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**Changing patterns  
of Congolese migration**

Bruno Schoumaker (UCL), Marie-Laurence Flahaux (UCL)  
With the collaboration of Agbada Mangalu Mobhe (UNIKIN)

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# CHANGING PATTERNS OF CONGOLESE MIGRATION

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## INTRODUCTION

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DR Congo is one of the most populated countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and the largest French-speaking African country. It is also currently one of the poorest countries in the World: in 2011, it ranked last (187) on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2011). Since its independence, it has gone through numerous political and economic crises. These crises are thought to have profoundly affected migrations (Sumata, 2002). Yet, although it is possible to draw a broad picture of Congolese migration, many of its characteristics and changes over time are still largely unknown. The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of the changing patterns of Congolese migration using quantitative MAFE data<sup>1</sup>. In the first section, a review of the literature provides background information on the recent political and economic changes in DR Congo, as well as on changes in migrations. Next, we use MAFE data collected in Kinshasa<sup>2</sup> (capital city of DR Congo) and in two European destination countries (Belgium and the UK) to document the changing patterns of migration from the DR Congo since the mid-1970s. In the third section, we focus on strategies and routes of migrations to Europe.

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## LITERATURE REVIEW

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### 1. RECENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN DR CONGO

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Since the country gained independence in 1960, the DR Congo has experienced a series of economic downturns and episodes of political instability. Until the mid-1970s, the economic situation was fairly good, benefiting notably from high copper prices on world markets and from foreign direct investments. From the mid-1970s onwards, however, the economic situation seriously deteriorated. The oil crisis, together with the collapse of the price of copper (and of other commodities) and bad economic policy, wiped out the gains of the preceding period (Peemans, 1997; Nzisabira, 1997). That time was also characterised by political turmoil,

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<sup>1</sup> For more information on the MAFE data, see Beauchemin (2012)

<sup>2</sup> Precaution should be taken in extrapolating the results to Congolese migration. Firstly, the data collected in DR Congo come exclusively from Kinshasa. Analyses on migration from DRC are therefore not representative of the Congolese population as a whole, but rather of the inhabitants of the capital. In Europe, results are representative of migrants in Belgium and the UK. Important Congolese populations living in other countries (e.g. France) are not covered by these data.

notably in 1977 and in 1978 (Shaba wars). The period from 1983 to 1989 started out with economic reforms, a slight increase in GDP and the start of a structural adjustment programme (Nzisabira, 1997). These improvements, however, did not last, and by the end of the 1980s, the GDP growth rate was negative. This coincided with the end of the cold war and with serious changes in the political situation in DR Congo.

TABLE 1 : BROAD PERIODS IN THE CONGO'S RECENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY

Period	Political situation	Economic situation
1960-1965	Political instability after independence	Stagnation
1965-1974	Mobutu seizes power. Relative political stability	Growth of the economy
1975-1982	Shaba wars in the late 1970s	Deterioration of the economy
1983-1989	Relative stability	Economic reforms and slow growth
1990-1996	End of cold war, democratisation process and start of serious political instability. Riots in the early 1990s, start of the first Congo war in 1996.	Economic deterioration, negative growth rates, decrease in international development aid.
1997-2002	Regime change (Mobutu replaced by L.-D. Kabila), first and second Congo wars. Assassination of L.-D. Kabila in 2001, replaced by his son J. Kabila.	Negative growth rates
2003-2008	End of the war, election of Joseph Kabila in 2006.	Improvement in the economic situation, resumption of international aid

The 1990s constituted one of the darkest periods in the Congo's recent political and economic history. The democratisation process announced by Mobutu in April 1990 lagged and was accompanied by political instability. Riots erupted in 1991, shortly after the Conférence Nationale Souveraine was set up to decide the future of the country (Hesselbein, 2007), and new riots occurred in 1993. In 1994, the genocide in Rwanda led to massive flows of people from Rwanda into DR Congo, which also contributed to political instability in DR Congo (Hesselbein, 2007). Two years later (1996), Laurent-Désiré Kabila led a rebellion with the support of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola (McCalpin, 2002). By May 1997, Mobutu had fled to Morocco and the rebellion forces had seized power. The next year, another rebellion started in Eastern Congo – this time with the goal of deposing Kabila (Dunn, 2002). This was the start of the second Congo War, which was to last until 2003. Laurent-Désiré Kabila remained in power until he was assassinated in January 2001. He was replaced by his son Joseph, who made overtures to the international community showing willingness to move towards peace (Putzel et al., 2008). From 2002, violence was significantly reduced (Hesselbein, 2007), and the second Congo War officially ended in 2003. In 2006, elections were organised, and Joseph Kabila was elected President. He was re-elected in 2011. Despite the end of the war, Eastern Congo has continued to be regularly prone to violence.

The 1990s were also characterised by a rapid deterioration in the economic situation. The estimated GDP growth rate, which was already negative at the beginning of the period, decreased from -6.6% in 1990 to -14% in 1999. DR Congo's economy was struck by hyperinflation, and the country's public debt also soared. Official development assistance also decreased drastically in the 1990s (Hesselbein, 2007; Mutamba Lukusa, 1999). During that period, the purchasing power of the Congolese population declined considerably. Since the year 2000, and especially since 2003, the economic context and living conditions of the population have slightly improved. In 2002, the country experienced positive GDP growth rates for the first time since 1995. The improvement in the economic situation can be explained by the post-war reunification of the country, by the resumption of international development aid

and a massive injection of foreign currency by the IMF (IMF, 2002). However, the living conditions of the Congolese population remain extremely difficult.

