, the descendants of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa marry only infrequently, this being true even for the over-30s. As for the descendants of European immigrants or DOM native-borns, they choose marriage or cohabitation in exactly the same proportions as the mainstream population. Lastly, while the

proportion of descendants of immigrants who are married at a given age is lower than than among immigrants of the same age, we nonetheless observe similar trends in their choice of type of union.

### 3 | Mixed-origin couples: a complex notion

Who do immigrants and descendants of immigrants choose as their partners? Sociologists of immigration have long been interested in partners' origins, deeming that the proportion of mixed couples reflects the degree of openness – or otherwise – of populations of immigrants or their descendants to the society in which they have settled. However, from our point of view, the other side of the coin is just as important, insofar as the proportion of immigrants living with a “mainstream partner” also indicates the receiving society's degree of acceptance of immigrants and, by extension, of their children. It should be noted that the very notion of “mixed couple” has been given a variety of meanings by immigration researchers.<sup>(2)</sup> Definitions of this polysemous term vary, according to whether it refers to the partners' nationality at the time of the study or the formation of the union, or instead to the country of birth and nationality at birth of either the respondents or their parents. The Trajectories and Origins survey has allowed us to conduct an in-depth examination of partners' origins, specifying whether they are immigrants or descendants of immigrants, and identifying their country of origin.

### 4 | Mixed-origin couples are more frequent among immigrants who meet their partner after migrating

The share of immigrants who form unions with members of the mainstream population is strongly determined by their marital status at the time of migrating. Meeting one's partner before or after migration considerably modifies the likelihood of forming a couple with a person born in France. Person who chose their partner after migrating did so in a transnational relational context, wherein they were able to choose between a partner born in France or a partner born in their country of origin, and between a partner met in France or a partner met in their country of origin.

Taken together, and regardless of when it was that they met their partner (before or after migrating), half of all immigrants aged 18-60 years and living in some kind of consensual union have a partner who emigrated from the same country as they did, while 5% have a partner who emigrated from a different country but the same continent of origin, and 3% a partner who emigrated from a different continent. Culturally speaking, a small proportion of unions between two immigrants are therefore mixed unions. For some migration waves, the majority of unions are between immigrants from the same country (82% for persons of Turkish origin), but the same certainly cannot be said for European migration waves (just 19% of unions for immigrants from Spain and Italy). These differences can be explained mainly by

---

(2) Tribalat, M., 1996, *De l'immigration à l'assimilation: enquête sur les populations d'origine étrangère en France*, Paris, La Découverte.

Filhon, A., & Varro, G., 2005, “Les couples mixtes une catégorie hétérogène” in Lefèvre C. & Filhon A. (eds.), *Histoires de familles, histoires familiales: les résultats de l'enquête Famille de 1999*, Paris: Les Cahiers de l'Ined, pp. 483-501.

Safi, M., 2008, “Intermarriage and assimilation: disparities in levels of exogamy among immigrants in France” *Population, English Edition*, 63(2), pp. 239-268.

Collet, B., & Régnard, C., 2008, “Mixité franco-étrangère: quelle réalité sociale?”, *Infos Migrations*, 2, 4 p.



age and marital status at the time of migration. For example, the overwhelming majority of immigrants from Turkey were already married when they arrived in France, whereas a large proportion of immigrants from Spain and Italy were either children who came with their parents or young single adults. Slightly more than four immigrants out of ten live with a partner who was born in France. Ninety percent of the latter belong to the mainstream population (with no immigrant parentage), leaving slightly under 10% who have immigrant parents (from the same country as the immigrant in two thirds of cases).

One third of current partners met prior to migrating were born in France (9% of all such partners have immigrant parents, while 23% belong to the mainstream population). Regarding immigrants from Europe, excluding Portugal, more than 40% of the couples formed prior to migration are mixed. For immigrants from Spain or Italy, this figure rises to around 50% (13% of partners born in France to parents from these two countries). Conversely, mixed couples formed prior to migration are far rarer among immigrants from Portugal (11%) and Turkey (16%). Furthermore, the latter group's mixed pre-migration unions usually involve partners born in France but whose parents had migrated from Turkey (12%). Lastly, more than 40% of immigrants from Algeria whose unions were formed prior to migrating live with a partner who was born in France – a mainstream partner in half of all cases.

## **5 | Forty percent of immigrants who formed a union after migrating live with a partner from the mainstream population**

Table 2 shows the proportion of immigrants aged 18-60 years who met their current partners after migrating. It should be noted that virtually all of them were single when they arrived in metropolitan France.<sup>(3)</sup> While slightly over half of all immigrants met their partners after settling in France, this figure differs considerably according to gender. Only 42% of women are in this situation, compared with 63% of men, as more women entered France following their marriage with an emigrant whom they had met while he was visiting his country of origin.

As for the origins of partners encountered after migrating, the most frequent situation for women is a union with a man belonging to the mainstream population. Immigrant women seem to have less difficulty finding a mainstream partner than their male counterparts (47% vs. 37%). Conversely, men more frequently form a union with a person who migrated from the same country of origin as them (45% for men vs. 37% for women). Slightly fewer than 10% of male and female immigrants live with a partner who also migrated, but from a different country, and even then, in six out of ten cases, that partner came from the same continent. Transcontinental couples are most common (7%) among immigrants from EU-27 states (excluding Spain, Italy and Portugal). Lastly, it is worth noting that immigrants who form a union after migrating seldom do so with descendants of immigrants whose parents migrated from the same country: 6% for men and 4% for women.

Once again, there are considerable differences between migration waves, which can be explained by several factors. The “age” of the migration wave can have a paradoxical effect, for while a lengthy presence in the receiving country tends to promote mixed-origin couples, it also increases the size of the population resulting from this wave and thus the “pool” of potential partners, initially comprising immigrants sharing the same origins, but subsequently their children. Religious

---

(3) Here, the term “single” includes persons who are widowed, separated or divorced.

**Table 2 - Link to migration and origin of partners of immigrants who met their partner after migration**

Immigrants' country of birth	Immigrant from same country	Descendant of immigrant from same country	Immigrant from another country	Descendant of immigrant from another country	Main-stream*	Total	Unweighted numbers	% of couples who met after migration with respect to all couples**
<b>MALES</b>								
Algeria	37	14	6	1	43	100	190	59
Morocco or Tunisia	59	6	5	6	25	100	325	70
Sahelian Africa	57	4	17	0	22	100	157	68
West and Central Africa	34	0	12	6	47	100	125	61
Southeast Asia	50	1	25	3	20	100	238	77
Turkey	75	7	5	4	9	100	176	47
Portugal	48	7	3	3	38	100	275	72
Spain or Italy	15	6	6	11	62	100	160	83
Other EU-27 countries	15	0	9	6	70	100	84	45
Other countries	45	2	13	3	37	100	209	52
<b>All male immigrants</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,939</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>FEMALES</b>								
Algeria	56	9	7	2	26	100	137	41
Morocco or Tunisia	51	5	12	3	29	100	165	39
Sahelian Africa	50	0	15	3	32	100	51	23
West and Central Africa	40	2	15	3	41	100	101	45
Southeast Asia	39	0	18	5	38	100	168	59
Turkey	88	2	0	1	9	100	111	35
Portugal	42	6	7	3	42	100	213	59
Spain or Italy	11	7	9	6	67	100	143	72
Other EU-27 countries	7	0	13	9	71	100	127	38
Other countries	25	0	16	8	50	100	167	33
<b>All female immigrants</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,383</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>All immigrants (both sexes)</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,322</b>	<b>52</b>

\* This includes partners who are DOM native-borns or descendants of DOM native-borns, who represent only 0.8% of immigrants' partners who met their partner after migration.

\*\* For 1% of immigrants living with a partner, we do not know if they migrated before or after meeting the current partner.

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Individuals aged 18-60, living with a partner (married, civil partnership or consensual union), who met their current partner after migration.

Interpretation • 37% of male Algerian immigrants aged 18-60, who arrived unmarried (including widowed, divorced and separated) and who are currently in a relationship, live with a partner who is also an Algerian immigrant.

affiliation, cultural distance, poor French language skills and poor qualifications can all erect barriers between immigrants and the mainstream population and hinder the formation of mixed couples. Lastly, stigmatization and rejection of varying degrees, depending on a person's origins, can also reduce the chances of forming a mixed couple.

Mixed-origin partnerships are very common for immigrants of European origin. Couples formed either with a member of the mainstream population or with an immigrant or descendant of an immigrant from another country clearly predominate. Of all Europeans, immigrants from Portugal are the ones who most rarely live with mainstream partners. Even so, the rate is a substantial 40% or so. More than half of all male and female immigrants from North Africa who live in a consensual union have a partner who migrated from the same country as them (six out of ten), with the exception of men from Algeria (just 37%). Then again, as the Algerian migration wave took place so long ago, there is a correspondingly large pool of potential

partners in the form of immigrants' descendants, and 14% of men and 9% of women from Algeria thus live with a descendant of immigrants of Algerian origin.

The overwhelming majority of immigrants from Turkey choose partners from among their fellow Turkish immigrants: 75% of men and 88% of women. This can be explained by their low level of qualifications and their recent arrival in France. Immigrants from Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are characterized both by their frequent choice of partners from the mainstream population and by their greater frequency of forming a union with an immigrant from a country other than their own (more than 15%). In 90% of cases, however, both partners come from the same continent.

## 6 | Descendants of immigrants primarily form unions with persons from the mainstream population

Although they themselves have not experienced migration, the fact that their families maintain ties with their countries of origin and are often close to other families that have migrated to France means that the descendants of immigrants born in France find themselves in what can be described as a “transnational relational space”. Nonetheless, their situation can be clearly differentiated from that of their parents. For them, living with a partner from the mainstream population represents a small cultural gap. Conversely, forming a union with an immigrant from the same country as their parents represents a larger cultural gap, for despite their common origin, they may not share the values that prevail in the partner's country, where descendants of immigrants are often perceived as being French first and foremost. A union with a partner who is also the descendant of immigrants can be based on a certain closeness of experience, not least a family history marked by migration, a wide range of cultural referents or simply the fact of growing up in the same neighbourhood (see chapter on Residential segregation).<sup>(4)</sup> Here once again, the choices they make depend on numerous factors: being born to a mixed couple, having parents who arrived in France when they were young or already adults and whether they had met before or after migrating, the date of their migration wave, religious and cultural differences, the partners' level of qualifications and, lastly, whether or not they belong to a population which encounters racism and discrimination.

A substantial majority of descendants of immigrants (65%) live with a partner from the mainstream population, especially if they themselves were born to mixed couples (Table 3). Far fewer (just 13%) choose to form a union with an immigrant from the same country as their parents, although there is a clear difference according to whether both these parents are immigrants (23%) or only one of them is (3%). The figure is also low for unions where the partner is the descendant of an immigrant who arrived in the same migration wave (9%), although it rises slightly when he or she is an immigrant or the descendant of an immigrant from a different country (14%), reflecting the context of considerable cultural diversity in which the descendants of immigrants are raised and meet their partners.

Contrasting with the figures for immigrants who met their partners after migrating, the percentage of unions with a member of the mainstream population is noticeably higher for immigrants' sons than it is for their daughters. The gap is particularly

---

(4) Santelli, E., & Collet, B., 2010, “De l'endogamie à l'homogamie socio-ethnique. Réinterprétations normatives et réalités conjugales des descendants d'immigrés maghrébins, turcs et africains subsahariens”, *Sociologie et sociétés* (forthcoming) explores the different options available for choosing partners, based on a qualitative survey of populations of immigrants' descendants.

**Table 3 - Link to migration and origin of the partner of immigrants' descendants by parents' country of birth**

Country of birth of parents of descendants of immigrants	Immigrant from same country as parents	Descendant of an immigrant from same country as parents	Immigrant from a country other than that of parents	Descendant of an immigrant from country other than that of parents	Mainstream*	Total	Unweighted numbers	% of descendants with only one immigrant parent
<b>MALES</b>								
Algeria	22	16	5	13	44	100	288	35
Morocco and Tunisia	19	8	2	18	52	100	158	46
Sahelian Africa	35	3	3	12	47	100	48	34
West and Central Africa	7	4	7	16	66	100	37	46
Southeast Asia	2	3	1	12	81	100	70	53
Turkey	38	12	4	6	41	100	79	23
Portugal	8	16	3	5	68	100	270	33
Spain and Italy	2	6	5	7	80	100	554	63
Other EU-27 countries	4	0	6	7	83	100	197	86
Other countries	8	2	10	14	66	100	104	65
<b>All male descendants of immigrants</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,805</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>FEMALES</b>								
Algeria	26	16	6	9	42	100	342	32
Morocco and Tunisia	38	11	7	8	36	100	309	32
Sahelian Africa	45	5	6	19	26	100	64	35
West and Central Africa	23	1	7	6	64	100	49	54
Southeast Asia	8	9	10	16	57	100	112	56
Turkey	74	13	3	3	7	100	99	1
Portugal	13	14	6	5	62	100	297	28
Spain and Italy	2	5	4	7	83	100	558	72
Other EU-27 countries	0	1	9	10	80	100	210	92
Other countries	7	2	6	15	71	100	131	73
<b>All female descendants of immigrants</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,171</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>All descendants of immigrants (both sexes)</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,976</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>All descendants with only one immigrant parent</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,893</b>	
<b>All descendants with two immigrants parents</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,083</b>	

\* This includes partners who are DOM native-borns or descendants of DOM native-borns who represent only 0.9% of partners of descendants of immigrants.

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Descendants of immigrants aged 18-50, with a partner - married/civil partnership/consensual union (cohabiting or non-cohabiting relationship).

Interpretation • 22% of men aged 18-50 with one or two immigrant parents from Algeria, live with an immigrant woman born in Algeria.

large for the descendants of immigrants from Southeast Asia, a migration wave which took place a number of decades ago, over a very short space of time, as well as for the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, who arrived far more recently. Meanwhile, the Algerian migration wave took place sufficiently long ago for unions between the descendants of North African immigrants to be a genuine option. Lastly, regarding European immigration, Portugal once more stands out from the rest, for while the figure for the descendants of immigrants of Portuguese origin is not as low as it is for their parents, fewer than two thirds of them live with a partner from the mainstream population, compared with eight out of ten for the descendants of persons who migrated from other parts of Europe.

## 7 | Is the choice of a spouse based on social as well as cultural origins?

This initial description of partners' origins has taken neither the respondents' social characteristics into account, nor those of their parents. And yet research on union formation<sup>(5)</sup> has shown that these characteristics have a major impact on the choice of a partner, with individuals tending to form a union with someone from the same social background. The data set out here therefore need to be analysed in greater depth, in order to assess the influence of social origin, level of qualifications, relational network, parental expectations, place of meeting, religious practice and place of residence on the meeting and choosing of partners.

---

(5) Bozon, M., & Héran, F., 2006, *La formation du couple: textes essentiels pour la sociologie de la famille*, Paris, La Découverte, 267 p.



# Inequalities in Housing Transitions, Perceived Discrimination and Segregation

*Jean-Louis Pan Ké Shon* \*, *Solenne Robello* \*\*

There is genuine inequality of access to housing, according to whether the resident is an immigrant or not, his or her experience of discrimination, the location of the dwelling and its occupational status. Immigrants and their children are less frequently homeowners and more frequently occupy social housing than the mainstream population. This is particularly true for people originating from North and sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey. One fifth of respondents from Algeria and sub-Saharan Africa report that they have been discriminated against, regarding access to housing. The feeling of segregation is strongest among social housing tenants, particularly immigrants and DOM native-borns.

## 1 | Type of housing occupancy as a reflection of social status

Being a homeowner or living in either social housing or private rented accommodation is a good indication of social status in French society, with persons who have the resources to acquire property at one end of the scale and those who resort to social housing at the other end.<sup>(1)</sup> Variations in the proportions of homeowners among immigrants of different origins and their descendants reveal three types of closely intertwined factors. The first type of factor relates to the amount of time since a particular migration wave took place, as immigrants who have been in France for a long time have naturally had more opportunity to acquire property. Next come residential strategies, reflecting different attitudes towards housing and home ownership. For instance, owning property is culturally more important for southern Europeans and Asians (see below). Lastly, disparities in access to home ownership signal inequalities in resources depending on the immigrants' origins.

An analysis of home ownership reveals that immigrants can be divided into two groups (Fig. 1). The first of these contains immigrants whose home ownership rates

\* INED.


\*\* Université Paris Sorbonne-Paris IV.

(1) These indications should be regarded as tendencies and do not exclude the possibility that some private rented accommodation may represent less favourable living conditions than social housing. Conversely, some social housing is just as good as private rented accommodation in terms of comfort and location. Lastly, social housing units are extremely heterogeneous and many researchers have reported that the least enviable ones are often allocated to immigrants.

are similar to that of the mainstream population (57%), with immigrants from Italy and the Iberian Peninsula, and Europeans from the other EU-27 countries, as well as immigrants from Southeast Asia, who actually have an even higher rate. A variety of different factors appear to be at work here. Southern European immigrants, for instance, have been in metropolitan France for a long time and the proportion of homeowners is close to that of the mainstream population. Then again, although immigrants from Southeast Asia arrived more recently, property ownership appears to be particularly important to them. The second group is characterized by rather lower rates of property ownership, ranging from 38% for Turkish immigrants to 27% for North African immigrants and a mere 13% for persons from sub-Saharan Africa. These sizeable gaps are slightly narrower for descendants of immigrants, but we need to control for the greater effects of age before we can come to any firm conclusions.