## 2. CONGOLESE MIGRATION OVER THE LAST DECADES

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In the first half of the twentieth century, emigration from DR Congo mainly involved short-distance movements to neighbouring countries (Ngoie Tshibambe and Vwakyankazi, 2008). The country's independence in 1960 marked a turning-point in the history of migration in several respects. Chronic political instability gave rise to mass refugee movements to neighbouring countries, whose intensity and destination varied from one crisis to the next. Migration towards Europe also developed gradually after independence. While some Congolese migrated to Belgium in the first half of the twentieth century, migration to Europe did not truly take off until the 1960s. At that time, most migrants were members of the country's elite who went to Europe to study (Kagné and Martiniello 2001; Schoonvaere, 2010), and returned to the Congo after completing their education. The deterioration of the economic and political situation in the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, led to an increase in flows, to a decrease in return migration (Schoonvaere, 2010) and to a diversification of the destinations and profiles of Congolese migrants (Demart 2008; Schoumaker, Vause, Mangalu, 2010). While Belgium was the main European destination of the Congolese in the 1960s and 1970s, France gradually became the preferred destination, and other countries, notably the United Kingdom and Germany, also attracted growing numbers of Congolese migrants (Ngoie Tshibambe and Vwakyankazi 2008). Major changes in the patterns of migration towards Africa were also observed in the late 1980s and the 1990s. In the late 1980s, and especially after the abolition of apartheid, South Africa became a leading destination country (Steinberg, 2005; Sumata, 2002).

Starting in the 1980s, the profile of Congolese migrants to Europe changed. Migrants came from less favoured socioeconomic categories (Sumata, 2002) and the proportion of women increased, in Belgium at least (Schoonvaere, 2010). Migrants' way of entry and itineraries also became more diverse. Firstly, many Congolese migrants started coming to Europe as asylum seekers, while traditionally they came to study or to join their family (Schoonvaere, 2010). Secondly, it would appear that migration trajectories became more complex. In a study of Congolese migrants in Paris in the early 2000s, Lututala (2005) indicates, for example, that two-thirds of migrants in his sample (122) had transited via another country before arriving in France. Illegal immigration developed and several studies indicate that it has become a key component of Congolese migration (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000; Ngoie Tshibambe, 2008), though its scale has not been documented. The phenomenon of "Ngulus", i.e. migrants travelling with an official group (sports team, music band, religious groups...) and overstaying the visa, is thought to have contributed to fuelling undocumented Congolese migrants (Sumata, Trefon *et al.*, 2004; George, 2004; Hanon, 2004).

Studies of Congolese return migration from Europe are quite rare, but show a downtrend in returns and a low proportion of intentions to return. Using Belgian administrative data, Schoonvaere (2010) showed a substantial decrease in returns among migrants who arrived in the 1990s and later<sup>3</sup>. In his study of Congolese migrants in Paris, Lututala (2006) also shows

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<sup>3</sup> Existing statistics also suggest that many returns are spontaneous; expulsions and returns under assisted voluntary return programmes represent a minority. For example, between 50 and 100 undocumented Congolese migrants are deported from Belgium each year (CECLR, 2008), and the

that three-quarters of migrants intend to stay in France, and that only 14% intend to return permanently to RD Congo (12% are undecided). The low propensity to return is visible in popular expressions such as “RIP” (*retour interdit au pays, forbidden return to the home country*), and ‘advice’ that families in Kinshasa give to migrants heading for Europe (Flahaux, 201b). Lututala (n.d.) suggests that non-return is part of the phenomenon of residential ubiquity. Migrants “consider [...] their host country as being part of their living space and not as a foreign country where they are living temporarily” (Lututala, n.d., p.3). This residential ubiquity is demonstrated through the money that migrants send home, but also through visits to DRC which may, to a certain extent, be a substitute for a definitive return. However, to our knowledge, no studies have collected data on visits and on round trips between Europe and DRC.

## CHANGING DEPARTURES AND RETURNS: AN OVERVIEW USING MAFE DATA

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The MAFE data were collected both in DR Congo and in two European countries. Through household data, an overall picture of migration trends, destinations and patterns can be provided. This picture complements existing data by allowing comparing trends in departure and returns, regardless of the destination. One should bear in mind that the data were collected in Kinshasa, the capital city, and is not representative of the whole population of Congo.

### **Box 1. Reconstructing migration trends**

MAFE data allow reconstructing the trends in departures and returns of Congolese migrants by computing retrospective rates of migration. The household questionnaire of the surveys conducted in DR Congo provides the dates of the first international migration (for at least 12 months) of the head of household, of his/her partner(s), and of his/her children. This information is available for migrants, regardless of their current country of residence (still living abroad or return migrants), and the date of first return is available for those who returned after their first departure. The household questionnaire also recorded the dates of birth, gender, and level of education of the head of household, the partner(s) and the children, whether they migrated or not.

Age-specific migration probabilities are computed by dividing the number of migrants at a given age during a given year, by the number of people of that age who had not yet migrated by that year. These probabilities are estimated using event history models including both ages and time periods as independent variables. They are then transformed into indicators that are more easily interpreted. The indicator used here is called the lifetime probability of migration, and measures the probability that a person would do at least one international migration during his/her adult life (18-70), if the age-specific probabilities of migration observed during a given time-period (i.e. 1990-1999) were applied to people from age 18 to 70. This is the ‘synthetic cohort’ principle commonly used for other types of demographic indicators (period life expectancy, period age-specific fertility rates). Trends in returns are reconstructed in a similar way. Probabilities of return are computed (among migrants) using event history models with time periods and duration of stay as independent variables. The coefficients of the models are then transformed into a synthetic indicator measuring the probability of returning within 10 years of first departure for separate periods. Because the population at risk of returning is only composed of those who left, the sample size for returns are much smaller, and indicators are less reliable.

Apart from problems of small samples in some cases, these techniques of reconstructing migration trends from retrospective are not free from biases. One possible bias is due to the fact that, for people not living in the household, data are collected from proxy respondents. Some migrants may not be declared, and data on those who are declared may be inaccurate. Another possible bias stems from the fact that some entire households may have migrated abroad, and as a result these emigrants may not be recorded as emigrants (the head or spouse may still be mentioned by their parents, but the children would not be mentioned). On the other hand, some people

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
number of migrants assisted by “voluntary return” programs is also relatively small (Ngoie Tshibambe & Lelu, 2009).

may be reported twice, since they can be reported by parents and spouses. Finally, only the first migration is included in the reconstruction of trends, and this may lead to underestimating recent migration. Even though biases are inevitable, they compensate each other to some extent, are considered sufficiently small to provide acceptable estimates of departures and returns. .

## LEAVING DR CONGO: A RESPONSE TO DETERIORATING LIVING CONDITIONS?

We first look at departures from DR Congo regardless of the destinations. Figure 1 shows that departures have dramatically increased since the 1980s, with migration probabilities tripling. The MAFE data indicate that if the migration rates of the 2000s continued, more than one out of four adults in Kinshasa would migrate over the course of his or her life (between the ages of 18 and 70), versus slightly under one in ten adults in the 1980s<sup>4</sup>. Of course, some of these migrants return, and some of them go to nearby countries. Nevertheless, the figures show that international migration directly concerns nearly one out of four adults, and is clearly a central feature of Congolese society, particularly in Kinshasa.

FIGURE 1: LIFETIME PROBABILITY OF MIGRATION (BETWEEN AGES 18 AND 70) FROM DR CONGO (ALL DESTINATIONS, 1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED FIGURES.



This incredible growth of Congolese emigration has occurred against a backdrop of deteriorating economic and political conditions since the 1980s. It notably represents a search for better living conditions for the migrants themselves, as well as a means of diversifying the income sources for the families who stay behind (Sumata, Tréfon and Cogels, 2004)<sup>5</sup>. For all migrations (regardless of the destination), almost half of departures are linked to work motives, which suggests the importance (but not the preponderance) of economic factors in Congolese migration (Table 2). Family reunification and education are two other important

<sup>4</sup> As mentioned in Box 1, these are lifetime probabilities. Probabilities at each age are of course much lower. For instance, at age 30, the probability of doing an international migration is a little above 1%. This means one person out of 100 does an international migration at age 30, among those who have not migrated before.

<sup>5</sup> Qualitative research indicates that some families go heavily into debt to ensure their child's journey, with the goal of benefitting from monetary returns in the form of remittances (Sumata, 2005).

motives for migration. Political reasons, included in the ‘other’ are also another important category.

TABLE 2: MOTIVES FOR DEPARTURE FROM DR CONGO, BY PERIOD OF DEPARTURE OF LAST MIGRATION (1975-2008) AMONG MIGRANTS CURRENTLY LIVING ABROAD.

Motives	Period			All
	1975-1990	1990-1999	2000-2008	1975-2008
Work	47.2	45.3	45.5	45.6
Family	18.1	24.5	23.6	23.2
Studies	23.7	20.5	20.3	20.8
Other	19.3	17.0	16.1	16.8
N	256	668	1137	2061
Sample includes migrants currently living abroad who were born in DR Congo and left at age 18 or older, in 1975 or later. Total may be greater than 100 because multiple answers were accepted. Household data, weighted percentages.				

## LESS EUROPE, MORE AFRICA: CHANGING CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The increase in migration from DR Congo appears to result from an upsurge in departures towards other African countries (Figure 2), and not towards developed countries. Contrary to widespread belief, Congolese migration to Europe has not exploded. The odds of leaving the Congo for Europe rose slightly in the 1990s during the worst moments of the political and economic crisis, but then returned to their pre-1990 levels. Migration towards other countries (mainly in North America) increased somewhat, but remained limited. On the other hand, migration to the rest of Africa truly took off, quadrupling during this period. In all, 44% of departures before the 2000s were to Europe and 42% to Africa. In the 2000s, Africa was the destination for 80% of departures, and Europe for only 12% of migrations.

This transformation is the result of new constraints and opportunities since the 1990s, and especially since the 2000s. Growing restrictions on African immigration to European countries may have contributed to stemming the flow of departures to these destinations. At the same time, new opportunities have been opening up for Congolese migrants. The end of apartheid boosted migration to South Africa beginning in the mid-1990s. At the beginning of the 2000s, the end of the war in Angola, combined with the unprecedented economic development in that country, also helped to attract many Congolese. These two countries alone received more than half of the migrants leaving Kinshasa in the 2000s (Figure 3, Table annex 1). Congo Brazzaville also the destination of one fifth of migrants from DR Congo<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> These data were collected only in Kinshasa. The proximity of the capital city of DRC with Angola and Congo-Brazzaville probably explain the preponderance of migration to these two countries. A survey conducted among 92 return migrants in Lubumbashi indicate that one third had return from South Africa, and one fifth from Angola. In contrast, very few migrants had returned from Congo Brazzaville (Ngoie Tshibambe, 2010).