Approximately 56% of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Algeria live in social housing. In second position come immigrants from Morocco, DOM native-borns and immigrants from Turkey (more than 40%). These two groups of immigrants clearly represent the most socially deprived “customers” of social housing. Rates fall sharply in our third and final group. Ranked in decreasing order, this group contains immigrants from Southeast Asia, Spain and Italy, then Portugal, the mainstream population, and finally, at below 10%, other EU-27 immigrants. Nonetheless, these figures should not disguise the fact that more than 63% of social

Figure 1 - Dwelling occupancy status by origin




Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Metropolitan France, persons aged 18-50 who no longer live with their parents and who are not non rent-paying tenants.



Figure 2 - Housing transitions by origin



Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Metropolitan France, persons aged 18-50 who no longer live with their parents, who are not non rent-paying tenants and who have moved in the last five years.

Note • These graphs are based on the results of a matrix of housing occupancy status transitions. This matrix crosses the previous status of the resident (owner, social housing tenant, private tenant) with the current status. The first graph reads as follows: among former home owners in the mainstream population 64% are again owners, 5% are now social housing tenants and 31% are private tenants.

housing units are occupied by the mainstream population. Rates are lower for the descendants of immigrants, especially in the case of those whose parents came from Africa, North Africa, Turkey, or are DOM native-borns, although the overall order remains unchanged. When we look at the proportions of homeowners, private tenants and social housing tenants, we find that the pattern of occupation by the parents is reproduced, albeit in a “minor key”, by their children.

## 2 | Less favourable transitions between types of housing for immigrants and, to a lesser extent, for their children

Transitions in residential status can be used to track each group’s residential trajectory. While the classic transition in France is from tenant to homeowner, it is by no means universal. Even so, changes such as these can give a broad indication of the ability of different sections of the population to engage in a certain upward mobility, moving from social housing to private rented accommodation and thence to home ownership – a process not dissimilar to the residential integration identified by the Chicago School.<sup>(2)</sup>

We compared the current and previous residential status of respondents who had changed their accommodation in the course of the previous five years. We did not control for income, age, employment or location, and our results are purely descriptive. They reveal a degree of inertia, along the lines of “once a homeowner, social tenant or private tenant, always a homeowner, social tenant or private tenant” (Fig. 2). Nonetheless, individuals do not consistently retain their previous status when they move. Where changes in status do occur, mainstream homeowners less frequently move into social housing (5%) than into private rented accommodation (31%). Descendants of immigrants and their immigrant parents, on the other hand, more frequently move into social housing, either due to their poorer social status (lower income, more often unemployed, etc.) or because they have less access to private accommodation, due to high rents and housing discrimination (see below).

(2) Park, R. E., 1926, “The urban community as a spatial pattern and a moral order”, in E. W. Burgess (ed.), *The Urban Community*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, (pp. 3-18).


Looking in greater detail at the immigrant population, the shift from home ownership to social housing is most frequent among individuals of Turkish origin (37%), followed by those from sub-Saharan Africa (29%) and lastly by immigrants from North Africa (26%) (figures not shown here). In all probability, some of them were living in substandard accommodation and were rehoused as a result of redevelopment or conjugal breakdown.

Turning our attention to former social housing tenants, 64% of immigrants and 55% of their children remain social housing tenants, way ahead of the mainstream population (37%). At first sight, it is the latter who enjoy the greatest upward residential mobility. For some of them, this type of accommodation affords them a breathing space, allowing them to save up to purchase a home. Accordingly, when they move out of social housing, 34% of mainstream tenants become homeowners, compared with 21% of immigrants and 23% of their children. Here once more, there are striking differences between immigrants of different origins, with immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa becoming property owners far less frequently (15% and 9% respectively) than DOM native-borns (30%) or immigrants from Southeast Asia (43%).

Clearly then, immigrants' residential behaviour varies and "lumping" them all together, regardless of their origins, disguises the disparities between them. For instance, as we have just seen, Southeast Asian immigrants 4.5 times more frequently become home owners upon leaving social housing than their sub-Saharan African counterparts.

Furthermore, the types of residential transitions reported by descendants of immigrants fit neatly between those recorded for the mainstream population and for

Figure 3 - Perceived discrimination in access to housing



immigrants. This can be interpreted either positively, as evidence of clear residential integration, or negatively, as proof of the persistence of discrimination and low social status, albeit in a less severe form.

### **3 | Housing discrimination is particularly keenly felt by immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa**

Immigrants and their children always have greater difficulty finding accommodation, due to the discrimination they are apt to encounter. For the purposes of the Trajectories and Origins survey, housing discrimination was defined as “refusal of accommodation for no valid reason” within the last five years. At the present time, there is nothing to suggest that this indicator either underestimates or overestimates actual discrimination. On this basis, experience of discrimination is reported by 13% of immigrants and 9% of their children, of whom 70% and 53%, respectively, cite skin colour or origin as one of the motives for the discrimination (Fig. 3). Although this level is, of course, unacceptably high, in absolute terms it is relatively low, as it concerns approximately one immigrant or descendant of immigrants out of ten. It is nonetheless 2.5 times higher for immigrants and 1.5 times higher for descendants of immigrants and for DOM native-borns than it is for the mainstream population. It should be noted that immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa once again stand out from the rest, in that they nearly 3.5-4.5 times more frequently feel that they have suffered housing discrimination.

### **4 | Perceptions of “immigrant concentration”<sup>(3)</sup> are twice as frequent among immigrants occupying social housing**

Another dimension of housing quality is perceived segregation within the neighbourhood. The question posed in the survey did not explicitly refer to segregation, but instead asked respondents to estimate the proportion of immigrants living in their particular neighbourhood. These results are striking, as immigrants report that they live in a neighbourhood where at least half the inhabitants are of immigrant origin nearly three times more frequently (47%) than the mainstream population (16%) (Fig. 4.) This figure falls to 36% for descendants of immigrants. Conversely, immigrants and their descendants report living in a neighbourhood where virtually none of the other residents are of immigrant origin nearly twice as frequently (26% and 35%, respectively), versus 60% among the mainstream population. Respondents claimed to be fully aware of their neighbourhood’s population make-up, as only about 5% reported that they were unable to gauge its immigrant origins.


The greater the social and “ethnic” mix, the greater the disparities in terms of home ownership and social or private tenancy. Thus, in a neighbourhood where at least half the population are immigrants, the ratio of social tenants to homeowners is 3:1 for the mainstream population and approximately 2.5:1 for immigrants and their children. Social housing is always more frequently associated than other forms of residence with an overrepresentation of immigrants.

Next, perceived segregation is twice as frequent among immigrants living in social housing as it is among mainstream social tenants. Conversely, persons

---

(3) These subjective estimates of the proportion of immigrants in a given neighbourhood can be interpreted as a subjective indicator of the spatial concentration of disadvantaged populations, and thus of segregation.

Figure 4 - Perceived "concentration of immigrants" in the neighbourhood



Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Metropolitan France, persons aged 18-50 who no longer live with their parents and who are not non rent-paying tenants.

Interpretation • 71.6% of immigrants who are social housing tenants report living in a neighbourhood where at least half the inhabitants are of immigrant origin.

belonging to the mainstream population and immigrants and descendants of immigrants living in sensitive neighbourhoods (ZUS) share relatively similar perceptions of segregation (although there is a 10% difference between the first group and the last two), thereby underscoring the high concentration of immigrants in these types of neighbourhoods. These observations show that social tenants are – or at least report themselves to be – less segregated when they belong to the mainstream population than when they are immigrants or descendants of immigrants. This finding is not particularly surprising and is in line with previous studies.<sup>(4)</sup>

For their part, immigrants report perceived segregation 30% less frequently if they live in private rented accommodation than if they live in social housing. This suggests that when they are subject to housing allocation rules, they end up in areas of considerable segregation, whereas when they are given the choice,<sup>(5)</sup> they settle in less segregated neighbourhoods. With the exception of Turkish immigrants, who are characterized by more frequent perceptions of segregation, immigrants' origins make very little difference to neighbourhood segregation rates.

At first sight, results appear to support analyses implying that the population distribution policies of certain social landlords and local decision-makers objectively result in segregation.<sup>(6)</sup> However, multivariate analyses need to be carried out using contextual data (proportion of immigrants in the neighbourhood, etc.) in order to confirm this finding.

(4) Pan Ké Shon J.-L., 2010, "The ambivalent nature of ethnic segregation in France's disadvantaged neighbourhoods", *Urban Studies*, 47(8), p. 1603-1623.

(5) Private rented accommodation is less constrained by the rule in social housing whereby applicants are offered three choices. If they reject them all, they have to start the application process all over again.

(6) Simon P., 1998, "Ghettos, immigrants, and integration. The French dilemma", *Netherland Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 13(1); Tanter A., Toubon J.-C., 1999, "Mixité sociale et politiques de peuplement: genèse de l'ethnisation des opérations de réhabilitation", *Sociétés contemporaines*, 33-34; Tissot S., 2005, "Une 'discrimination informelle'? Usage du concept de mixité sociale dans la gestion des attributions de logement HLM", *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 159.

## Spheres of Sociability: Family Relations versus Social Relations

*Laure Moguérou\**, *Emmanuelle Santelli\*\**

The Trajectories and Origins survey allowed us to examine the variability of life styles and cultural references that organize social relations. The spheres of proximity that mark out ways of organizing relationships in private space (degrees of proximity to the family circle, mutual support and sociability) are constructed differently for cultural reasons (finding people who share the same life style), for migratory reasons (the conditions in which people are welcomed and settled in a country vary according to the period concerned and their minority status) and for social reasons (relating to social status, inequality and segregation). Here we will deal with respondents' residential location and their relations with parents and family in comparison to those with friends and neighbours. We wanted to determine what the conditions were for a stronger focus on the family circle by analysing the respective importance of family, friend and neighbour relationships in respondents' sphere of sociability.

Our analysis revealed that descendants of immigrants live for longer with their parents than the mainstream population, and that once they have left the family home they tend to live closer to them, usually in the same city or neighbourhood. This is especially true of descendants of North African and Turkish immigrants. In both these groups, residential proximity goes hand-in-hand with closer relationships with the family circle. While descendants of Portuguese immigrants (and to a lesser extent of Spanish and Italian) live further away from their parents (but in the same region) they also have close family relationships. Both descendants of immigrants and the mainstream population behaved in similar fashion with regard to relations with friends and neighbours.

An immigration characteristic shared by all migrants arriving in France as adults is that people leave behind part, if not all, of their family circle. Yet this lack of family relationships is not offset by closer friendships, and relations with neighbours are similar to those of the mainstream population.

---

\* Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense (UPO)-INED.

\*\* CNRS-INED.

## 1 | Spatial proximity: living with one's parents

General population surveys have shown that women tend to leave the family home earlier than men,<sup>(1)</sup> mainly because they form couples earlier. Our results confirmed this: at the time of the survey, fewer women, whatever their age<sup>(2)</sup> or origin (or of those of their parents), were living with their parents (Table 1). Descendants of immigrants, whatever the age group, lived longer with their parents than other groups, and for longer than the mainstream population (30% vs. 17%).

Male descendants of North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish immigrants (Table 2) also left home later. Between the age of 26 and 35, 35% of descendants of Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants, 36% of descendants of Sahelian African immigrants and 27% of descendants of Turkish immigrants were still living with their parents, versus only 12% of men of the same age in the mainstream population. Greater professional instability (see the chapters on employment) combined with a lesser propensity to forming couples outside marriage (see the chapter on couples) may explain why these men leave home later. Parental control over their offspring, and especially in the case of young women, also delay the age at which they leave their parents' homes. This was confirmed among female descendants of sub-Saharan African and Turkish immigrants among whom 25% and 22%, respectively, in the 26 to 35 age group lived with their parents at the time of the survey (compared with 7% of women of the same age in the mainstream population). Financial parameters

**Table 1 - Co-residence with parents and residential proximity of non co-resident children by link to migration (%)**

		Share of persons who live with one or both parents at the time of the survey	Unweighted numbers	Parents of ego (or one of them) live(s)...						Total	Unweighted numbers
				... nearby (same neighbourhood, same town)	... in the same region	... in another region	... in another country, a DOM	Parents are unknown, dead, out of touch			
Immigrants who arrived before age 17	Overall	23	2,345	24	31	15	24	7	100	1,852	
	Males	26	1,146	24	29	16	24	7	100	860	
	Females	21	1,199	25	33	13	23	6	100	992	
Immigrants who arrived at age 17 or above	Overall	3	4,028	2	2	2	81	13	100	3,909	
	Males	3	1,777	2	2	2	82	12	100	1,721	
	Females	4	2,251	2	2	2	80	14	100	2,188	
Immigrants (all ages at arrival)	Overall	11	6,373	9	11	6	63	11	100	5,761	
	Males	12	2,923	10	11	6	63	10	100	2,581	
	Females	10	3,450	9	12	5	63	12	100	3,180	
Descendants of one or two immigrants	Overall	30	8,110	27	41	18	8	6	100	5,083	
	Males	33	3,866	26	41	19	8	6	100	2,210	
	Females	27	4,244	28	41	17	8	6	100	2,873	
Mainstream population	Overall	17	3,186	20	47	26	1	6	100	2,593	
	Males	20	1,522	20	46	27	1	6	100	1,177	
	Females	14	1,664	20	49	24	1	6	100	1,416	
All metropolitan population	Overall	18	17,669	20	43	23	9	7	100	13,437	
	Males	21	8,311	19	42	24	9	6	100	5,968	
	Females	15	9,358	20	44	22	9	7	100	7,469	

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-50.

Interpretation • 80% of men in the mainstream population aged 18-50 were not living with their parents at the time of the survey. Among those not living with their parents, 20% were living in the same neighbourhood or the same town as one or both parents.

(1) Sebille P., 2009, "Un passage à l'âge adulte en mutation ?" in Régnier-Loilier A. (ed.), *Portraits de familles: l'enquête Etudes des Relations Intergénérationnelles*, Paris, Ed. INED, Grandes Enquêtes, pp. 315-340.

(2) The differences by age are not included in the table, but were systematically controlled.

should also be taken into account to see whether the lack of job security for descendants of immigrants (and in particular those whose parents were from North or sub-Saharan Africa) is also an obstacle to their independence.

**Table 2 - Co-residence with parents and residential proximity of non co-resident descendants of one or two immigrants or DOM native-borns by parents' origin (%)**

Country or <i>département</i> of birth of the parents of immigrants or DOM native-borns		Share of persons who live with one or both parents at the time of the survey	Unweighted numbers	Parents of ego (or one of them) live(s)...						Total	Unweighted numbers
				nearby (same neighbourhood, same town)	in the same region	in another region	in another country, a DOM	Parents are unknown, dead, out of touch			
DOM	Overall	34	650	16	42	19	19	3	100	405	
	Males	39	307	15	37	19	26	3	100	176	
	Females	28	343	18	47	20	13	3	100	229	
Algeria	Overall	29	1,306	35	36	15	8	6	100	867	
	Males	32	582	33	38	14	9	6	100	362	
	Females	27	724	36	34	16	7	6	100	505	
Morocco and Tunisia	Overall	45	1,122	28	40	18	10	4	100	593	
	Males	52	487	29	40	18	10	4	100	209	
	Females	38	635	28	40	18	10	4	100	384	
Sahelian Africa	Overall	59	480	15	41	24	17	4	100	169	
	Males	61	214	13	41	24	20	2	100	62	
	Females	57	266	18	40	23	14	5	100	107	
West and Central Africa	Overall	48	333	16	36	22	20	6	100	150	
	Males	56	156	19	39	17	25	-	100	57	
	Females	42	177	15	34	25	17	9	100	93	
Southeast Asia	Overall	49	573	19	46	23	8	4	100	242	
	Males	59	299	22	43	26	4	6	100	97	
	Females	37	274	18	49	20	12	2	100	145	
Turkey	Overall	53	447	41	34	14	11	1	100	186	
	Males	52	213	33	46	8	12	2	100	78	
	Females	54	234	51	20	20	9	-	100	108	
Portugal	Overall	30	933	27	47	13	12	1	100	654	
	Males	34	469	29	44	14	12	1	100	302	
	Females	24	464	25	51	12	12	1	100	352	
Spain and Italy	Overall	15	1,692	26	43	19	6	7	100	1,398	
	Males	16	829	24	42	21	6	7	100	665	
	Females	14	863	28	45	16	5	7	100	733	
Other EU-27 countries	Overall	16	649	17	41	24	3	15	100	529	
	Males	17	317	15	39	27	3	17	100	247	
	Females	13	332	20	43	22	3	13	100	282	
Other countries	Overall	44	575	24	37	25	7	7	100	295	
	Males	51	300	23	37	28	8	4	100	131	
	Females	37	275	25	37	23	6	9	100	164	
Mainstream population	Overall	17	3,186	20	47	26	1	6	100	2,593	
	Males	20	1,522	20	46	27	1	6	100	1,177	
	Females	14	1,664	20	49	24	1	6	100	1,416	
All metropolitan population	Overall	18	17,669	20	43	23	9	7	100	13,437	
	Males	21	8,311	19	42	24	9	6	100	5,968	
	Females	15	9,358	20	44	22	9	7	100	7,469	

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-50.