FIGURE 2: LIFETIME PROBABILITY OF MIGRATION (BETWEEN AGES 18 AND 70) FROM DR CONGO, BY DESTINATION (1975-2009). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.





FIGURE 3: PROPORTION OF FIRST MIGRATIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA, BY PERIOD (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.



## THE AMERICANISATION OF MIGRATION ATTEMPTS


The figures demonstrate that the Congolese are increasingly heading to Africa instead of Europe. Migration attempts to Europe have also lost ground. Whereas European countries were particularly popular among would-be migrants until the 1990s, they are considerably less sought-after today (Figure 4). The European El Dorado persists in the Congolese collective imagination, but the continent no doubt inspires fewer dreams than before. It has gradually been overtaken by North America in migration intentions, with Africa also gaining ground in this regard.<sup>7</sup>

This relative decline of Europe in both departures and migration intentions contrasts with the idea sometimes put forward that Europe is as attractive as ever to African migrants. The continent certainly still appeals to migrants from specific countries (e.g. Senegalese migrants, see Sakho, 2013), and remains a prime destination. As we shall see below, however, European countries increasingly seem to be a default choice or one based on convenience. The presence of family is one of the main factors in choosing the destination. For the Congolese, the

<sup>7</sup> We should point out that these data were gathered from people residing in DRC. It is possible that those wishing to emigrate to North America are less likely to leave and are therefore overrepresented, compared with would-be migrants to Europe. As regards Africa, the upward trend in intentions may be related to the fact that people who intended to migrate in the past have succeeded, while those wishing to so more recently have not (yet?) migrated.

emergence of North America remains for the moment largely limited to attempts, with actual migration to that continent being marginal. In relative terms, such migration has nevertheless increased in comparison with Europe, and perhaps foreshadows significant transformations in the Congolese diaspora.

FIGURE 4: PROPORTION OF MIGRATION ATTEMPTS TO NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE AND AFRICA, BY PERIOD (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.



RETURNS: NO LONGER AN OPTION?

Alongside the rise in departures, returns to DRC have considerably decreased since the 1970s (Figure 5). For all destinations combined, 60% of migrants before the 1990s returned within ten years following their first departure; that is true for less than 40% today. As is the case for departures, this change in returns should be considered in the context of deteriorating living conditions in RD Congo and heightened constraints in the host countries, particularly in Europe.

The decrease in returns to DR Congo results from the dramatic drop in returns from Europe (Figure 6). Before the 1990s, returning was the norm, and three-quarters of migrants went back to DRC within ten years following their departure to Europe. At the time, Congolese migrants were mostly individuals studying in Europe or working in companies located there (Flahaux, 2011b; Kagné and Martiniello, 2001). Congolese families whose children were students in Europe encouraged them to finish their studies quickly and return home. Today, however, families push their children, including those who are not students, to remain abroad. In fact, the Congolese practically do not return from Europe anymore; the proportion of those who go back to DRC within ten years is under 10%. In contrast, returns from African countries have been generally stable since the 1980s, with around one in two migrants returning within ten years after his or her departure.<sup>8</sup> Returns from North America are based on very small samples and trends are not reliable.

<sup>8</sup> These values are, of course, averages. The propensity to return and the related trends vary from one country to the next. The Congolese return slightly more from Belgium than from France, for example, and returns from Angola – although decreasingly frequent – are more common than returns from South Africa.

FIGURE 5: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS RETURNING WITHIN 10 YEARS OF THEIR FIRST DEPARTURE (KAPLAN MEIER ESTIMATES) FROM DR CONGO, BY PERIOD (1975-2008), ALL DESTINATIONS. HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.





FIGURE 6: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS RETURNING WITHIN 10 YEARS OF THEIR FIRST DEPARTURE (LIFE TABLE ESTIMATES) FROM DR CONGO, BY DESTINATION AND PERIOD (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.



This drop in returns from Europe has occurred within a context of strong uncertainty for Congolese migrants. Given the tightening of entry requirements for European countries, the possibility of a new departure to Europe after a return to DRC is quite speculative. The investments and sacrifices made by migrants to reach Europe, combined with the chronic instability in DRC, make it very unlikely that they could return to their country of origin and be able to go back to Europe later. The differences in living conditions, notably in terms of access to healthcare and education, as well as the lack of employment opportunities in DRC, tend to limit attempts to return to the country.

The situation for migrants to other African countries is, however, less complex. One reason is that circulation between countries is easier, and a return does not necessarily jeopardise the chances of a new departure. Investment in migration is also lower, and the smaller gap in living conditions may constitute less of a barrier to return. Returns from South Africa are nonetheless markedly less frequent than those from Angola, for example – indicating that differences also exist within Africa.

Biographical data collected among migrants in Europe (Belgium and the UK) also indicate that migrants who have arrived recently (since 2000) are unlikely to want to leave their new country. More than 80% of the migrants stated that, when they arrived in Belgium or the UK,

they intended to stay for at least ten years, or forever (Table annex 3). This finding is in line with Lututala’s survey (2006) of immigrants in Paris, where three-quarters stated they intended to stay indefinitely. In short, Congolese migrants no longer return, and currently do not intend to return.

This has not always been the case. Upon their arrival, 38% of the Congolese migrants who arrived in Belgium and the UK in the 1980s and 1990s were thinking of staying for fewer than ten years (and probably returning to DR Congo), against 18% in the 2000s.<sup>9</sup> The significant decrease since the 2000s suggests that hopes have vanished. Most people now seem to know from the beginning that they are unlikely to go back to DRC. Qualitative studies also indicate that returns are not encouraged by families back home (Banzonzi, 2010; Sumata, Tréfon and Cogels, 2004). As suggested by research using register data in Belgium, Congolese migration patterns shifted from temporary migration to settlement migration (Schoonvaere, 2010).

### CIRCULATION OR RUPTURE?

Decreasing returns may in theory be accompanied by increasing circulation. Short visits may act as a substitute to definitive return and become part of a transnational way of living – what Lututala (2006) calls, in the case of Congolese migration, “residential ubiquity”. As a matter of fact, data collected in Belgium and the UK suggests that visits to DR Congo have not replaced returns (Table 3). In Belgium, the likelihood of visiting the Congo within the first five years of stay has only slightly increased over time (from 16.3% to 18.8%, not significant). In the UK, very few Congolese migrants visit DR Congo: fewer than 5% of Congolese migrants living in the UK have visited DRC within five years of their first arrival in Europe. With both countries taken together, the figures indicate that visits have diminished over time. In short, visits have not replaced return<sup>10</sup>.

TABLE 3: PROPORTION OF PEOPLE LIVING IN BELGIUM AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WHO HAVE UNDERTAKEN AT LEAST ONE (LONG) RETURN MIGRATION OR VISIT (SHORT RETURN) WITHIN 5 YEARS OF FIRST ARRIVAL (KAPLAN MEIER ESTIMATES), BY PERIOD OF FIRST ARRIVAL AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE.

Current place of residence	Long or short visits			
	1975-1990	1990-1999	2000-2009	1975-2009
Belgium	16.3	17.7	18.8	18.1
N	59	77	127	263
United Kingdom	(21.7)	5.0	3.2	3.9
N	14	67	67	148
Belgium, United Kingdom	17.7	9.1	10.9	11.1
N	73	144	194	411
Sample includes migrants who left at age 18 or older, in 1975 or after, currently living in Belgium and the United Kingdom. Biographic data. Weighted percentages.				

These results suggest a growing distance between Congolese migrants in Europe and their country of origin. While Congolese migrants maintain all sorts of links with DR Congo (cf.

<sup>9</sup> It is not possible to know if people intended to return to DRC, or move to another country.

<sup>10</sup> Results from Flahaux, Schoumaker et al., 2013 on the determinants of migration indicate that people who visit DR Congo are indeed less likely to return. At the individual level, this is consistent with a substitution of visits for returns. At the aggregate level however, changes in visits do not account for changes in returns.

Schoumaker, Castagnone *et al.*, 2013 on remittances, and Beauchemin, Caarls *et al.*, 2013 on contacts between households in DRC and migrants), they increasingly settle in Europe and do not visit DRC regularly. Data also show that return intentions and circulation are particularly low among people who left for political reasons, people with low education levels, and women, who have represented a larger share of Congolese migrants in recent years. These results contrast with Lututala's hypothesis of residential ubiquity (Lututala, 2006). Do such trends indicate a rupture? Qualitative research conducted in the UK (Garbin and Wa Gamoka Pambu, 2009) suggests many Congolese migrants still regard DR Congo as their "home", or one of their homes. However, this home appears increasingly distant.<sup>11</sup>

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## FEMINISATION OF CONGOLESE MIGRANTS IN EUROPE

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Migration to Europe has changed in other ways. One of the most significant changes is the feminisation of Congolese migration to Europe. Women are now slightly more likely to leave DRC for Europe than their male counterparts<sup>12</sup> (Figure 7) Their probability of leaving DRC for Europe was half that of males in the 1970s-1980s, and is now a little higher than that of males. The growing share of women among Congolese migrants may be linked to increasing violence and deteriorating living conditions (Mukwasa Gipela and Kapinga Wa Diamba, 2009). As shown in data collected from Congolese migrants in Europe, migration for political reasons has greatly increased since the 1970s and may have played a significant role in the rise in female migration. The increase in female migration is also in part a direct consequence of the diminishing returns of males. In the 1980s, when returns were frequent, females did not have to move to Europe to live with their husbands. In a society in which the nuclear family is highly valued (Ngondo, 1996), the vanishing prospect of male returns has encouraged family reunification in destination countries. Migration of single women have also increased, as well as migration for economic reasons among women, indicating more frequent 'autonomous' migration (Vause, 2012). Interestingly, the percentage of women among Congolese migrants to Europe is also much higher than in other MAFE migrant groups such as Senegal and Ghana. This fact may reflect lesser social control of female migrants than in other African countries, and the greater autonomy among female Congolese migrants.

In addition, women are now much less likely to return than men – and in fact virtually no women return from Europe, whereas returns from Africa remain frequent and have slightly increased (Figure 8). This has contributed to the feminisation of the Congolese migrant population in Europe (for similar conclusions on Belgium using administrative data, see Schoonvaere, 2010). Not only do they return less, but they are also less likely to want to return (Table 4).<sup>13</sup> Surveys in Belgium and the UK show that, when women arrive in these countries, they are more likely to want to stay more than ten years than their male counterparts (75% versus 61%). These gender differentials are, to a large extent, tied to the motives for migration. Women are much more likely than men to migrate for family reasons, and arrive in Europe

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<sup>11</sup> "Returning to the Congo is not an option for Weyi. But there's more than a hint of sadness in his voice when he says, 'I don't think about my country any more. I would rather make my life here'" (Taylor, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Whereas males are still much more likely than females to migrate to Africa.