Interpretation • 52% of male descendants of immigrants from Turkey aged 18-50 were living one or both parents at the time of the survey.

## 2 | Degree of spatial proximity to parents

Individuals not living with their parents at the time of the survey were grouped into categories according to whether they were living close to one or both of their parents (in the same city or neighbourhood), in the same region, or in another country. Another category included individuals whose parents had died, were unknown to them or with whom they had lost touch (Tables 1 and 2).

Immigrants were clearly identified according to their age on arrival, and 90% of those who arrived at age 17 or above lived far away from their parents, usually as a result of their migration. The behaviour of immigrants who arrived as children or adolescents (mostly with their parents) is similar to that of descendants of immigrants, although more of them lived further away from their parents. The disparities in the time of migration reflect the age effect (immigrants who arrived before the age of 17 being younger on average than the others) and the effect of their status when they arrived in France (young immigrants usually came to join one or more family members). More descendants of immigrants and immigrants who arrived as children lived close to their parents (same city or neighbourhood) than individuals in the mainstream population (27% and 20% respectively). That is especially true for the youngest among them: 31% of descendants aged 18-25 lived close to their parents compared with 22% of the mainstream population. Descendants of immigrants from Turkey (41%), Algeria (35%), Morocco and Tunisia (28%) more frequently stay in the same city or neighbourhood after leaving their parents' homes, and this is also true, albeit to a lesser extent, for descendants of southern European immigrants. The most common situation was living in the same region as one or both parents, which was the case for 41% of descendants of immigrants and 47% of the mainstream population (only descendants of Portuguese and Southeast Asian immigrants and descendants of DOM native-borns had comparable rates).

Geographic distance from parents was the norm for descendants of DOM native-borns and of sub-Saharan African immigrants, where more than 35% lived in another region or country.<sup>(3)</sup> Their situation is similar to that of the immigrants who arrived in France at an early age, whereas 80% of the parents of immigrants who had arrived after the age of 16 lived in another country.

Conversely, descendants of immigrants from Portugal (especially women), Turkey, and North Africa were more likely to live close to their parents. The asymmetry between men and women with regard to parental proximity has been observed in general population surveys and is confirmed here for women of almost all origins.<sup>(4)</sup> While women leave their parents' homes earlier than men, they generally tend to live closer. This leads us to ask whether or not the degree of proximity/distance to parents affects family relations.

---

(3) In these two groups, more than one third of individuals who still lived with their parents, in fact only lived with their mothers.

(4) Bonvalet C. and Maison D., 1999, "Famille et entourage, le jeu des proximités" in Bonvalet C., Gotman A. and Grafmeyer Y. (eds), *La famille et ses proches: l'aménagement des territoires*, Travaux et Documents, INED, Cahier 143, pp. 27-67.



### 3 | Spending time with the family

Here we looked into parent-child relationships, notably after the children leave home (Tables 3 and 4). We asked the following question: “During the past two weeks, how many times have you seen members of your nuclear or extended family (for the pleasure of seeing each other at your home or theirs, or for going out together)?” This enabled us to include relationships with the entire family network rather than just the parent-child relationship.

More than one third of immigrants who arrived after the age of 17 did not visit their families at all and lived far away from their parents (Table 3). The intensity of family relations varied according to the duration of residence in France. Some 54% of immigrants who arrived in metropolitan France as adults and had spent less than 10 years there reported having seen family members during the fortnight prior to the survey, and the proportion rose to 67% among those who had lived in France for more than 25 years. Similarly, but to a lesser extent, descendants of DOM native-borns were both geographically distant from their parents and more distant in their relationships, since more than one quarter had not seen their families in the fortnight prior to the survey (Table 4).

The previous section showed that male and female descendants of North African immigrants lived closer to their parents than the mainstream population. This spatial proximity also went hand-in-hand with more frequent family contact. That was also true for descendants of southern European immigrants. Fewer lived in the same city or neighbourhood as their parents but they were often in the same region. While more than half the descendants of Turkish immigrants lived in the same city or neighbourhood as their parents, only the women visited their families regularly. Women whose parents originally came from Sahelian Africa, Southeast Asia or Turkey also reported close relationships with their family circles.

**Table 3 - Spending time with family, friends and neighbours by link to migration and sex**

		Family	Friends	Neighbours	Unweighted numbers
Immigrants who arrived before age 17	Overall	82	85	40	1,850
	Males	80	87	40	858
	Females	83	84	41	992
Immigrants who arrived at age 17 or above	Overall	58	83	44	3,902
	Males	58	86	43	1,718
	Females	58	81	44	2,184
Immigrants (all ages at arrival)	Overall	66	84	43	5,752
	Males	66	86	42	2,576
	Females	65	82	43	3,176
Descendants of one or two immigrants	Overall	87	88	38	5,077
	Males	85	88	38	2,209
	Females	88	87	38	2,868
Mainstream population	Overall	83	90	44	2,592
	Males	81	90	45	1,177
	Females	84	89	44	1,415
All metropolitan population	Overall	81	89	44	13,421
	Males	79	90	44	5,962
	Females	82	88	43	7,459

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-50 not living with their parents.

Interpretation • 88% of female descendants of immigrants aged 18-50 not living with their parents had spent time with members of their family in the two weeks preceding the survey. 38% reported spending time with their neighbours.

Indeed all women, whether descendants of immigrants or in the mainstream population, reported more frequent contact with their families than men (Table 3) and that was confirmed for almost all immigrant groups.<sup>(5)</sup> It is usually up to the women to maintain family relationships, including the spouse's family.<sup>(6)</sup> People living in a couple (and women more usually than men), claimed to have closer relationships with family members than single people, and 88% of descendants of immigrants (86% of men and 89% of women) who lived with their spouses, reported having seen their families in the fortnight preceding the survey, compared with only 84% of single people (82% of men and 85% of women). In the mainstream population the percentages were 79% of single people and 84% of those living with a spouse.

The intensity of parental relationships usually varies according to periods in the individuals' life cycles, being relatively intense when they are young and decreasing as they grow independent. However, the relationship may be reactivated at certain moments of people's lives, especially when the children become parents in turn, or later when their own parents become dependent.<sup>(7)</sup> Family relations appear to be closest when people are in the 26-35 year age group – the time when they start their own families – and here there was hardly any difference between descendants of immigrants and the mainstream population.

**Table 4 - Spending time with family, friends and neighbours by parents' country or département of birth and sex (%)**

Country or <i>département</i> of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants or DOM native-borns	Family	Friends	Neighbours	Unweighted numbers
DOM	75	88	30	405
Algeria	88	88	33	866
Morocco and Tunisia	87	85	37	591
Sahelian Africa	85	89	25	169
West and Central Africa	81	91	32	150
Southeast Asia	84	94	35	242
Turkey	84	87	44	186
Portugal	90	90	39	654
Spain and Italy	88	88	41	1,397
Other EU-27 countries	82	86	37	529
Other countries	83	90	42	293
Mainstream population	83	90	44	2,592
All metropolitan population	81	89	44	13,421

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-50 not living with their parents.

Interpretation • 88% of descendants of Algerian immigrants not living with their parents had spent time with members of their family in the two weeks preceding the survey. 33% reported spending time with their neighbours.

(5) In the subsequent analyses we will not mention gender distinctions, largely because of the differences between men and women in spending time with friends and neighbours are small.

(6) Bonvalet C., and Maison D., 1999, *op. cit.*

(7) Régnier-Loilier A. and Vivas E., 2009, "Les déterminants de la fréquence des rencontres entre parents et enfants" in Régnier-Loilier A. (ed.), *Portraits de familles: l'enquête Études des Relations Intergénérationnelles*, Paris, Ed. INED, Grandes Enquêtes, pp. 427-451.

## 4 | Family relations versus social ones

Immigrants' family ties may strengthen with the duration of residence, but their relationships with friends follow an inverse process (except for women, but they see less of their friends than men in any case). However, for both men and women, whatever their origins, friendships with neighbours tend to increase with the length of time spent in France. Compared with all the other groups, immigrants who arrived as adults and the mainstream population enjoy the greatest amount of sociability with neighbours.

Very few individuals in all the groups (always less than 20%) reported not seeing any friends in the fortnight preceding the survey, and there was very little difference here between descendants of immigrants and the mainstream population. With the exception of descendants of sub-Saharan African immigrants, there was little overall difference between men and women in spending time with friends. In fact, there is a relatively wide male-female discrepancy at a young age, which tends to diminish over time. While 96% of descendants of immigrants aged between 18 and 25 reported having seen their friends in the fortnight preceding the survey, the percentage fell to 85% in the 35 and over age group, and from 92% to 85% among the women. Proportions in the mainstream population were similar. Similarly, young men spent more time with their neighbours than young women did, but the gap tended to disappear with age. There are fairly standard results, since the peer network, which is especially dense among young people, tends to shrink with age, and male sociability – especially in youth – largely takes place in the neighbourhood or district.

Descendants of immigrants, with the exception of women of Turkish origin, spent time with their neighbours relatively less frequently than individuals from the mainstream population. We observed a relative convergence of friendship behaviour between descendants of immigrants and the mainstream population but the two groups differed in the share of family relationships in their sphere of sociability. The weakness of family relationships of immigrants who arrived in France as adults is not entirely offset by a larger network of friendships. However, the compensatory effect is stronger for relationships with neighbours.



# Civic Life and Political Participation

Vincent Tiberj\*, Patrick Simon\*\*

For immigrants or people with immigrant origins, getting involved in civic life and taking part in politics are often viewed as important aspects of integration into the adopted country. People's investment in civic society is strongly influenced by the degree of trust they place in institutions such as school, public services, and in particular, the police force. This is reflected, among other things, in their political participation, which is understood here as electoral registration, an issue that aroused a great deal of debate in France during the 2005 violence in the Parisian suburbs, and in the country's "multi-cultural" political positioning.

## 1 | The logic of trust

Trust in institutions is one of the foundations of social cohesion.<sup>(1)</sup> It depends on the expectations people have in them and the capacity of those institutions to live up to those expectations and treat their users respectfully. People have contrasting views of these institutions, depending on their end use and operating methods. The survey collected opinions regarding justice, the police, the employment services and schools. Schools, which convey aspirations of social promotion and access to knowledge, were trusted almost unanimously (86% and 94% depending on the respondents' origins) (Figures 1 and 2).

There was less of a consensus about the three other institutions in the survey although they did inspire confidence on the whole. Immigrants were systematically less critical of the justice and employment services than members of the mainstream populations or descendants of immigrants. This may be due to a reluctance to criticize the institutions of a host country (the "politeness of foreigners"<sup>(2)</sup>), but also possibly because they were perceived as functioning correctly in comparison with the same institutions in their country of origin. Continued high unemployment does impact the relatively poor perception of the employment services, but that is also due to a reputation effect more than to direct experience, for the groups most exposed


\* Sciences Po, Centre d'études européennes.

\*\* INED.

(1) Putnam R., 1993, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

(2) Sayad A., 1991, *L'immigré ou les paradoxes de l'altérité*, Bruxelles, De Boeck University.


*Figure 1 - Level of trust in various institutions by origin of immigrants and DOM native-borns*



Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
 Population • Persons aged 18-50.

to unemployment were not those who were the most disillusioned with the system. The divergence in trust by origin is greater with regard to the two sovereign institutions of justice and the police. The mainstream population is fairly trustful of these institutions, and slightly more so for the police than for justice (75% vs. 71%), and the same is true for southern European immigrants and their descendants, whereas North African and sub-Saharan African immigrants and their descendants are more reserved about the police. In fact, mistrust of the police force is especially high among the descendants of those two immigrant groups. This difference cannot be explained merely by an aversion to repressive institutions, or there would be no statistical difference between their perceptions of justice and of the police. The difference becomes clear when placed in relation to the frequency of contact these people have with the police force.

Figure 2 - Level of trust in various institutions by origin of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns



Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
Population • Persons aged 18-50.


## 2 | Police controls

Police identity checks are a source of controversy with young people from working class backgrounds, especially those of immigrant origin, and are regularly reported in the press. A recent study based on *in situ* observations established the existence of controls based on people’s looks that targeted young men visibly from ethnic minorities who adopted “youth” dress codes.<sup>(3)</sup> The Trajectories and Origins survey recorded the frequency of police controls as reported by respondents. The chances of young people being controlled by the police once in the course of the year were the same, whatever the respondents’ origins. Conversely, there were significant differences when it came to repeated controls. More than 20% of second-generation youth of North African, Turkish or sub-Saharan African origin had experienced several controls in the course of the year (rising to 27% for the last category) whereas only 13% of the mainstream population was controlled.

(3) Goris I., Jobard F. and Lévy R. (2009), *Police et minorités visibles: les contrôles d’identité à Paris*, New York, Open Society Institute.

The main parameters governing the frequency of controls are age, residential area, and sex. But among the men in the 20-25 year age group, all other things being equal, our analyses show that descendants of North African immigrants have a 47% probability of being controlled several times by the police, rising to 50% for descendants of sub-Saharan African immigrants. By contrast, descendants of Spanish or Italian immigrants “only” have a 32% chance (33% for people with no foreign origins). This factor clearly influences people’s trust in the police force: 25% of persons who had not been controlled claimed they did not trust the police, but the percentage rose to 54% for those who had been controlled several times.

**Figure 3 - Frequency of police controls over the previous year by origin of immigrants, DOM native-borns and their descendants**



### 3 | Registering and voting

Despite the rising abstention rate and new types of political participation, voting is still the central and supreme political act in democracy. Naturally, only those immigrants and descendants of immigrants who hold French nationality can register to vote (which accounts for more than 97% of the second generation but only 40% of immigrants aged 18-50). However, since 1992, European Union citizens may vote in municipal and European elections.<sup>(4)</sup> The electoral registration rate recorded in the survey showed that few people actually do so. Only 27% of foreigners with an EU nationality reported having registered to vote, and of that percentage, 75% reported having voted in municipal elections, which in total is a mere 20% of active citizens in this group.

(4) Strudel S., 2004, “La participation des Portugais aux élections européennes et municipales en France”, Cahiers de l’Urmis, 9, pp. 69-76.



Earlier surveys recorded weak electoral registration rates for immigrants and their descendants but this was no longer the case in the Trajectories and Origins survey where rates for persons with French nationality did not fluctuate greatly according to origin, ranging from 90% for the mainstream population to 75% for Turkish immigrants and their descendants. In other ethnic groups, between 80% and 90% had registered to vote. But after controlling for age, level of education, place of residence and duration in the place of residence, we observed that most naturalized immigrants were half as likely to register on the electoral roll as the mainstream population. Turkish immigrants were no different from the others, including European immigrants. Descendants of immigrants, whatever their origins, were as likely (or more likely) to register as their counterparts in the mainstream population. Lastly, DOM native-borns and their descendants were significantly less likely to register.

In addition to voter registration, the survey also recorded participation in the last elections prior to the survey, namely the municipal ones in 2008 and the presidential elections of 2007.

Participation in the municipal elections showed more perceptible variations, while the presidential elections strongly mobilized voters of all origins (89% on average). Only three groups reported participation below 80%: descendants of Turkish, Southeast Asian and sub-Saharan African immigrants. The second generations were less mobilized overall than naturalized immigrants and the mainstream population, even though here too, most of the discrepancies were due to differences in social status. This was also true for the municipal elections, albeit with a greater abstention rate, at 20% on average, but rising to more than 30% for descendants of DOM native-borns and second generation sub-Saharan Africans, almost 35% for descendants of Southeast Asian immigrants, and 40% for descendants of Turkish immigrants.

## 4 | Political positioning


The positioning of “multicultural France” on the left-right political scale aroused a great deal of debate during the 2007 and 2008 elections. In surveys, questions on this sensitive issue often receive no reply at all or an apolitical one of the “neither left nor right” type, which we shall call the “neither-nors”. There was a high level of this neutral “neither-nor” positioning in the Trajectories and Origins survey, but it was not exceptional when compared with other recent surveys.<sup>(5)</sup> It may be that immigrants and their descendants are reluctant to position themselves politically, but our model explains these evasive replies by the variables measuring political knowledge (education, sex, interest in politics) rather than by variables related to origin (notably the fact of having French nationality).

“Multi-cultural France” clearly leans to the left compared to the mainstream population (Figure 4). Only two groups appear to be right-leaning in similar proportions to the mainstream population, namely immigrants from the EU 27 countries excluding Portugal, Spain and Italy, and descendants of immigrants from the other EU 27 countries. At the other end of the spectrum are descendants of sub-Saharan African and Algerian immigrants (in both cases 46% positioned themselves on the left) as well as sub-Saharan African and Algerian immigrants themselves (36% and 32% respectively). A very small minority in these four groups (less than

---

(5) Thus in the mainstream population, 31% of respondents claimed to be “neither nor”, and 8.5% refused to reply, whereas in the political confidence barometer (CEVIPOF 2009), the respective proportions were 38% and 3%.

Figure 4 - Political positioning on a right-left scale, by origin



10%), positioned themselves on the right. Furthermore some groups of descendants of immigrants lean further to the left than immigrants of the same origin.

This left-alignment may be explained by the influence of the ethnic environment (a factor that should diminish with social integration and mobility<sup>(6)</sup>), religion, and, according to some researchers,<sup>(7)</sup> the effect of racial and ethnic discrimination. The social hypothesis was partly validated by regression analysis in the case of immigrants from Spain, Italy, Asia and the rest of Europe. We observed a convergence with the mainstream population for immigrants, DOM native-borns and their descendants (Table 1), who tend to follow the political alignments of their social and occupational environments. Conversely, we observed a growing

polarization by origin for the other migratory groups. While Algerian immigrants did not appear to be significantly more left-leaning than the mainstream population, all other things being equal,<sup>(8)</sup> their descendants were three times more likely to be left-leaning, and we found the same trend among DOM native-borns and sub-Saharan African and Turkish immigrants. In other words, people's origins are increasingly influencing their political stance. It is certainly no coincidence that these groups also suffer the most discrimination.

(6) Dahl R., 1961, *Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

(7) Brouard S., Tiberj V., 2005, *Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine et turque*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po; Rogers Reuel, 2006, *Afro-Caribbean Immigrants and the Politics of Incorporation: Ethnicity, Exception or Exit*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

(8) In this case, the non-significance may be explained by the multicollinearity with the religious variable, since 87% of Algerian immigrants reported being Muslim. In the regression analysis, reporting this religion doubled the probability of being left-leaning compared with those reporting no religion.

**Table 1 - Odds ratio of being on the left rather than on the right by origin  
(reference: mainstream population)**

	Immigrants and DOM native-borns	Descendants
DOM	2.2 ***	4.0 ***
Algeria	1.4	2.9 ***
Morocco and Tunisia	1.4	1.7 ***
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.2 ***	4.9 ***
Southeast Asia	0.6 *	1.3
Turkey	0.8	2.0 ***
Portugal	1.0	1.8 ***
Spain and Italy	2.1 **	1.6 ***
OtherEU-27 countries	0.8	1.1
Other countries	0.9	1.8 ***

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-50.

Note • These odds ratios were derived from a multinomial logistic regression where the other independent variables were age, social class, educational level, home ownership, religion and sex.



## Nationality and National Belonging

*Patrick Simon\**

While all immigrants have a foreign nationality when they arrive in France, some will acquire French nationality over time. They can do this in several ways and all procedures taken together, 42 % of immigrants will become French. Among descendants of immigrants born in France, 97% have French nationality. Since there is no contradiction in keeping a foreign nationality, just over 20% of immigrants and one third of their descendants have dual nationality. Both subjectively and legally, dual nationality reflects an attachment that can be gauged through questions on national belonging. In the context of the recent French debate on national identity, “feeling French” goes beyond a personal relationship with nationality, it is also a recognition of this belonging by the other members of the national community.

Nationalities of immigrants living in France are collected in the census, while the ministry in charge of immigration records the annual flows of citizenship acquisition. In 2009, among the 133,500 foreigners who acquired French nationality, some 92,000 were naturalized by decree, and 16,355 obtained nationality by marrying a French national.<sup>(1)</sup> These are in addition to the 800,000 people who have acquired nationality since the early 2000s. According to the Trajectories and Origins survey, 41% of immigrants aged 18-60 living in metropolitan France, are French. Children born in France of foreign parents come under a delayed *jus soli* nationality law: foreigners at birth<sup>(2)</sup>, they become automatically French when they come of age, or earlier by request. Consequently the vast majority of descendants of immigrants are French, with less than 3% reporting only foreign nationality. There are, however, two exceptions to this general rule: the percentage rises to 5% for descendants of Turkish immigrants and 8% for descendants of Portuguese immigrants.

Being French does not prevent people from having another nationality, whether it is the previous one kept on after acquiring French nationality or the parents’ nationality of origin. Little is known about these dual or – more rarely – triple, citizenship situations because they are not recorded in the census and poorly monitored by the foreign consulates. They are legal under French law but in practice not effective when the bi-national resides in France. The Trajectories and Origins survey provides details of the various nationalities held by residents in metropolitan

\* INED.

(1) Regnard C., 2010, “L’intégration ‘à la française’: plus de 130000 nouveaux Français chaque année”, Infos migrations, 16.

(2) Unless one of their parents was born in France (case of dual *jus soli*) in which case the person is French at birth.

France as well as how they were acquired in the case of French nationals. The information was gathered from the respondents' replies, which means that it may on occasion stray from strictly legal definitions. Indeed, it is possible to claim to be a dual-national without the countries concerned actually recognizing that dual nationality. Respondents may have claimed to have a nationality without holding a passport from the country. Their statement actually reflects an attachment rather than an actual legal situation. Nationality must be analysed at the intersection of legal status and the feeling of belonging to a country, as something that is asserted as much as an objective status.

The subjective aspect of “national belonging” is also broached in the survey through a series of questions/statements about attitudes and opinions, such as “I feel French”, “I feel at home in France”, or “People see me as French”. Immigrants were asked to position themselves in relation to their foreign nationality or, if they had become French, their origins. Descendants of immigrants were asked how they felt about their or parents' nationality when one or both were foreign nationals.

## 1 | Being French?

For immigrants, acquiring French nationality is directly linked to the age of arrival and length of residence in France (which are of course related but their effects may be dissociated). Indeed, 64% of immigrants who arrived before the age of 10 became French, as did 53% of those who came between the ages of 10 and 16, and 32% of those who arrived after age 16. The effect of age at arrival is considerable when we observe the differences between groups of origin. More than 80% of Southeast Asian immigrants are French, which may be explained by the political reasons for their migration and their lack of intention to return to their country of origin for those who arrived as refugees. Spanish and Italian immigrants also had high French nationality acquisition rates, largely explained by their age on arrival. However, if we consider only immigrants who arrived as adults, the percentage with French nationality follows a quite different logic. Southeast Asian immigrants continue to have the highest French nationality rate (72%), while those from North and Sub-Saharan Africa who arrived as adults more frequently acquire French nationality than southern

*Table 1 - Proportion of French nationals among immigrants by origin, sex and age at arrival (%)*

Immigrants' country of birth	Overall	Males	Females	Arrived after age 16
Algeria	45	47	43	35
Morocco and Tunisia	47	48	46	39
Sahelian Africa	29	30	29	26
West and Central Africa	43	45	42	37
Southeast Asia	81	83	78	72
Turkey	31	30	32	21
Portugal	28	22	35	12
Spain and Italy	51	48	54	15
Other EU-27 countries	26	21	29	19
Other countries	45	46	44	37
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>32</b>

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Immigrants aged 18-60.

Interpretation • 47% of males immigrants and 43% of female immigrants from Algeria have French nationality (45% overall); 35% of immigrants from Algeria who arrived after age 16 have taken French nationality.

European immigrants. The harmonization of status for European nationals living in another European Union country, has made the acquisition of French nationality less attractive.

In descriptive statistics, men become French more often than women, but a regression analysis shows that, controlling for sex, country of origin, age, education, activity, occupational category and age at arrival, women are in fact more likely to acquire French nationality. The native country effect is less marked and is only significant for Southeast Asian immigrants (high probability of becoming French) and North African immigrants (a lesser but positive probability), whereas the Portuguese are significantly less likely to become French. Conversely, after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, Turkish immigrants are in the average group and are more likely to become naturalized than southern European immigrants once the age on arrival in France is taken into account. There is a higher French nationality acquisition rate among the intermediate and higher occupational categories, and immigrants with *baccalauréat* or university-level qualifications. But the most important parameters in the process for acquiring French nationality remain the age at arrival in France and the length of residence in the country. Since there is a strong correlation between the two, it is difficult to disentangle their effects. Indeed, the fact that immigrants who arrived as children are more likely to be French is both a result of the naturalization of their parent(s), and the relative similarity of their position to that of descendants of immigrants born in France, which often leads them to consider themselves in the same way. Length of residence is a determining factor in the decision to be naturalized because settling in a country permanently transforms immigrants' original project at the time of migration. As the possibility of returning to the home country grows more distant, and attachment to the country of residence increases, the obstacles related to foreign nationality become harder to tolerate. Whether naturalization is the consequence of a functional decision or a sign of a commitment to the country of residence, it takes time to mature. In any case, a minimum of five years residence is legally required before applying, and the procedure takes 18 months on average.<sup>(3)</sup> Finally the assimilation criteria required for naturalization tend to favour the “established” profile, (or the more “natural” one according to Sayad<sup>(4)</sup>), i.e. older people, usually in employment, in a married couple and above all, having mastered both oral and written French.

## 2 | Combining nationalities

French law permits dual nationality and does not require foreigners who obtain French nationality to give up their original one. It is therefore legally possible for a naturalized immigrant to have both French nationality and another one, and vice versa (French citizens may keep their nationality after opting for a foreign one). The same holds true for descendants of foreigners born in France when they come of age or make an early declaration of French nationality between the ages of 13 and 18. We should add that this is a mere declaration and does not imply that this dual nationality is legally effective.

Predictably, dual nationality is not widespread in the mainstream population, including among individuals born in foreign countries. Only 4% of repatriates and 16% of French nationals born abroad reported having dual nationality and their

---


(3) 2008 figures from MIIINDS, or a total of 545 days.

(4) Sayad A., 1993, “Naturels et naturalisés”, *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, vol. 99, pp. 26-35.

foreign nationality is rarely passed on to their descendants born in France. Dual nationality is more frequent among immigrants (21%) and nearly half the people who have acquired French nationality have also kept their original nationality. Bi-nationals are very rare among people from Southeast Asia (less than 10%), whereas more than two thirds of North African immigrants, 55% of Turkish immigrants and 43% of Portuguese immigrants combine French nationality with that of their countries of origin. Unlike Spanish or Italian immigrants, those from the other countries in the EU 27 mainly hold on to their original nationalities when they become French.

The proportion of bi-nationals recorded in the Trajectories and Origins Survey in 2008 was far higher than in the 1992 Geographic Mobility and Social Integration Survey (MGIS).<sup>(5)</sup> Far more immigrants became French between the two surveys and bi-nationals rose from 7% (MGIS) to 67% (TeO) for Algerian immigrants and from 18% to 43% for Portuguese immigrants. While there have been no notable changes to the law since 1992, immigrant practice with regard to dual nationality has changed considerably. Having a “dual allegiance” is no longer perceived as being a contradiction in terms of loyalty and has made multi-nationality compatible affectively, if not legally.

The situation of descendants of immigrants reveals the attachment to the parents’ nationality of origin. While 95% are French, nearly one third of descendants with two immigrant parents report dual nationality. This falls to 12% for descendants of



(5) Tribalat M., Simon P. and Riandey B., 1996, *De l'immigration à l'assimilation. Enquête sur les populations d'origine étrangère en France*, “La nationalité”, Paris, La Découverte, pp.145-171.



mixed parentage. Descendants of Turkish immigrants are the most attached to their parents' nationality, but one third of descendants of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians are also bi-national. The situation is especially significant in the case of Algerians, who, because of their dual *jus soli*,<sup>(6)</sup> used to have French nationality at birth. However very few descendants of Southeast Asian immigrants have dual nationality, and it is also quite rare for individuals whose parents originally came from Italy or Spain.

### 3 | National belonging

Representations attached to nationality, which we call “national belonging”, are complex to study and cannot be captured by univocal indicators. One way of broaching the relationship to nationality is to do so indirectly through statements about how French nationality was obtained as reported by the descendants. With the exception of descendants of Algerians, who were French at birth due to their dual *jus soli*, most children of foreigners born in France are defined legally as French by declaration (when they come of age or earlier). Nationality is automatically granted when they come of age and requires no specific process. A 1993 law did render the acquisition of nationality conditional upon a “manifestation of intent” but automatic acquisition was re-established in 1998. Despite the debates surrounding every reform of the nationality law, the measures for acquiring nationality are not well understood – including by those most concerned by them – and the majority of descendants of immigrants born in France defined themselves as “French by birth” when asked (Table 2). These replies demonstrate their belief that nationality is obtained by *jus soli* even when the parents are foreigners.

Were these indirect observations confirmed by the opinion questions in the survey? One question asked respondents if they “feel French”. This illustrates an aspect of national sentiment that, paradoxically, may be felt whether or not people have French nationality. The fact of living in France creates a sense of belonging, the extent of which varies according to a person’s history, education, cultural

**Table 2 - Mode of acquisition of French nationality reported by descendants of immigrants, by origin of their parent(s)**

Immigrants' country of birth	French by birth	By naturalization	By declaration	Total
Algeria	95	1	3	100
Morocco and Tunisia	83	9	8	100
Sahelian Africa	94	2	4	100
West and Central Africa	95	2	3	100
Southeast Asia	93	4	3	100
Turkey	63	14	23	100
Portugal	78	13	9	100
Spain and Italy	91	5	3	100
Other EU-27	97	1	2	100
Other countries	94	4	2	100

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Descendants of immigrants aged 18-50.

Interpretation • 95% of descendants of immigrants from Algeria are French by birth, 2% became French by naturalization and 3% by declaration.

(6) The fact of being born in France to at least one parent born in France, Article 23 of the French Nationality Law, and Article 19-3 of the Civil Code.

references, social milieu, etc. Conversely, having French nationality does not necessarily determine the relationship to “Frenchness”. Table 3 shows that 16% of immigrants with French nationality did not feel very French, whereas nearly half of the foreigners did. National sentiment is not an issue for the mainstream population or for descendants of mixed parentage. Feelings are more mixed for descendants of two immigrant parents. What national sentiment meant for respondents differed widely, but the questionnaire does not allow us to delve deeper into any significance that may be implied.

The variations in national sentiment we observed according to the origins of the immigrants and their descendants (a stronger feeling of being French for people from Southeast Asia, North Africa, and West and Central Africa), may be explained by parameters not related to origins as such. For immigrants, being a man, a French national, with a vocational qualification, living in France for more than 15 years and not having experienced discrimination, considerably increased the probability of “feeling French”. For descendants, the probability of feeling French is significantly higher among the under-35s, in employment, with a degree in higher education, who have not experienced discrimination and, above all, who have a French parent. The employment status (being unemployed, economically inactive or in employment) and the occupational category do not influence national sentiment.

**Table 3 - Sentiment of "being French" by link to migration and nationality**

	Mainstream population	Immigrants			Descendants of two immigrant parent	Descendants of a mixed-origin couple
		Foreigners	French	All		
Totally agree	88	22	54	35	63	85
Agree	10	25	28	26	26	12
Disagree	2	49	16	36	10	3
Non-response	0	4	2	3	1	0
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Persons aged 18-50.  
*Interpretation* • 88% of the mainstream population totally agree and 10% agree that they feel French, 2% disagree, and non-response (including refusals to reply and don't know) is below 1%.

# Religion

*Patrick Simon*\*, *Vincent Tiberj*\*\*

Long before the debate raised by Islam in France, the Catholicism of the Italian and Polish immigrants who arrived between the two World Wars, had provoked hostility not only in the secular community but also among French Catholics, concerned by the different forms of religious organization and practices developed by the immigrant communities. The migration to France of the Jewish communities of North Africa, generally from Arab countries in the throes of decolonization, also helped to transform French Judaism. While immigration has altered the religious structure of French society, a mirror process of transformation of immigrant religiosity in the host society can also be observed. How is the religiosity of immigrants evolving and does it differ from that of the mainstream population? How does intra-family religious transmission take place and to what extent does growing up in a family where religion is important, determine a person's current religiosity? Is religious sentiment maintained more frequently in the minority religions, and especially in a migratory context?

## 1 | Religions and denominations

The religious landscape in France has undergone a profound change characterised by the country's continued secularisation and the emergence of Islam as a minority religion alongside Protestantism, Judaism and Buddhism.<sup>(1)</sup> In the population aged 18-50 residing in metropolitan France, nearly 45% of individuals claim to be agnostic or atheist.<sup>(2)</sup> This distance from religion is observed mainly in the mainstream population and among descendants of mixed parentage. More than three quarters of immigrants and their descendants reported having a religion.

The religious detachment of Spanish and Italian immigrants is similar to that observed in the mainstream population and among descendants of Southeast Asian

\* INED.

\*\*Sciences Po, Centre d'études Européennes.

(1) Lambert Y., 2002, "La religion en France des années 1960 à nos jours", Données sociales, Paris, INSEE, pp. 565-579.

(2) The various religious denominations and the agnostic and atheist categories were constructed from a direct question, "Do you currently have a religion?" The negative replies formed the agnostic and atheist categories, and the affirmative replies led to the denomination.

<b>Table 1 - Religious denomination by link to migration</b>					
	<b>Immigrants</b>	<b>Descendants of two immigrant parents</b>	<b>Descendants of one immigrant parent</b>	<b>Mainstream population</b>	<b>Population in metropolitan France</b>
No religion	19	23	48	49	45
Catholic	26	27	39	47	43
Orthodox Christian	3	1	0	0	0.5
Protestant	4	1	1	1.5	2
Muslim	43	45	8	1	8
Jewish	0.5	1	2	0.5	0.5
Buddhist	2.5	1	0.5	0.5	0.5
Other	2	1	1	0.5	0.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Persons aged 18-50.  
*Interpretation* • 19% of immigrants reported having no religion and 26% reported being Catholic.

immigrants who had the highest proportion of “no religion” answers of all groups. Among respondents of European origin, the Portuguese stood out for maintaining their Catholicism (only 20% reported “no religion”). Overall, there was a division between the groups with ties to regions where Islam is dominant and the rest. Far fewer immigrants from Islamic regions reported having no religion, and their descendants reported having a religion more frequently than the others. Transmission is more frequent in mainly Muslim families than in mainly Catholic, Protestant or Buddhist ones.