<sup>13</sup> Other research also indicates that women are more likely to acquire Belgian citizenship (Schoumaker and Rakotonarivo, 2010).

through family reunification. People arriving through family reunification are very likely to intend to stay for at least ten years (90%, among both males and females). In contrast, people coming for studies (more frequent among males) are more likely to want to stay for a shorter period. Very few women who come because of political reasons – an increasing proportion of migrants – wish to return, which is not true of men. Qualitative research also indicates that, after reunification in Europe, male migrants may return, while their wife and children remain in Europe (Flahaux, 2011a; Vause, 2012).

FIGURE 7: LIFETIME PROBABILITY OF MIGRATION (BETWEEN AGES 18 AND 70) FROM DR CONGO TO EUROPE AND AFRICA, BY PERIOD AND GENDER (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.




FIGURE 8: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS RETURNING WITHIN 10 YEARS OF THEIR FIRST DEPARTURE TO EUROPE AND AFRICA (KAPLAN MEIER ESTIMATES), BY PERIOD AND GENDER (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.




TABLE 4: INTENTION TO STAY UPON FIRST ARRIVAL IN MAFE COUNTRIES, BY GENDER (1975-2008)


	Gender		All
	Males	Females	1975-2008
Belgium and the United Kingdom			
Fewer than 3 years	12.4	15.1	13.9
3 to 10 years	27.0	10.2	17.8
More than 10 years	60.6	74.7	68.3
N	250	214	464

Sample includes the first long stay in country, at age 18 or older, in 1975 or after, among all migrants in the biographical survey (migrants still living in the country, returnees and migrants who moved to another MAFE country). Note: people intending to stay forever are included in the category “more than 10 years”.  
Biographic data, weighted percentages.

## EDUCATED MIGRANTS IN EUROPE: FEWER DEPARTURES, BUT FEWER RETURNS


People with higher education have always been more likely to move from DR Congo to Europe than their less educated counterparts (Figure 9). This probability is related notably to their greater economic resources and their relative advantage compared with uneducated people in obtaining a visa (mainly to pursue higher education). Educated people also often have larger family and social networks in Europe capable of assisting with their migration. Their possibilities of valorising their skills on the European labour market are also greater, as attested by their higher employment rates and the better jobs they hold (see Schoumaker, Castagnone *et al.*, 2013). Despite these factors, the educational differential in migration propensity to Europe – especially between people with higher education and people with secondary education – has decreased over time. In the 1980s, people with higher education were twice as likely to move to Europe as people with secondary education. In the 2000s, the ratio is much smaller.

FIGURE 9: LIFETIME PROBABILITY OF MIGRATION (BETWEEN AGE 18 AND 70) FROM DR CONGO TO EUROPE AND AFRICA, BY PERIOD AND EDUCATION (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.



These changes result from several factors. First, cooperation between the Congo and several European countries was interrupted in the early 1990s (Hoebeke, 2007; Luntumbue, 2010), and the possibilities of pursuing studies in Europe with the help of a scholarship were greatly reduced until the early and mid 2000. The economic and political crisis in DR Congo in the 1990s also decreased the opportunities offered by the Congolese government. As a result, the overall propensity of educated Congolese to migrate to Europe has diminished over the last three decades, and some educated people eventually migrated to other African countries (Figure 9). In contrast, migration to Europe increased in the 1990s among the less educated, and then decreased more slightly than among educated people. This situation is, to some extent, related to the feminisation of migration, inasmuch as females have progressively accounted for a larger share of Congolese migrants to Europe and have, on average, lower levels of education than their male counterparts. This also reflects the growing share of asylum seekers among migrants, who also have lower education levels on average. In brief, the deterioration of economic and political conditions in DR Congo has contributed to modifying the education profiles of migrants.

FIGURE 10: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS RETURNING WITHIN 10 YEARS OF THEIR FIRST DEPARTURE TO EUROPE AND AFRICA (KAPLAN MEIER ESTIMATES), BY PERIOD AND EDUCATION (1975-2008). HOUSEHOLD DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.



Unsurprisingly, returns of educated migrants have greatly decreased since the 1970s (Figure 10). As mentioned before, returning was the norm in the 1970s, especially for educated people who were very likely to obtain a good job in DR Congo upon their return. Deteriorating living conditions in the Congo have significantly changed this situation, and educated Congolese migrants are increasingly likely to stay in Europe. Despite the fact that their integration into the European labour market is difficult – many educated migrants are employed in unqualified jobs (see Schoumaker, Castagnone et al., 2013) – they consider that their prospects are probably better in Europe than in DR Congo.

Return intentions have also seriously diminished among educated migrants (Table annex 3). Before the years 2000, more than half of educated migrants intended to stay for ten years or less, whereas only one third of migrants with higher education were in this category in the 2000s. Overall, this finding is in line with the decrease in returns. It seems, however, that educated migrants have not completely given up on the idea of returning to DR Congo. Their intentions of returning are higher than their less educated counterparts, and are also much higher than their propensity to return. A possible explanation for the gap between intentions

upon arrival and returns is that their intentions have changed over time: they did not intend to stay when they arrived and changed their mind after some time. Another possibility is that their intentions have remained the same, but that they have postponed their return until the situation in DRC improves.