While Catholicism is still the principal religion in France with 11.5 million people aged 18-50 reporting being Catholic (43% of the population), Muslims now form the largest minority religion with 2.1 million followers – a long way from certain estimates put forward during the recent public debate (Table 1). There are fewer than 500,000 Protestants, 150,000 Buddhists and 125,000 Jews. Respondents in the mainstream population who reported having a religion were almost exclusively Catholic, with minority religions representing less than 5%. However, Catholics were in a minority among the immigrants and their descendants, where Islam dominated. Descendants of mixed parentage were mainly Catholic, reflecting the proportion of descendants of Southern European immigrants in this group.

Most groups had a dominant religion. Southern European immigrants and their descendants were Catholic while the majority of people with North African origins were Muslim. Algerian Jews, who have been French since 1870, were not represented among the immigrants and the only traces of the Jewish community in the Maghreb (2% among the immigrants and 6% among descendants of immigrants) were to be found among some of the Moroccans and Tunisians. Immigrants from West and Central Africa and their descendants differed from their sub-Saharan African counterparts by their religious diversity due to the variety of countries in those regions. Alongside the Catholic majority, Protestants (17%) and Muslims (7%) formed significant minorities, but not necessarily in the same country. There were some Christian minorities (Catholic and Orthodox) among the Turkish immigrants and their descendants. Most immigrants from Southeast Asia were either Catholic or Buddhist. The majority of DOM native-borns were Catholic and rarely Protestant, but the dominant Catholicism of Martinique and Guadeloupe tends to mask the religious diversity in La Réunion.

Figure 1 - Religious denominations (including no religion) by origin and link to migration



Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
 Population • Persons aged 18-50.

## 2 | Religiosity

Very different realities lie behind respondents' statements that they had a religion, ranging from a mere cultural reference to a form of spiritual and social investment. What we describe as "religiosity" here was measured by a direct question on the importance of religion to the respondent.<sup>(3)</sup> Once again there was a split between the mainstream population and descendants of mixed parentage on the one hand, who attributed little importance to religion (75% and 66% respectively), and immigrants and descendants of two immigrant parents on the other, where two thirds stated that religion played an important role in their lives. Of course, these differences by link

(3) The question was: "What importance does religion have in your life?" The replies were listed in four categories ranging from "Very important" to "Not important at all".

to migration cut across the various denominations (Table 2). The clearest difference was between Catholics on the one hand, 76% of whom reported that religion was not important or moderately so, and Muslims and Jews on the other, who reported in equal proportions that religion was important.

	Little or no importance	Strong or moderate importance	Total	Unweighted numbers
Catholic	76	24	100	6,301
Orthodox Christian	52	48	100	214
Protestant	53	47	100	456
Muslim	22	78	100	5,046
Jewish	24	76	100	143
Buddhist				

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Persons aged 18-50 who reported having a religion.  
*Interpretation* • For 76% of persons who reported being Catholics, religion has little or no importance in their life, and for 24% it has a strong or moderate importance.

Women reported greater religiosity than men, whatever their links with migration (Table 3). Fewer women reported having no religion, and when they claimed a religion it played a more important role in their lives than for the men. Religiosity varies significantly according to origin, and follows the distribution of religions by group. European and Southeast Asian immigrants and their descendants have further contributed to the secularisation of France – already advanced – reporting relatively low religiosity even when they reported having a religion. In contrast with this disaffection, religion is still important for more than three quarters of North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish immigrants. The same holds true for their descendants, who have very similar religious participation. In other words, being born and socialized in France does not appear to have changed the level of religiosity for the minorities in the Muslim faith.

All other things being equal, our analysis (not shown here) has confirmed that the importance placed in religion by parents is one of the leading factors in determining respondents’ current religiosity. The age and education level had no influence. However, being a woman, coming from a modest social background (parents who are clerical and sales workers, unskilled manual workers or economically inactive), the fact of living in a sensitive urban area and above all, affiliation to Islam or Judaism, all contributed significantly to increasing the likelihood of high religiosity. After controlling for all the other factors, origins remain significant. Religiosity is certainly determined by the type of religion, but its influence varies considerably according to the origin of the immigrants or their descendants.

### 3 | Transmission

Before being a personal choice, religion is generally transmitted by parents through their own religious socialization, or more usually by “denominational heredity”. In other words, children are assumed to inherit their parents’ religion. The survey allowed us to find out about the parents’ religious affiliation, as well as the importance of religion in the respondents’ education.<sup>(4)</sup> Growing up in a religious family

(4) With the following question: “What importance did religion have in the upbringing you received from your family?”

<b>Table 3 - Importance of religion by sex and origin (%)</b>				
	<b>Males</b>	<b>Females</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Unweighted numbers</b>
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>				
<b>DOM</b>	50	63	58	410
Algeria	72	82	77	565
Morocco and Tunisia	72	82	77	817
Sahelian Africa	77	89	84	507
West and Central Africa	76	78	77	548
Southeast Asia	50	59	55	343
Turkey	67	79	73	634
Portugal	38	51	45	431
Spain and Italy	29	30	30	144
Other EU-27 countries	33	41	38	364
Other countries	61	66	64	774
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>5,127</b>
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>				
<b>DOM</b>	43	49	46	414
Algeria	71	75	73	825
Morocco and Tunisia	71	81	77	864
Sahelian Africa	90	85	88	392
West and Central Africa	67	61	64	242
Southeast Asia	49	45	47	251
Turkey	71	76	73	390
Portugal	30	44	37	617
Spain and Italy	24	27	26	868
Other EU-27 countries	22	31	26	372
Other countries	51	53	52	333
<b>All descendants of immigrants</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>5,324</b>
<b>Mainstream population</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>1,635</b>
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>12,910</b>
<i>Source</i> • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008. <i>Population</i> • Persons aged 18-50 who reported having a religion. <i>Interpretation</i> • For 72% of male immigrants and 82% of female immigrants from Algeria who reported having a religion, this religion has a strong or moderate importance in their lives.				

conditioned the formation of religious sentiment, and transmission took place in 85% of cases, although the degree of religiosity was weaker (Table 4). Conversely, nearly all respondents who grew up in an agnostic or atheist family also reported being agnostic or atheist, with fewer than 7% showing a certain religiosity. Only 10% of families had mixed religiosity, i.e. one of the parents was not religious, and they were even rarer in immigrant families.

The decrease in religious intensity from one generation to the next is clear in the following comparison: 24% of individuals aged 18-50 living in metropolitan France grew up in families without a religion, and 44% report no religion today. The trend varies according to the religion practiced by the parents. People growing up in Buddhist families (30%), followed by Christians and Jews (26%), more frequently give up their religion than those who grew up in a Muslim family (11%). Intergenerational transmission may be divided into three categories:

– Secularized: people who give up their parents' religion or have a lower level of religiosity than their family;

- Reproduced: people with the same level of religiosity (including in the “no religion” case);
- Reinforced: people with a higher level of religiosity than their parents (including in relation to agnostics).

Under this typology, just over one quarter of 18-50 year-olds living in metropolitan France have become secularized and feel less attached to religion than their parents, two thirds are in continuity with their family’s religious attachment, and nearly 7% participate more in religion than the previous generation.

These proportions are relatively similar in all the population groups. However, the detail per origin does show a greater secularization for DOM native-borns and well as southern European and Southeast Asian immigrants (between 30% and 35% respectively) compared with North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish immigrants, confirming the observations we made earlier regarding the major religions. While these results confirm attachment to Islam for immigrants with a Muslim tradition and their descendants, the hypothesis of a “religious revival” is not very credible, or at least, it only concerns a small minority of various origins.<sup>(5)</sup>

<i>Table 4 - Relation between family religiosity and respondent's religiosity</i>						
Family religiosity	Total	Respondent's religiosity				Unweighted numbers
		No religion	Little importance	Strong importance	Total	
No religion	24	93	4	3	100	2,379
Little importance	46	37	55	8	100	6,913
Strong importance	30	15	35	50	100	9,207

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Persons aged 18-50 who reported having a religion.  
*Interpretation* • 24% of respondents aged 18-50 grew up in a family where neither parent had a religion, and 46% in a family where the parents had a religion which was of little or no importance in the education received. Among persons who grew up in a family where neither parent had a religion, 93% currently report no religion, 4% report a religion which had little or no importance in the education they received during childhood, and 3% report a religion that had a strong or moderate importance.

(5) See also, Brouard S. and Tiberj S., 2005, *Français comme les autres ? Enquête auprès des citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine et turque*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po.



# Discrimination

*Yaël Brinbaum* \*, *Christelle Hamel* \*\*, *Jean-Luc Primon* \*\*\*,  
*Mirna Safi* \*\*\*\*, *Patrick Simon* \*\*

Several aspects of the direct experiences of discrimination reported by respondents are dealt with in the survey. First and foremost are opinions about the existence of discrimination, with gender discrimination less recognized than discrimination with respect to origin or skin colour. The relative importance of the different grounds of discrimination varies according to the experience reported by the respondents. Here again, origin and skin colour are the main reasons mentioned, before gender, age or religion. But experience of discrimination is constructed by exposure to prejudice and stereotypes. Ascription to origins in day-to-day interactions contributes to the feeling of a pejorative perception of otherness. Immigrants and descendants of immigrants frequently report this, the most numerous being sub-Saharan Africans and Southeast Asians. More intense is the experience of racism, and, as with discrimination, descendants of immigrants are more likely to report it than immigrants. Skin colour plays a dominant role in racism and the main victims are the descendants of sub-Saharan African immigrants and of DOM native-borns.

## 1 | Representation of discrimination

While discrimination has received considerable attention in French society over the past ten years, very few reliable statistics allow us to quantify the degree of awareness of discriminatory behaviour that exists among the French. The Trajectories and Origins Survey has shed some light on this issue. Respondents were asked about their perceptions of two types of discrimination: against women and relating to origins or skin colour.<sup>(1)</sup>

\* Université de Bourgogne, researcher at IREDU.

\*\* INED.

\*\*\* Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (UNS), URMIS.

\*\*\*\* Sciences Po, OSC, CNRS et LSQ, CREST, INSEE.

(1) The two questions were as follows: “Compared to men, do you think that in France women are subject to unequal or discriminatory treatment?” and “Do you think that in France certain persons are subject to unequal or discriminatory treatment because of their origins or skin colour?” The choice of replies to the questions was: “Often”, “Sometimes”, “Never”, “Refusal to answer”, and “Don’t know”.

In the mainstream population, 53% of males and 60% of females answered that people are “often” discriminated against in France because of their origins or skin colour (Table 1), while 42% of male immigrants and 43% of female ones shared the same conviction. Discrimination would seem to be more to be more widely acknowledged by the mainstream population in France, which, in theory, is not directly confronted by the problem. This gap may come from the differences in the population profile. We know that awareness of discrimination is closely correlated to the individual’s age, education and social status,<sup>(2)</sup> but after controlling for the main socio-demographic variables, immigrants were still less convinced of the existence of discrimination. Was that because their present situation is perceived as being better than their previous one in their country of origin? Or is this a form of unconscious denial of their subordinate migrant position, functioning as a type of self-defence in the face of discrimination? Another discrepancy in statements lay in gender. While men in the mainstream population were less aware of the problem than women, the gender gap disappeared for immigrants.

**Table 1 - Representations of sex and race discrimination by link to migration and sex (%)**

	Discrimination linked to origin or skin colour		Sex discrimination		Unweighted numbers	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
All immigrants	42	43	16	19	2,921	3,447
Descendants of two immigrant parents	55	59	24	31	2,172	2,453
Descendants of one immigrant parent	58	62	30	33	1,693	1,790
Mainstream population	53	60	27	29	2,088	2,293
All metropolitan population	53	58	26	28	8,874	9,983

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-50

Interpretation • In answer to the question on perceived discrimination due to origin or skin colour in France, 42% of male immigrants replied that they "often" experienced such discrimination.

We logically expect large differences between men and women in perception of gender discrimination, but the gap in the mainstream population was narrow, with 27% of men and 29% of women believing that that it occurred frequently. While the gender gap was comparable for immigrants, the level of awareness remained very low, at 16% for men and 19% for women. Here too, the difference between immigrants and the mainstream population was significant after controlling for socio-demographic variables. While one interpretation of this result may lie with the traditional conception of the woman’s role in some of the sending countries, it should be qualified by the fact that the question does not always have the same meaning for all the groups, as some American research has shown. Respondents’ replies were, in fact, very sensitive as to how the question about male/female inequality was worded.<sup>(3)</sup>

Descendants of immigrants had a similar (or slightly stronger) perception of discrimination to the mainstream population. Descendants of mixed parentage were more aware of the issue, which is partly explained by their higher level of education. This result also reflected other research demonstrating that descendants of mixed parentage feel the injustice of ethnic and racial discrimination more acutely than

(2) Bobo L. D., Fox C., 2003, “Race, Racism, and Discrimination: Bridging Problems, Methods, and Theory in Social Psychological Research”, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66(4), pp. 319-332.

(3) Kane E. W., 2000, “Racial and Ethnic Variations in Gender-Related Attitudes”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, pp. 419-439.

those with two immigrant parents.<sup>(4)</sup> Lastly, daughters of immigrants, like women in the mainstream population, are more sensitive to unequal treatment, whether ethnic/racial or sexual, than their male counterparts.

## 2 | Experience of discrimination is dominated by origin and skin colour

Do perceptions reflect personal experience? The survey gathered direct accounts of experiences of discrimination with a question on the “unequal treatment or discrimination” to which respondents had been subjected in the past five years. Primarily subjective, the question and the replies reflected self-reported experience of discrimination, for whatever reason. The respondents were then asked to give one motive or several out of a list of 11 that explained why they believed they were discriminated against. Some 14% of respondents aged 18-50 reported having been subjected to discrimination in the past five years. The experience was occasional (“sometimes”) rather than regular (“often”). Descendants of two immigrant parents reported a higher frequency of discrimination than immigrants, whereas descendants of mixed parentage were positioned mid-way between the two. Among the immigrants and descendants of immigrants, those from sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and, to a lesser extent, Turkey and Southeast Asia, reported more experience of discrimination than the others. These results were confirmed after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, which leads us to posit that discrimination is essentially an issue that concerns the “visible minority”.<sup>(5)</sup> Given that these statements covered all the motives of discrimination, not just ethnic or racial, the next question was to identify any differences between the groups in the motives for discrimination.

Respondents could choose more than one reason for discrimination but 63% mentioned only one, 23% mentioned two and only 8% mentioned three or more. Nearly half of immigrants and 46% of descendants of immigrants gave two reasons or more. When several motives were cited, it was usually due to more frequent combinations of the “origins” reason with one or several others, which was not the case for the mainstream population. For the population as a whole (Table 2), the main reasons given by respondents were origins and nationality (37%), skin colour (20%), followed by sex (17%) and age (12%). The place of residence and the way of dressing, accent, religion and family situation, were less important, except for respondents of certain origins.

A specialization in motives can be observed per group of origin. Skin colour was the main reason for discrimination mentioned by the “visible minorities”, i.e. DOM native-borns and their descendants and sub-Saharan Africans and their descendants. In the case of North African, Southeast Asian and Turkish immigrants, the main reason given was origins.

While immigrants and descendants of immigrants reported origins and skin colour in similar proportions, the first generation more frequently mentioned accent as a motive for discrimination, while the second generation mentioned the place where they lived (neighbourhood) and their way of dressing. Religion was only mentioned as a motive of discrimination by respondents linked to countries where Islam is the dominant religion, and more often by descendants of immigrants than by immigrants.

---

(4) Rumbaut R., 1994, “The Crucible within: Ethnic identity, self-esteem, and segmented assimilation among children of immigrants”, *International Migration Review*, 28(4), pp. 748-794.

(5) Beauchemin C., Hamel C., Lesné M. and Simon P., 2010, “Discrimination: a question of visible minorities”, *Population & Societies*, 466.

**Table 2 - Reported reasons for discrimination by detailed origin (%)**

	Age	Sex	Skin colour	Origins	Neighbourhood	Accent	Religion	Look	Family situation	Unweighted numbers
<b>Country or département of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>										
DOM	11	5	78	34	6	14	6	8	3	168
Algeria	6	2	14	85	8	10	8	4	3	192
Morocco and Tunisia	6	5	24	87	3	8	12	3	1	273
Sahelian Africa	2	3	81	52	3	16	3	1	2	240
West and Central Africa	2	2	86	44	3	9	1	1	3	310
Southeast Asia	3	6	25	73	5	20	0	0	3	95
Turkey	3	3	6	77	7	20	13	7	1	166
Portugal	4	8	2	51	3	14	5	9	18	37
Other EU-27 countries	4	18	3	72	12	20	1	9	6	97
Other countries	3	5	38	64	5	22	2	3	1	236
All immigrants	4	5	34	70	5	14	6	4	3	1,668
<b>Country or département of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>										
DOM	14	9	81	28	12	3	1	10	2	243
Algeria	7	6	20	83	11	4	15	6	3	504
Morocco and Tunisia	9	7	31	80	18	3	23	8	3	423
Sahelian Africa	10	7	87	43	16	10	6	11	1	210
West and Central Africa	11	6	89	46	18	3	4	6	1	153
Southeast Asia	22	14	38	64	12	6	1	8	5	159
Turkey	15	4	5	75	14	4	14	6	0	143
Portugal	13	18	14	44	6	7	3	10	6	105
Spain and Italy	15	24	9	26	11	4	2	6	7	155
Other EU-27 countries	12	24	7	26	7	6	12	8	3	64
Other countries	12	12	44	54	15	3	6	11	6	156
All descendants of immigrants	10	10	28	65	13	4	13	8	4	2,502
Mainstream population	16	24	8	18.5	6	4	3	11	9	356
All metropolitan population	12	17	20	39	8	6	5	9	7	4,487

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Individuals aged 18-50 who reported experience of discrimination over the 5 previous years.  
*Interpretation* • When asked about the reasons for discrimination, 78% of DOM native-borns mention skin colour, 34% origins, and 11% age.  
*Notes* • As several answers are possible, the percentages are above 100. The reason cited most often by each of the sub-populations is given in red. The results for immigrants from Spain are not given because the numbers were too small.  
*The figures in italics were calculated on fewer than 50 persons and are not robust.*

Gender discrimination was only mentioned significantly by the groups who did not report origins or skin colour, notably the mainstream population (24%). Similarly, age was mentioned more frequently by descendants of immigrants and the mainstream population.

### 3 | Ethnic ascription

Before it translates into action, discrimination is built on the stigmatization of populations by the dissemination of stereotypes and prejudices. These are usually

studied through the representations of those who convey them, but less frequently from the viewpoint of those who are targeted by them. Several questions in the Trajectories and Origins Survey deal with this aspect, and here we will discuss two questions that relate to how respondents acquired the experience and feeling of being discriminated against: the frequency of inquiries about their origins in their day-to-day lives,<sup>(6)</sup> and the feeling that people don't see them as French.<sup>(7)</sup>

Predictably, the mainstream population was not greatly concerned by references to origin, whereas immigrants reported experiencing them quite frequently (62% “sometimes” or “often”, see Table 3), as did 58% of descendants of two immigrant parents, despite being born in Metropolitan France. Fewer descendants of mixed parentage report such experience, but that is mainly due to the large presence of descendants of European immigrants in this group, who are less exposed to comments about their origins. Indeed, taking the details of origin into account, we see that the gap between immigrants and descendants of the same origin is a narrow one and, for some groups, that descendants of immigrants felt that their origins were more of an issue in their relations with others. For these “visible minorities”, being of mixed parentage provides no protection from questions about origins. Both immigrants and descendants of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa are the most exposed (nearly 80% reported hearing comments about their origins “often” or “sometimes”) followed by approximately two thirds of people of Southeast Asian origin.

Descendants of DOM native-borns, North Africans and Turks receive slightly fewer comments about their origins (60%) although they still occur frequently. Descendants of southern European immigrants are less “visible” and their origins are rarely commented upon.

	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Total
Immigrants	32	30	27	11	100
Descendants of two immigrant parents	27	31	28	14	100
Descendants of a mixed-origin couple	20	24	25	31	100
Mainstream population	5	12	20	63	100
All metropolitan population	10	78	6	6	100

*Source* • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.  
*Population* • Persons aged 18-50, metropolitan France.  
*Interpretation* • 32% of immigrants living in metropolitan France say that their origins are often mentioned in everyday life.


These daily reminders of “otherness” contribute to perceptions of being foreign, and 58% of immigrants disagreed with the statement “People see me as French”. More surprisingly, half of the respondents who had acquired French nationality and 37% of descendants of immigrants with French nationality did not feel that were “seen as French”, while only 11% of descendants of mixed parentage felt that way. The role of visibility, in terms of phenotype, appearance or name/surname, appears to be decisive, notably for descendants of immigrants. The considerable discrepancy between descendants of southern European immigrants and those from sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Turkey shows just how tenuous is the feeling of belonging to a nation.<sup>(8)</sup> While origins mainly determine the feeling of not being recognized as

(6) The question was: “In everyday life, how often are you asked about your origins?”

(7) The statement was: “People see me as French”, with replies ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”.

(8) Ribert E., 2006, *Liberté, égalité, carte d'identité: les jeunes issus de l'immigration et l'appartenance nationale*, Paris, La Découverte.

French, the educational level and the occupational category also play a part. University level education and managerial jobs, all other things being equal, make some people “more French” than others.



#### 4 | The experience of racism

Discrimination based on people’s real or supposed origins and their skin colour, do not encompass exactly the same experiences as ordinary racism, even though they occur in a more global social context of stigmatization and hostility to racialized or ethnicized minorities. In addition to questions about discrimination, the survey recorded direct experience of racism by asking respondents if, during their lives, they had ever been the targets of insults or racist terms or attitudes in metropolitan France, and if not, if they believed they could be a victim of racism in France. Table 4 compares the experience of racism with the feeling of having been exposed to racism without having actually experienced it.

As with discrimination, immigrants reported a racist experience in their lifetimes slightly less frequently than descendants of immigrants (32% vs. 36%). The difference between immigrants and their descendants was more pronounced for the Southeast Asian and Turkish groups, and less so for the North African group. More people with ties to sub-Saharan Africa or a DOM (whether they or their parents were born there) more frequently reported having been subjected to a racist experience, and least frequently reported never having felt exposed to racism. They attributed their racist experiences to their skin colour (nearly 95%, findings not presented here) whereas 80% of people with a North African background attributed it to their origin or nationality, and approximately 35% to their religion or their name. Skin colour, followed by origin and religion are the main sources of stigmatization that expose to racism in French society. Lastly, 16% of the mainstream population reported having experienced a racist situation and nearly 40% claimed skin colour as the likely cause of their experience of racism. In-depth analysis is required to explain the determinants of these reported experiences.

**Table 4 - Racism experienced by immigrants, DOM native-borns and their descendants (%)**

	Has experienced a racist situation	Has not experienced a racist situation but feels exposed	Does not feel exposed to racism and has not experienced a racist situation	Total	Unweighted numbers
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>					
DOM	47	36	17	100	522
Algeria	35	35	30	100	614
Morocco and Tunisia	38	34	28	100	832
Sahelian Africa	41	38	20	100	509
West and Central Africa	55	33	12	100	606
Southeast Asia	36	28	36	100	493
Turkey	25	31	43	100	662
Portugal	20	25	55	100	515
Spain and Italy	27	17	56	100	211
Other EU-27 countries	19	17	64	100	522
Other countries	28	26	45	100	921
<b>All immigrants</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>5,885</b>
<b>Country or <i>département</i> of birth of the parents of descendants of immigrants and DOM native-borns</b>					
DOM	52	28	20	100	616
Algeria	49	31	20	100	1,247
Morocco and Tunisia	50	28	22	100	1,079
Sahelian Africa	58	31	12	100	461
West and Central Africa	60	25	15	100	322
Southeast Asia	53	26	21	100	546
Turkey	44	32	25	100	427
Portugal	28	26	46	100	892
Spain and Italy	21	19	60	100	1,617
Other EU-27 countries	21	20	59	100	622
Other countries	38	24	38	100	553
<b>All descendants of immigrants</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>8,110</b>
<b>Mainstream population</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,186</b>
<b>All metropolitan population</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>18,864</b>

Source • Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), INED-INSEE, 2008.

Population • Persons aged 18-50.

Interpretation • 47% of persons born in a DOM reported experience of a racist situation.

Note • The data presented do not include refusals to reply and "don't know" answers, i.e. 4% of the survey population.





# Appendices



Rules for classification of the survey populations			
Population category	Definition	Classification rule when two or more categories possible	Special cases
<b>Persons born outside metropolitan France</b>			
Immigrants	Persons born as foreigners outside France (current borders).		Persons who have declared themselves as French by reintegration are considered here as foreigners at birth (for example, persons born French in a colony, who become foreigners at the time of colonization and who were later reintegrated into French nationality).
DOM native-borns	Persons born in one of the French overseas départements (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Réunion).	The criterion of place of birth in a DOM takes priority; for example, a person born in a DOM to immigrant parents is classified as a DOM native-born.	There is no condition of nationality at birth. 0.8% of DOM native-borns were born as foreigners.
Repatriates (included in mainstream population)	Persons born French in one of the former colonial territories before independence, i.e. in one of the following countries: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Djibouti, Comoros, Madagascar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.		
Other French nationals born outside France (included in mainstream population)	Persons born French outside metropolitan France, but not in a DOM or in a former colony before its independence.		Includes persons born in a COM (13 TeO survey respondents).
<b>Persons born in metropolitan France</b>			
Descendants of immigrants	Persons born in metropolitan France with at least one immigrant parent.	When both parents are immigrants from different countries, the father's origin is used.	When parent(s) is(are) unknown, the origin of the substitute parent who raised the child is used.
Descendants of two immigrant parents	Persons born in metropolitan France with both parents born as foreigners abroad.		In the strictest sense, an "immigrant" parent should have lived in France. In fact, this is not always the case. As they are born in France, individuals who are "descendants of two immigrant parents" are assumed to have a mother who herself immigrated. However, in some cases, the respondent's father never immigrated to France.
Descendants of a mixed-origin couple	Persons born in metropolitan France with one immigrant parent. The other parent is either unknown, or known but not an immigrant.	The country of origin associated with the respondent is that of the immigrant parent.	This category includes persons whose only known parent (or substitute parent) is an immigrant (28 observations representing 0.3% of all immigrants' descendants).
Descendants of DOM native-borns	Persons born in metropolitan France with at least one parent born in a DOM.	Priority is given to the immigrant parentage in the case where one parent is a DOM native-born and the other an immigrant.	
Descendants of repatriates (included in mainstream population)	Persons born in metropolitan France with at least one parent born French in a former colonial territory before its independence.	Priority is given first to the immigrant parentage, and second to the DOM parentage, in cases where one parent is a repatriate and the other is an immigrant or a DOM native-born.	The parent who was born French in a colony and who took the country's nationality at the time of independence is considered as an immigrant and the respondent is considered as a descendant of immigrant(s) and not as a descendant of repatriate(s).
Descendants of other French nationals born outside France (included in mainstream population)	Persons born in metropolitan France with at least one parent born French outside metropolitan France, but not in a DOM or in a former colony before its independence.	Priority is given first to the immigrant parentage, second to the DOM parentage, and third to the repatriate parentage, in cases where one parent is a repatriate and the other is an immigrant, a DOM native-born or a repatriate.	For this category, the TeO sample includes 2 respondents with at least one parent born in a COM.
Metropolitan France native-borns with no migrant parentage (included in mainstream population)	Persons born in metropolitan France to French parents who were themselves born in metropolitan France.	By exclusion of preceding categories.	



## The authors

### | Cris Beauchemin (INED)

Cris Beauchemin is a specialist in African migrations and has been a researcher at INED since 2004. His early research focused on mobility within African countries, while more recently he has worked on the history of international migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa, return migration, the relationship between migration and development, trans-national practice and the connection between migratory and family trajectories. He is in charge of the MAFE project on migration between Africa and Europe and has helped to coordinate the Trajectories and Origins project (TeO).

### | Catherine Borrel (INSEE)

Catherine Borrel was a lecturer at CERC (Centre d'Etude des Revenus et des Coûts), before working for SESI and then DREES (French Directorate for Research, Studies, Evaluation and Statistics) where she worked on issues relating to dependence and disability. She contributed to INSEE's Handicap, Disability and Dependence survey and with Patrick Simon co-authored, "*L'origine des Français*" (the origin of the French), in *Histoires de familles, histoires familiales: les résultats de l'enquête Famille de 1999*, Paris, INED, 2005. She has been in charge of the Statistics and Migration studies unit since 2000, which is part of INSEE's Demographic and Social Research unit. She helped to coordinate the Trajectories and Origins project (TeO).

### | Yaël Brinbaum (IREDU Université de Bourgogne, CNRS; INED)

Yaël Brinbaum is a sociologist and associate professor at Bourgogne University, a researcher at IREDU and associate researcher at INED. Her research focuses on the relations immigrant families have with schools, inequality and discrimination in the school system and the labour market integration of young descendents of immigrants, using an international comparative approach. Together with Anthony Heath (Oxford University), she coordinates research in inequalities in education according to social background and ethnic origins in Europe, the United States and Canada, for the Equalsoc network (Economic change, Quality of life and Social cohesion).

### | Stephanie Condon (INED)

An INED researcher since 1992, Stephanie Condon is specialised in Caribbean migration to France and Europe and is a member of the team that designed the Migrations, Family, and Ageing survey carried out in the French DOM (overseas departments) in 2009-2010. She studies the history of immigration to France from a gender perspective, as well as linguistic practice in the migratory context. In 2000, she worked on the ENVEFF survey (on violence against women in France) and since then has extended her research to cover violence against women Europe and the issue of ethnicity.

### **Christelle Hamel (INED)**

Christelle Hamel is a sociologist and researcher at INED, who specializes in gender issues in minority populations. Her early research focused on sexuality and managing the risk of HIV infection among young people of North African origin. She is currently working on couple formation and the choice of partner by descendants of immigrants, as well as their experiences of racism and discrimination. She also studies violence against women, notably through forced marriage.

### **Hugues Lagrange (EHESS/CNRS, Observatoire sociologique du changement)**

Hugues Lagrange is a sociologist who has worked with Brigitte Lhomond on a quantitative survey on the sexuality of young people in the context of AIDS. His current research is on the socialization of young people in social housing neighbourhoods, delinquency and the issue of urban revolt. His recent publications include: *Le Déni des Cultures*, Paris, Seuil, 2010; *L'épreuve des inégalités* (ed.), Puf, 2006; *Émeutes urbaines et protestations*, Presses de Sciences-Po, 2006 (with Marco Oberti); *Demandes de sécurité*, Seuil / République des Idées, 2003.

### **Bertrand Lhommeau (INSEE)**

Bertrand Lhommeau is a former lecturer on redistribution topics at INSEE and then DREES (French Directorate for Research, Studies, Evaluation and Statistics), later working on low wages at DARES (Directorate for Research, Studies, and Statistics, attached to the Ministry of Labour). Since 2008 he has been in charge of the TeO survey at the Statistics and Immigration Studies group of INSEE's Demographic and Social Research Unit.

### **Dominique Meurs (INED; EconomiX-Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense)**

An associate professor of economic science, Dominique Meurs has written numerous articles on wage inequalities between men and women. She researches wage discrimination, occupational segregation and the economic assimilation of migrants. Together with Ariane Pailhé and Patrick Simon, she co-authored, "Immigrés et enfants d'immigrés sur le marché du travail: une affaire de générations?" in *Histoires de familles, histoires familiales : les résultats de l'enquête Famille de 1999*, Paris, INED, 2005.

### **Laure Moguérrou (UPO - INED)**

Laure Moguérrou has been a senior lecturer at Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense (UPO) since 2008, and is an associate researcher at INED. Her PhD thesis was on educational practices among families in Dakar (Senegal), the specific expectations of parents according to the sex of their children, and the transformation and re-composition of male and female social roles resulting from the educational progress of girls. She is currently working on educational trajectories of immigrants and their children in France, intergenerational relationships in immigrant families and how young men and women from those families enter adult life.

### **Muriel Moisy**

Muriel Moisy is a demographer, whose PhD thesis was on the relationship between the family and employment in a comparative European perspective. She is currently studying health issues using a population approach, including pain in children, palliative care in medical institutions and the public health and social welfare sectors,

health and risk behaviour in young people aged 16-25, and abortion among minors. She co-edited a book on women's health in 2009.

### **Mahrez Okba (DARES)**

Project leader on integration issues and migratory flows at DARES (Directorate for Research, Studies, and Statistics) Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Employment, and Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and the Civil Service, Mahrez Okba researches the labour market integration of immigrants and their descendants, with particular emphasis on young people.

### **Ariane Pailhé (INED)**

Ariane Pailhé has a PhD in economics and is a researcher at INED where she works on gender and ethnic discrimination in the labour market, the relationship between family and occupational life, and time management in couples. She co-headed the Families and Employers survey and has edited a book called *Entre famille et travail: des arrangements de couples aux pratiques des employeurs*, published by La Découverte in 2009.

### **Jean-Louis Pan-Ke-Shon (INED)**

A researcher at INED, Jean-Louis Pan-Ke-Shon's work is divided between urban issues, (segregation, residential mobility, disadvantaged neighbourhoods, how inhabitants describe their neighbourhoods, the perception of insecurity in sensitive neighbourhoods), and expressions of ill-being according to gender. His published works included "Ségrégation ethnique et ségrégation sociale en quartiers sensibles", in *Revue française de sociologie*, 2009, "The ambivalent nature of ethnic segregation in France's disadvantaged neighbourhoods", *Urban Studies*, 2010, and "Perception of insecurity in poor neighbourhoods: Racial proxy or pure discrimination hypotheses?" to be published shortly.

### **Jean-Luc Primon (Université Nice Sophia Antipolis , Urmis/IRD)**

Senior lecturer in Sociology and researcher in the Migrations and Society unit (URMIS), Jean-Luc Primon analyses careers in higher education, the training-employment transition, inequalities in entering the labour market, and discrimination related to origins. He has taken part in several projects and publications dealing with how descendants of immigrants are penalized in the French labour market.

### **Corinne Régnard (Service Statistique Ministériel (SSM) - Immigration)**

Corinne Régnard has worked as a demographer for SSM-Immigration since it was established in 2008. She prepared the last five annual reports on immigration and the presence of foreigners in France for the former Department of Population and Migration (DPM). She has represented France for the OECD's Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI) since 2004. Corinne Régnard contributed to analysis of the CNAV survey on immigrants' retirement and the DREES survey on migrant careers and profiles. She is currently coordinating a longitudinal study on the integration of newly arrived immigrants led by SSM-Immigration (Étude longitudinale sur l'intégration des primo-arrivants – ELIPA).