While there is no increase in the emigration of educated people to Europe, the strongly decreasing returns of educated migrants still translates into a brain drain. This brain drain is also visible to African countries, where it results from a combination of increasing departures and decreasing returns.

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## STRATEGIES AND ROUTES OF MIGRATION TO EUROPE

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### A COMPLEXIFICATION OF STRATEGIES

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Another striking feature of Congolese migrations to Europe is their increasing complexity. While new barriers to migration may have somewhat curbed Congolese migrations to Europe – probably by reorienting some of them to other African countries – they have also contributed to the diversification of migrants’ strategies to reach Europe.

The growing complexity of strategies is visible through several types of data collected in the biographical surveys (Figure 11). For instance, people were asked to mention the type of steps they had undertaken to migrate to Belgium and the UK. These data not only show that the migration steps have become more varied over time, but also that migrants have increasingly used false documents or other people’s documents, and have paid smugglers to facilitate their migration (cf. Figure 11, Table annex 4). This is consistent with qualitative work on this topic (Sumata, Trefon and Cogels, 2004; Ngoie Tshibambe, 2010). Overall, one out of six migrants who arrived after the year 2000 said he or she had used false documents, someone else’s documents and/or paid smugglers.


The increasing role of smugglers and groups<sup>14</sup> is also visible in data collected on people with whom migrants travelled. Some 12% of people who arrived after 2000 mentioned having travelled with a smuggler or a group, compared with less than 3% in the 1970s and 1980s. While this figure remains low in relation to all Congolese migrants, the phenomenon is clearly part of the diversification of migration strategies (Ngoie Tshibambe, 2010; Sumata, Tréfon and Cogels, 2004).

Finally, another sign of changing strategies is the growing percentage of people who have been undocumented at some point during their first year in the country of destination. Almost one out of three migrants arriving in Belgium or the UK in the 2000s was undocumented in the first year, compared with about 10% before the 1990s. As these figures show, undocumented migrants are much more numerous than migrants arriving clandestinely (using false documents, other people’s documents), showing that a significant proportion enter legally and overstay their visas. Increasingly restrictive immigration policies have probably contributed to this trend.

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<sup>14</sup> This refers to “Ngulus”, i.e. people migrating with the help of specific groups (sports teams, musical groups, religious groups, soldiers, etc.). People become part of the group for the duration of the trip, obtain a visa, and stay in the destination country (See Sumata, Trefon and Cogels, 2004).

FIGURE 11: PERCENTAGE OF CONGOLESE MIGRANTS TRAVELLING WITH SMUGGLERS OR “GROUPS”, USING FALSE DOCUMENTS AND HAVING NO RESIDENCE PERMIT IN THE FIRST YEAR (BELGIUM, UNITED KINGDOM), BY PERIOD OF FIRST ARRIVAL (1975-2008). BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.




## CHANGING MIGRATION ROUTES

A related aspect of the changing strategies is the complexification of migration routes. For the purposes of this report, a migration route is considered to be the series of countries in which people stayed (for a short or long period) before settling in the current country of residence. For instance, someone may move from DR Congo to Belgium, and then settle in the UK. Others may have much more complex routes, or go directly from DR Congo to their country of residence (usually flying from Kinshasa to a European destination). While the majority of people still come directly from the Congo, the proportion of people using indirect routes has increased from the 1990s. Since the 1990s, almost 40% of migrants settling in Belgium or the UK have transited through another country (Table annex 6). Overall, females and educated migrants have more direct routes. In contrast, people who were undocumented in the first year were more likely to have transited through one or more countries (results not shown).

Indirect routes involve both African and European countries, and migration routes to the UK are more complex than routes to Belgium. Migrants coming to Belgium in an indirect way (30.4% since the 1970s) have mainly passed through Angola (4.3%) and France (4.1%). Those arriving in the UK (45% since the 1970s) transited mainly through Belgium (8.0%), France (6.7%), Nigeria (6.7%) and South Africa (2.9%) (cf. Table annex 7). Routes have changed (for instance, transit through Angola has increased), but the samples are not large enough to provide a detailed picture of such changes. What the data show, however, is that the number of routes used by Congolese migrants has greatly increased (Figure 12). Before the 1990s, 90% of the migrants arrived in Belgium or in the UK through 5 routes. In the 1990s and 2000s, the number of routes used by 90% of the migrants has more than doubled; it has tripled in the UK. This is probably – at least partly – a response to the tightening of border controls.

FIGURE 12: NUMBER OF ROUTES USED BY 90% OF THE MIGRANTS TO BELGIUM AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, BY PERIOD OF FIRST ARRIVAL (1975-2008). BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WEIGHTED FIGURES.



The diversification and the complexification of routes have also been accompanied by a greater variety of means of transportation. While almost everyone still flies to reach their destination country, the number of those using the plane exclusively has decreased, going in Belgium, for example, from 92% before the 1990s to 80% in the 2000s (cf. Table annex 8). Contrary to what is observed for other migrants (e.g. Senegalese migrants to Spain), Congolese migrants are very unlikely to travel by boat or pirogues (cf. Table annex 9).