## List of available issues

Documents in this series are available upon request to the author:

Institut national d'études démographiques;  
133 bd Davout, 75980 PARIS Cedex 20  
Telephone: (33) 01 56 06 20 86  
Fax: (33) 01 56 06 21 99

- N° 168 | Équipe TeO, coordonné par Cris BEAUCHEMIN, Christelle HAMEL et Patrick SIMON, *Trajectoire et Origines. Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France. Premiers résultats*, 2010, 152 p.
- N° 167 | Angela LUCI, Olivier THEVENON, *Does economic development drive fertility rebound in OECD countries*, 2010, 45 p.
- N° 166 | Cris BEAUCHEMIN (Ined), Lama KABBANJI (Ined), Bruno SCHOU MAKER (UCL), *Sept communications présentées lors de la table ronde sur les migrations entre l'Afrique et l'Europe*, Dakar, Sénégal, 21 novembre 2009, 244 p.
- N° 165 | Arnaud RÉGNIER-LOILIER, Présentation, questionnaire et documentation de la seconde vague de l'étude *des relations familiales et intergénérationnelles* (Erfi-GGS2), 211 p.
- N° 164 | Carole BONNET (Ined), Anne SOLAZ (Ined), Elisabeth ALGAVA (Dares), *La séparation conjugale affecte-t-elle l'activité professionnelle ? Une estimation basée sur les méthodes d'appariement*, 2009, 36 p.
- N° 163 | Olivia EKERT- JAFFÉ, *Le coût du temps consacré aux enfants : contraintes de temps et activité féminine/The Real Time Cost of Children in France is Equally Shared by Mothers and Fathers*, 2009, 48 p.
- N° 162 | Laurent GOBILLON et François-Charles WOLFF, *Housing and location choices of retiring households : Evidence from France*, 2009, 28 p.
- N° 161 | Matthieu SOLIGNAC, *Les politiques de conciliation vie professionnelle/vie familiale menées par les employeurs : élaboration d'une typologie des établissements de l'Enquête Familles-Employeurs*, 2009, 143 p.
- N° 160 | Géraldine DUTHÉ, Raphaël LAURENT, Gilles PISON, *Vivre et mourir après 60 ans en milieu rural africain. Isolement, recours aux soins et mortalité des personnes âgées à Mlomp*, 2009, 26 p.
- N° 159 | Nathalie DONZEAU et Jean-Louis PAN KÉ SON, *La mobilité résidentielle depuis la fin des Trente Glorieuses*, 2009, 34 p.
- N° 158 | Olivier THÉVENON, *The costs of raising children and the effectiveness of policies to support parenthood in European countries: a Literature Review* 2009, 612 p.
- N° 157 | Jean-Louis PAN KÉ SON, *L'émergence du sentiment d'insécurité en quartiers défavorisés. Dépassement du seuil de tolérance... aux étrangers ou à la misère ?*, 2009, 20 p.
- N° 156 | Maryse Marpsat, *The Ined Research on Homelessness*, 1993-2008, 2008, 218 p.
- N° 155 | Éva BEAUJOUAN, Anne SOLAZ, *Childbearing after separation : Do second unions make up for earlier missing births ? Evidence from France*, 2008, 24 p.
- N° 154 | Carole BONNET, Laurent GOBILLON, Anne LAFERRÈRE, *The effect of widowhood on housing and location choices*, 2008, 40 p.
- N° 153 | Louise MARIE DIOP-MAES, *La population ancienne de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Les éléments d'évaluation*, 2008, 20 p.
- N° 152 | *Traduction en Russe du N° 121.*

- N° 151 | P. Festy, J. Accardo, D. Demailly, L. Prokofieva, I. Kortchagina, A. Szukielojc-Bienkunska, L. Nivorozhkina, L. Ovtcharova, M. Sebti, A. Paterno, S. Strozza, I. Eliseeva, A. Shevyakov, *Mesures, formes et facteurs de la pauvreté. Approches comparative*, 2008, 196 p.
- N° 150 | Géraldine DUTHÉ, Serge H. D. FAYE, Emmanuelle GUYAVARCH, Pascal ARDUIN, Malick A. KANTE, Aldiouma DIALLO, Raphaël LAURENT, Adama MARRA, Gilles PISON, *La détermination des causes de décès par autopsie verbale : étude de la mortalité palustre en zone rurale sénégalaise*, 2008, 42 p.
- N° 149 | Maryse MARPSAT, *Services for the Homeless in France. Description, official statistics, client recording of information. A report for the European Commission*, 2007, 84 p.
- N° 148 | Olivier THÉVENON, *L'activité féminine après l'arrivée d'enfants : disparités et évolutions en Europe à partir des enquêtes sur les Forces de travail, 1992-2005*, 2007, 56 p.
- N° 147 | Magali BARBIERI, *Population en transition. Dix communications présentées au xxv<sup>e</sup> Congrès général de la population, Tours, France, 18-23 juillet 2005*, 2007, 201 p.
- N° 146 | François CHAPIREAU, *La mortalité des malades mentaux hospitalisés en France pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 2007, 36 p.
- N° 145 | Maryse MARPSAT, *Explorer les frontières. Recherches sur des catégories « en marge », Mémoire présenté en vue de l'habilitation à diriger des recherches en sociologie*, 2007, 274 p.
- N° 144 | Arnaud RÉGNIER-LOILIER et Pascal SEBILLE, *Modifications to the Generations and Gender Surveys questionnaire in France (wave 1)*, 192 p.
- N° 143 | Ariane PAILHÉ et Anne SOLAZ, *L'enquête Familles et employeurs. Protocole d'une double enquête et bilan de collecte*, 180 p.
- N° 142 | Annie BACHELOT et Jacques de MOUZON, *Données de l'enquête « Caractéristiques des couples demandant une fécondation in vitro en France »*, 2007, 44 p.
- N° 141 | Olivia Ekert-Jaffé, Shoshana Grossbard et Rémi Mougin, *Economic Analysis of the Childbearing Decision*, 2007, 108 p.
- N° 140 | Véronique Hertrich and Marie Lesclingand, *Transition to adulthood and gender: changes in rural Mali*
- N° 139 | Patrick SIMON et Martin CLÉMENT, *Rapport de l'enquête « Mesure de la diversité ». Une enquête expérimentale pour caractériser l'origine*, 2006, 86 p.
- N° 138 | Magali BARBIERI, Alfred NIZARD et Laurent TOULEMON, *Écart de température et mortalité en France*, 2006, 80 p.
- N° 137 | Jean-Louis Pan Ké Shon, *Mobilités internes différentielles en quartiers sensibles et ségrégation*, 2006, 42 p.
- N° 136 | Francisco Munoz-Pérez, Sophie PENNEC, avec la collaboration de Geneviève Houriet Segard, *Évolution future de la population des magistrats et perspectives de carrière, 2001-2040*, 2006, XXX + 114 p.
- N° 135 | Alexandre Djirikian et Valérie laflamme, sous la direction de Maryse MARPSAT, *Les formes marginales de logement. Étude bibliographique et méthodologique de la prise en compte du logement non ordinaire*, 2006, 240 p.
- N° 134 | Catherine BONVALET et Éva LELIÈVRE, *Publications choisies autour de l'enquête « Biographies et entourage »*, 2006, 134 p.
- N° 133 | Arnaud RÉGNIER-LOILIER, *Présentation, questionnaire et documentation de l'« Étude des relations familiales et intergénérationnelles » (Erft). Version française de l'enquête « Generations and Gender Survey » (GGS)*, 2006, 238 p.
- N° 132 | Lucie BONNET et Louis BERTRAND (sous la direction de), *Mobilités, habitat et identités, Actes de la journée d'étude « Jeunes chercheurs ». Le logement et l'habitat comme objet de recherche. Atelier 3*, 2005, 92 p.
- N° 131 | Isabelle FRECHON et Catherine Villeneuve-Gokalp, *Étude sur l'adoption*, 2005, 64 p.
- N° 130 | Dominique MEURS, Ariane PAILHÉ et Patrick SIMON, *Mobilité intergénérationnelle et persistance des inégalités. L'accès à l'emploi des immigrés et de leurs descendants en France*, 2005, 36 p.
- N° 129 | Magali MAZUY, Nicolas RAZAFINDRATSIMA, Élise de LA ROCHEBROCHARD, *Déperdition dans l'enquête « Intentions de fécondité »*, 2005, 36 p.
- N° 128 | Laure MOGUEROU et Magali BARBIERI, *Population et pauvreté en Afrique. Neuf communications présentées à la IV<sup>e</sup> Conférence africaine sur la population, Tunis, Tunisie, 8-12 décembre 2003*, 2005, 184 p.
- N° 127 | Jean-Louis PAN KÉ SHON, *Les sources de la mobilité résidentielle. Modifications intervenues sur les grandes sources de données dans l'étude des migrations*, 2005, 30 p.

- N° 126 | Thierry DEBRAND et Anne-Gisèle PRIVAT, *L'impact des réformes de 1993 et de 2003 sur les retraites. Une analyse à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation Artémis*, 2005, 28 p.
- N° 125 | Kees WAALDIJK (ed), *More or less together: levels of legal consequences of marriage, cohabitation and registered partnership for different-sex and same-sex partners: a comparative study of nine European countries*, 2005, 192 p. (s'adresser à Marie DIGOIX)
- N° 124 | Marie DIGOIX et Patrick FESTY (eds), *Same-sex couples, same-sex partnerships, and homosexual marriages: A Focus on cross-national differentials*, 2004, 304 p.
- N° 123 | Marie DIGOIX et Patrick FESTY (sous la dir.), *Séminaire « Comparaisons européennes », années 2001-2002*, 2004, 220 p.
- N° 122 | Emmanuelle GUYAVARCH et Gilles PISON, *Les balbutiements de la contraception en Afrique au Sud du Sahara*, septembre 2004, 48 p.
- N° 121 | Maryse JASPARD et Stéphanie CONDON, *Genre, violences sexuelles et justice*. Actes de la journée-séminaire du 20 juin 2003, 2004, 135p.
- N° 120 | Laurent TOULEMON et Magali MAZUY, *Comment prendre en compte l'âge à l'arrivée et la durée de séjour en France dans la mesure de la fécondité des immigrants ?*, 2004, 34 p.
- N° 119 | Céline CLÉMENT et Bénédicte GASTINEAU (coord.), *Démographie et sociétés*. Colloque international « Jeunes Chercheurs », Cerpos-Université Paris X-Nanterre, 1<sup>er</sup> et 2 octobre 2002, 2003, 350 p.
- N° 118 | Monique Bertrand, Véronique Dupont et France Guérin-Pace (sous la dir.), *Espaces de vie. Une revue des concepts et des applications*, 2003, 188 p.
- N° 117 | Stephanie CONDON et Armelle ANDRO, *Questions de genre en démographie. Actes de la journée du 22 juin 2001*, 2003, 128 p.
- N° 116 | Maryse JASPARD et l'équipe Enveff, *Le questionnaire de l'enquête Enveff. Enquête nationale sur les violences envers les femmes en France*, 2003, 10 + 88 p.
- N° 115 | Zahia OUADAH-BEDIDI et Jacques VALLIN, *Disparités régionales de l'écart d'âge entre conjoints en Algérie. Évolution depuis 1966*, 2003, 32 p.
- N° 114 | Magali MAZUY, *Situations familiales et fécondité selon le milieu social. Résultats à partir de l'enquête EHF de 1999*, 2002, 60 p.
- N° 113 | Jean-Paul SARDON, *Fécondité et transition en Europe centrale et orientale*, 2002, 38 p.
- N° 112 | Thérèse LOCOH, *Deux études sur la fécondité en Afrique : 1) Structures familiales et évolutions de la fécondité dans les pays à fécondité intermédiaire d'Afrique de l'Ouest ; 2) Baisse de la fécondité et mutations familiales en Afrique sub-saharienne*, 2002, 24 p. et 30 p.
- N° 111 | Thierry DEBRAND et Anne-Gisèle PRIVAT, *Individual real wages over business cycle: The impact of macroeconomic variations on individual careers and implications concerning retirement pensions*, 2002, 38 p.
- N° 110 | Recueil préparé par Amandine LEBUGLE et Jacques VALLIN, *Sur le chemin de la transition*. Onze communications présentées au XXIV<sup>e</sup> Congrès général de la population à Salvador de Bahia, Brésil, août 2001, 2002, 234 p.
- N° 109 | Éric BRIAN, Jean-Marc ROHRBASSER, Christine THÉRÉ, Jacques VÉRON (intervenants et organisateurs), *La durée de vie : histoire et calcul*. Séminaire de la valorisation de la recherche, 7 février 2000, 2002, 70 p.
- N° 108 | France MESLÉ et Jacques VALLIN, *Montée de l'espérance de vie et concentration des âges au décès*, 2002, 20 p.
- N° 107 | Alexandre AVDEEV, *La mortalité infantile en Russie et en URSS: éléments pour un état des recherches*, 2002, 48 p.
- N° 106 | Isabelle ATTANÉ (organisatrice), *La Chine en transition: questions de population, questions de société*. Séminaire de la valorisation de la recherche, 31 janvier et 1<sup>er</sup> février 2001 (s'adresser à Céline Perrel), 2002, 46 p.
- N° 105 | A. AVDEEV, J. BELLENGER, A. BLUM, P. FESTY, A. Pailhé, C. GOUSSEFF, C. LEFÈVRE, A. MONNIER, J.-C. SEBAG, J. VALLIN (intervenants et organisateurs), *La société russe depuis la perestroïka: rupture, crise ou continuité ?* Séminaire de la valorisation de la recherche, 1<sup>er</sup> mars 2001 (s'adresser à Céline Perrel), 2001, 124 p.
- N° 104 | Jacques VÉRON, Sophie PENNEC, Jacques LÉGARÉ, Marie DIGOIX (éds), *Le contrat social à l'épreuve des changements démographiques ~ The Social Contract in the Face of Demographic Change*, Actes des 2<sup>e</sup> Rencontres Sauvy, 2001, 386 p.

- N° 103 | Gilles PISON, Alexis Gabadinho, Catherine ENEL, *Mlomp (Sénégal). Niveaux et tendances démographiques ; 1985-2000*, 2001, 182 p.
- N° 102 | *La famille en AOF et la condition de la femme*. Rapport présenté au Gouverneur général de l'AOF. par Denise Savineau (1938). Introduction de Pascale Barthélémy, 2001, XXII-222 p.
- N° 101 | Jean-Paul SARDON, *La fécondité dans les Balkans*, 2001, 88 p.
- N° 100 | Jean-Paul SARDON, *L'évolution récente de la fécondité en Europe du Sud*, 26 p.
- N° 99 | S. JUSTEAU, J.H. KALTENBACH, D. LAPEYRONNIE, S. ROCHÉ, J.C. SEBAG, X. THIERRY ET M. TRIBALAT (intervenants et organisateurs), *L'immigration et ses amalgames*. Séminaire de la valorisation de la recherche, 24 mai 2000, 2001, 94 p.
- N° 98 | Juliette HALIFAX, *L'insertion sociale des enfants adoptés. Résultats de l'enquête « Adoption internationale et insertion sociale », 2000 (Ined – Les Amis des enfants du monde)*, 2001, 58 p.
- N° 97 | Michèle TRIBALAT, *Modéliser, pour quoi faire ?*, 2001, 10 p.
- N° 96 | O. EKERT-JAFFÉ, H. LERIDON, S. PENNEC, I. THÉRY, L. TOULEMON et J.-C. SEBAG (intervenants et organisateurs), *Évolution de la structure familiale*. Séminaire de la valorisation de la recherche, 28 juin 2000, 2001, 110 p.
- N° 95 | A. ANDRO, A. LEBUGLE, M. LESCLINGAND, T. LOCOH, M. MOUVAGHA-SOW, Z. OUADAH-BEDIDI, J. VALLIN, C. VANDERMEERSCH, J. VÉRON, *Genre et développement. Huit communications présentées à la Chaire Quetelet 2000*, 2001, 158 p.
- N° 94 | C. BONVALET, C. CLÉMENT, D. MAISON, L. ORTALDA et T. VICHNEVSKAIA, *Réseaux de sociabilité et d'entraide au sein de la parenté : Six contributions*, 2001, 110 p.
- N° 93 | Magali MAZUY et Laurent TOULEMON, *Étude de l'histoire familiale. Premiers résultats de l'enquête en ménages*, 2001, 100 p.
- N° 92 | *Politiques sociales en France et en Russie*, INED/IPSEP, 2001, 246 p.
- N° 91 | Françoise MOREAU, *Commerce des données sur la population et libertés individuelles*, 2001, 20 p. + Annexes.
- N° 90 | Youssef COURBAGE, Sergio DELLAPERGOLA, Alain DIECKHOFF, Philippe FARGUES, Emile MALET, Elias SANBAR et Jean-Claude SEBAG (intervenants et organisateurs), *L'arrière-plan démographique de l'explosion de violence en Israël-Palestine*. Séminaire de la valorisation de la recherche, 30 novembre 2000, 2000, 106 p.
- N° 89 | Bénédicte GASTINEAU et Elisabete de CARVALHO (coordonné par), *Démographie : nouveaux champs, nouvelles recherches*, 2000, 380 p.
- N° 88 | Gil BELLIS, Jean-Noël BIRABEN, Marie-Hélène CAZES et Marc de BRAEKELEER (modérateur et intervenants), *Généétique et populations*. Séminaire de la valorisation de la recherche, 26 janvier 2000, 2000, 96 p.
- N° 87 | Jean-Marie FIRDION, Maryse MARPSAT et Gérard MAUGER (intervenants), *Étude des sans-domicile : le cas de Paris et de l'Île-de-France*. Séminaire de la valorisation de la recherche, 19 avril 2000, 2000, 90 p.
- N° 86 | François HÉRAN et Jean-Claude SEBAG (responsables modérateurs), *L'utilisation des sources administratives en démographie, sociologie et statistique sociale*. Séminaire de la valorisation de la recherche, 20 septembre 2000, 2000, 170 p.
- N° 85 | Michel BOZON et Thérèse LOCOH (sous la dir.), *Rapports de genre et questions de population. II. Genre, population et développement*, 2000, 200 p.
- N° 84 | Michel BOZON et Thérèse LOCOH (sous la dir.), *Rapports de genre et questions de population. I. Genre et population, France 2000*, 2000, 260 p.
- N° 83 | Stéphanie CONDON, Michel BOZON et Thérèse LOCOH, *Démographie, sexe et genre: bilan et perspectives*, 2000, 100 p.
- N° 82 | Olivia EKERT-JAFFE et Anne SOLAZ, *Unemployment and family formation in France*, 2000, 26 p.
- N° 81 | Jean-Marie FIRDION, *L'étude des jeunes sans domicile dans les pays occidentaux : état des lieux*, 1999, 28 p.
- N° 80 | *Age, génération et activité : vers un nouveau contrat social ? / Age, cohort and activity : A new "social contract"?*, Actes des 1<sup>es</sup> rencontres Sauvy (s'adresser à Marie DIGOIX), 1999, 314 p.
- N° 79 | Maryse MARPSAT, *Les apports réciproques des méthodes quantitatives et qualitatives : le cas particulier des enquêtes sur les personnes sans domicile*, 1999, 24 p.
- N° 78 | *Les populations du monde, le monde des populations. La place de l'expert en sciences sociales dans le débat public*, Actes de la Table ronde pour l'inauguration de l'Ined, 1999, 54 p.

- N° 77 | Isabelle SÉGUY, Fabienne LE SAGER, *Enquête Louis Henry. Notice descriptive des données informatiques*, 1999, 156 p.
- N° 76 | I. SÉGUY, H. COLENÇON et C. MÉRIC, *Enquête Louis Henry. Notice descriptive de la partie nominative*, 1999, 120 p.
- N° 75 | Anne-Claude LE VOYER (s'adresser à H. LERIDON), *Les processus menant au désir d'enfant en France*, 1999, 200 p.
- N° 74 | Jacques VALLIN et France MESLÉ, *Le rôle des vaccinations dans la baisse de la mortalité*, 1999, 20 p.
- N° 73 | Bernard ZARCA, *Comment passer d'un échantillon de ménages à un échantillon de fratries ? Les enquêtes « Réseaux familiaux » de 1976, « Proches et parents » de 1990 et le calcul d'un coefficient de pondération*, 1999, 20 p.
- N° 72 | Catherine BONVALET, *Famille-logement. Identité statistique ou enjeu politique ?* 1998, 262 p.
- N° 71 | Denise ARBONVILLE, *Normalisation de l'habitat et accès au logement. Une étude statistique de l'évolution du parc « social de fait » de 1984 à 1992*, 1998, 36 p.
- N° 70 | *Famille, activité, vieillissement : générations et solidarités*. Bibliographie préparée par le Centre de Documentation de l'Ined, 1998, 44 p.
- N° 69 | XXIII<sup>e</sup> Congrès général de la population, Beijing, Chine, 11-17 octobre 1997: *Contribution des chercheurs de l'Ined au Congrès*, 1997, 178 p.  
*Participation of Ined Researchers in the Conference*, 1997, 180 p.
- N° 68 | France MESLÉ et Jacques VALLIN, *Évolution de la mortalité aux âges élevés en France depuis 1950*, 1998, 42 p.
- N° 67 | Isabelle SEGUY, *Enquête Jean-Noël Biraben « La population de la France de 1500 à 1700 ». Répertoire des sources numériques*, 1998, 36 p.
- N° 66 | Alain BLUM, *I. Statistique, démographie et politique. II. Deux études sur l'histoire de la statistique et de la statistique démographique en URSS (1920-1939)*, 1998, 92 p.
- N° 65 | Annie LABOURIE-RACAPÉ et Thérèse LOCOH, *Genre et démographie : nouvelles problématiques ou effet de mode ?* 1998, 27 p.
- N° 64 | C. BONVALET, A. GOTMAN et Y. GRAFMEYER (éds), et I. Bertaux-Viame, D. Maison et L. Ortalda, *Proches et parents : l'aménagement des territoires*, 1997.
- N° 63 | Corinne BENVENISTE et Benoît RIANDEY, *Les exclus du logement : connaître et agir*, 1997, 20 p.
- N° 62 | Sylvia T. WARGON, *La démographie au Canada, 1945-1995*, 1997, 40 p.
- N° 61 | Claude RENARD, *Enquête Louis Henry. Bibliographie de l'enquête*, 1997, 82 p.
- N° 60 | H. AGHA, J.C. CHASTELAND, Y. COURBAGE, M. LADIER-FOULADI, A.H. MEHRYAR, *Famille et fécondité à Shiraz (1996)*, 1997, 60 p.
- N° 59 | Catherine BONVALET, Dominique MAISON et Laurent ORTALDA, *Analyse textuelle des entretiens « Proches et Parents »*, 1997, 32 p.
- N° 58 | B. BACCAÏNI, M. BARBIERI, S. CONDON et M. DIGOIX (éds), *Questions de population. Actes du Colloque Jeunes Chercheurs:*  
*I. Mesures démographiques dans des petites populations*, 1997, 50 p.  
*II. Nuptialité – fécondité – reproduction*, 1997, 120 p.  
*III. Histoire des populations*, 1997, 90 p.  
*IV. Économie et emploi*, 1997, 50 p.  
*V. Vieillesse – retraite*, 1997, 66 p.  
*VI. Famille*, 1997, 128 p.  
*VII. Santé – mortalité*, 1997, 136 p.  
*VIII. Population et espace*, 1997, 120 p.  
*IX. Migration – intégration*, 1997, 96 p.
- N° 57 | Isabelle SÉGUY et Corinne MÉRIC, *Enquête Louis Henry. Notice descriptive non nominative*, 1997, 106 p.
- N° 56 | Máire Ní BHROLCHÁIN and Laurent TOULEMON, *Exploratory analysis of demographic data using graphical methods*, 1996, 50 p.
- N° 55 | Laurent TOULEMON et Catherine de GUIBERT-LANTOINE, *Enquêtes sur la fécondité et la famille dans les pays de l'Europe (régions ECE des Nations unies). Résultats de l'enquête française*, 1996, 84 p.
- N° 54 | G. BALLAND, G. BELLIS, M. DE BRAEKELEER, F. DEPOID, M. LEFEBVRE, I. SEGUY, *Généalogies et reconstitutions de familles. Analyse des besoins*, 1996, 44 p.

- N° 53 | Jacques VALLIN et France MESLÉ, *Comment suivre l'évolution de la mortalité par cause malgré les discontinuités de la statistique ? Le cas de la France de 1925 à 1993*, 1996, 46p .
- N° 52 | Catherine BONVALET et Eva LELIÈVRE, *La notion d'entourage, un outil pour l'analyse de l'évolution des réseaux individuels*, 1996, 18 p.
- N° 51 | Alexandre AVDEEV, Alain BLUM et Serge ZAKHAROV, *La mortalité a-t-elle vraiment augmenté brutalement entre 1991 et 1995 ?*, 1996, 80 p.
- N° 50 | France MESLÉ, Vladimir SHKOLNIKOV, Véronique HERTRICH et Jacques VALLIN, *Tendances récentes de la mortalité par cause en Russie, 1965-1993*, 1995, 70 p.  
Avec, en supplément, 1 volume d'Annexes de 384 p.
- N° 49 | Jacques VALLIN, *Espérance de vie : quelle quantité pour quelle qualité de vie ?*, 1995, 24 p.
- N° 48 | François HÉRAN, *Figures et légendes de la parenté:*  
I. *Variations sur les figures élémentaires*, 1995, 114 p.  
II. *La modélisation de l'écart d'âge et la relation groupe/individu*, 1995, 84 p.  
III. *Trois études de cas sur l'écart d'âge : Touaregs, Alyawara, Warlpiri*, 1995, 102 p.  
IV. *Le roulement des alliances*, 1995, 60 p.  
V. *Petite géométrie fractale de la parenté*, 1995, 42 p.  
VI. *Arbor juris. Logique des figures de parenté au Moyen Age*, 1996, 62 p.  
VII. *De Granet à Lévi-Strauss*, 1996, 162 p.  
VIII. *Les vies parallèles. Une analyse de la co-alliance chez les Etoro de Nouvelle-Guinée*, 1996, 80 p.  
IX. *Ambrym ou l'énigme de la symétrie oblique : histoire d'une controverse*, 1996, 136 p.
- N° 47 | Olivia EKERT-JAFFÉ, Denise ARBONVILLE et Jérôme WITTEWER, *Ce que coûtent les jeunes de 18 à 25 ans*, 1995, 122 p.
- N° 46 | Laurent TOULEMON, *Régression logistique et régression sur les risques. Deux supports de cours*, 1995, 56 p.
- N° 45 | Graziella CASELLI, France MESLÉ et Jacques VALLIN, *Le triomphe de la médecine. Évolution de la mortalité en Europe depuis le début de siècle*, 1995, 60 p.
- N° 44 | Magali BARBIERI, Alain BLUM, Elena DOLGIKH, Amon ERGASHEV, *La transition de fécondité en Ouzbékistan*, 1994, 76 p.
- N° 43 | Marc De BRAEKELEER et Gil BELLIS, *Généalogies et reconstitutions de familles en génétique humaine*, 1994, 66 p.
- N° 42 | Serge ADAMETS, Alain BLUM et Serge ZAKHAROV, *Disparités et variabilités des catastrophes démographiques en URSS*, 1994, 100 p.
- N° 41 | Alexandre AVDEEV, Alain BLUM et Irina TROITSKAJA, *L'avortement et la contraception en Russie et dans l'ex-URSS : histoire et présent*, 1993, 74 p.
- N° 40 | Gilles PISON et Annabel DESGREES DU LOU, *Bandafassi (Sénégal) : niveaux et tendances démographiques 1971-1991*, 1993, 40 p.
- N° 39 | Michel Louis LÉVY, *La dynamique des populations humaines*, 1993, 20 p.
- N° 38 | Alain BLUM, *Systèmes démographiques soviétiques*, 1992, 14 + X p.
- N° 37 | Emmanuel LAGARDE, Gilles PISON, Bernard LE GUENNO, Catherine ENEL et Cheikh SECK, *Les facteurs de risque de l'infection à VIH2 dans une région rurale du Sénégal*, 1992, 72 p.
- N° 36 | Annabel DESGREES DU LOU et Gilles PISON, *Les obstacles à la vaccination universelle des enfants des pays en développement. Une étude de cas en zone rurale au Sénégal*, 1992, 26 p.
- N° 35 | France MESLÉ, Vladimir SHKOLNIKOV et Jacques VALLIN, *La mortalité par causes en URSS de 1970 à 1987 : reconstruction de séries statistiques cohérentes*, 1992, 36 p.
- N° 34 | France MESLÉ et Jacques VALLIN, *Évolution de la mortalité par cancer et par maladies cardio-vasculaires en Europe depuis 1950*, 1992, 48 p.
- N° 33 | Didier BLANCHET, *Vieillesse et perspectives des retraites : analyses démo-économiques*, 1991, 120 p.
- N° 32 | Noël BONNEUIL, *Démographie de la nuptialité au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 1990, 32 p.
- N° 31 | Jean-Paul SARDON, *L'évolution de la fécondité en France depuis un demi-siècle*, 1990, 102 p.
- N° 30 | Benoît RIANDEY, *Répertoire des enquêtes démographiques : bilan pour la France métropolitaine*, 1989, 24 p.
- N° 29 | Thérèse LOCOH, *Changement social et situations matrimoniales : les nouvelles formes d'union à Lomé*, 1989, 44 p.

- N° 28 | Catherine ENEL, Gilles PISON, et Monique LEFEBVRE, *Migrations et évolution de la nuptialité. L'exemple d'un village joola du sud du Sénégal, Mlomp*, 1989, 26 p.  
(Sénégal) depuis 50 ans, 1<sup>re</sup> édition : 1989, 36 p. ; 2<sup>e</sup> édition revue et augmentée : 1990, 48 p.
- N° 27 | Nicolas BROUARD, *L'extinction des noms de famille en France : une approche*, 1989, 22 p.
- N° 26 | Gilles PISON, Monique LEFEBVRE, Catherine ENEL et Jean-François TRAPE, *L'influence des changements sanitaires sur l'évolution de la mortalité : le cas de Mlomp*, 1989, 36 p.
- N° 25 | Alain BLUM et Philippe FARGUES, *Estimation de la mortalité maternelle dans les pays à données incomplètes. Une application à Bamako (1974-1985) et à d'autres pays en développement*, 1989, 36 p.
- N° 24 | Jacques VALLIN et Graziella CASELLI, *Mortalité et vieillissement de la population*, 1989, 30 p.
- N° 23 | Georges TAPINOS, Didier BLANCHET et Olivia EKERT-JAFFÉ, *Population et demande de changements démographiques, demande et structure de consommation*, 1989, 46 p.
- N° 22 | Benoît RIANDEY, *Un échantillon probabiliste de A à Z : l'exemple de l'enquête Peuplement et dépeuplement de Paris. INED (1986)*, 1989, 12 p.
- N° 21 | Noël BONNEUIL et Philippe FARGUES, *Prévoir les « caprices » de la mortalité. Chronique des causes de décès à Bamako de 1964 à 1985*, 1989, 44 p.
- N° 20 | France MESLÉ, *Morbidité et causes de décès chez les personnes âgées*, 1988, 18 p.
- N° 19 | Henri LERIDON, *Analyse des biographies matrimoniales dans l'enquête sur les situations familiales*, 1988, 64 p.
- N° 18 | Jacques VALLIN, *La mortalité en Europe de 1720 à 1914 : tendances à long terme et changements de structure par âge et par sexe*, 1988, 40 p.
- N° 17 | Jacques VALLIN, *Évolution sociale et baisse de la mortalité : conquête ou reconquête d'un avantage féminin ?*, 1988, 36 p.
- N° 16 | Gérard CALOT et Graziella CASELLI, *La mortalité en Chine d'après le recensement de 1982 : I Analyse selon le sexe et l'âge au niveau national et provincial*, 1988, 72 p.  
*II Tables de mortalité par province*, 1988, 112 p.
- N° 15 | Peter AABY (s'adresser à J. VALLIN), *Le surpeuplement, un facteur déterminant de la mortalité par rougeole en Afrique*, 1987, 52 p.
- N° 14 | Jacques VALLIN, *Théorie(s) de la baisse de la mortalité et situation africaine*, 1987, 44 p.
- N° 13 | Kuakuvi GBENYON et Thérèse LOCOH, *Différences de mortalité selon le sexe, dans l'enfance en Afrique au Sud du Sahara*, 1987, 30 p.
- N° 12 | Philippe FARGUES, *Les saisons et la mortalité urbaine en Afrique. Les décès à Bamako de 1974 à 1985*, 1987, 38 p.
- N° 11 | Gilles PISON, *Les jumeaux en Afrique au Sud du Sahara : fréquence, statut social et mortalité*, 1987, 48 p.
- N° 10 | Philippe FARGUES, *La migration obéit-elle à la conjoncture pétrolière dans le Golfe ? L'exemple du Koweït*, 1987, 30 p.
- N° 9 | Didier BLANCHET, *Deux études sur les relations entre démographie et systèmes de retraite*, 1986, 26 p.
- N° 8 | Didier BLANCHET, *Équilibre malthusien et liaison entre croissances économique et démographique dans les pays en développement : un modèle*, 1986, 20 p.
- N° 7 | Jacques VALLIN, France MESLÉ et Alfred NIZARD, *Reclassement des rubriques de la 8<sup>e</sup> révision de la Classification internationale des maladies selon l'étiologie et l'anatomie*, 1986, 56 p.
- N° 6 | Philippe FARGUES, *Un apport potentiel des formations sanitaires pour mesurer la mortalité dans l'enfance en Afrique*, 1986, 34 p.
- N° 5 | Jacques VALLIN et France MESLÉ, *Les causes de décès en France de 1925 à 1978*, 1986, 36 p.
- N° 4 | Graziella CASELLI, Jacques VALLIN, J. VAUPEL et A. YASHIN, *L'évolution de la structure par âge de la mortalité en Italie et en France depuis 1900*, 1986, 28 p.
- N° 3 | Paul PAILLAT, *Le vécu du vieillissement en 1979*, 1981, 114 p.
- N° 2 | Claude LÉVY, *Aspects socio-politiques et démographiques de la planification familiale en France, en Hongrie et en Roumanie*, 1977, 248 p.
- N° 1 | Georges TAPINOS, *Les méthodes d'analyse en démographie économique*, 1976, 288 p.