### ASYLUM REQUESTS ON THE RISE

Another defining feature of Congolese migration to Europe is the large number of migrants requesting asylum (Figure 13). More than half of the migrants in the MAFE sample in Europe made an asylum request in the first year of their stay in their destination countries. In the 1990s, when the political troubles were at their highest, the proportion of asylum seekers reached 60% among Congolese migrants to the UK and Belgium (more than 80% in the UK). This finding is in line with the peaks in asylum requests observed in administrative data in the 1990s.

FIGURE 13: PERCENTAGE OF CONGOLESE MIGRANTS HAVING REQUEST ASYLUM IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THEIR STAY (BELGIUM, UNITED KINGDOM), BY PERIOD OF FIRST ARRIVAL (1975-2008). BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES.




Table annex 9 also shows that asylum requests are more frequent in the UK, where on average three-quarters of the migrants have applied for asylum, compared to one third of Congolese

migrants living in Belgium. Interestingly, the percentage of asylum seekers in the UK has decreased, suggesting that other ways of migrating, such as family reunification, have been increasingly available to migrants to the UK. While the percentage of asylum seekers is large, not all of them obtain the refugee status. But eventually, many regularize their situation.

Is there evidence of intra-European mobility linked to asylum requests? Overall, very few people apply more than once for asylum. Less than 10% of the Congolese migrants who have applied for asylum have applied more than once, and around 5% have applied in different countries. There is no sign of ‘country shopping’ among asylum seekers.

**MIGRANTS’ NETWORKS - THE INCREASING ROLE OF “OTHERS”**

Migrants also increasingly arrive in a place where they know someone (often a parent) who can sometimes facilitate migration and/or host them. For instance, before the 1990s, almost 60% of migrants knew nobody in Belgium or the UK before moving to these countries (Table 5). In the 2000s, almost two-thirds of migrants knew someone in the destination country, often a relative. This figure illustrates the growing influence of networks. Of particular significance is the increase in the percentage of people with a spouse or partner in the destination country, from 10% before the 1990s to 20% in the 2000s. This is in line with the decreasing returns and greater family reunifications.

TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS KNOWING SOMEONE IN DESTINATION COUNTRY BEFORE THEIR FIRST ARRIVAL, MIGRATIONS TO BELGIUM AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (1975-2009) AMONG MIGRANTS CURRENTLY LIVING IN THESE COUNTRIES, BY PERIOD

Country of residence	Contact in destination country	Period			1975-2009
		1975-1989	1990-1999	2000-2009	
Belgium and the UK	Nobody	58.7	48.5	35.4	42.4
	Spouse/partner	10.0	17.2	20.3	18.2
	Children	4.6	4.3	9.0	6.9
	Mother/father	0.0	1.3	6.1	3.8
	Brother/sister	15.7	21.0	23.8	22.0
	Other parents	11.4	16.6	24.0	20.1
	Friend	10.0	4.9	9.1	7.7
	Other people	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	N	71	138	204	413

Sample includes migrants currently living in Belgium and the United Kingdom who were born in DR Congo and left at age 18 or older, in 1975 or later.  
 The percentage of people knowing someone in the destination country is calculated by comparing the presence of someone in the destination country the year before the arrival in the country.  
 Biographic data, weighted percentages.

At the same time, family and friends have also had an increasing role in the choice of the destination country (Table 6). The ease of obtaining papers has, in contrast, decreased since the 1990s. This situation illustrates the growing difficulties faced by migrants, and the increasing role in migration of social capital in the destination country, which is a valuable resource for migrants. As shown in Flahaux, Schoumaker *et al.*, 2013, knowing someone in the destination country also greatly increases the probability of moving from DR Congo to Europe (see also Vause, 2012). People who know someone are less likely to use clandestine ways of entering (e.g. false documents), and are also less likely to submit an asylum request. They are, on the other hand, as likely as the others to become undocumented migrants in their first year,

which suggests that some of them may have easier access to short-term visas, and overstay their visas.

TABLE 6: MOTIVES FOR CHOIC OF DESTINATION (BELGIUM OR THE UNITED KINGDOM) AMONG MIGRANTS CURRENTLY LIVING IN THESE COUNTRIES (1975-2009)

Country of residence	Motives	Period			1975-2009
		1975-1990	1990-1999	2000-2009	
Belgium, United Kingdom	Work	9.1	3.9	7.9	6.7
	Family/friends	25.6	33.6	35.7	33.8
	Studies	9.3	6.9	8.5	8.0
	Transit	3.1	7.1	1.0	3.3
	Ease / papers	19.8	8.4	9.4	10.3
	Language	3.9	3.6	2.1	2.8
	Qualities of country	10.0	16.1	9.2	11.6
	Others	19.2	20.5	26.2	23.4
	N	71	138	204	413
Sample includes migrants currently living in Belgium and the United Kingdom, who were born in DR Congo and left at age 18 or older, in 1975 or later. Biographic data, weighted percentages.					

## CONCLUSION

Congolese migration shows dramatic changes since the 1970s. Departures from Kinshasa have greatly increased, while returns have decreased during the same period. These changes have not been homogeneous across destinations however. For instance, the propensity to leave to Europe has not increased significantly since the 1970s, but returns have literally collapsed. On the other hand, departures to African destinations have veritably taken off whereas returns from Africa have remained stable. All in all, these trends have contributed to the increasing size of the population of Congolese-born people living outside DR Congo.

The large increase of departures and the decrease in returns are most likely related to the deterioration of economic and political conditions in DR Congo. Migration has become a key strategy for improving living conditions in Kinshasa – in a context of great uncertainty. Changes in destination countries have also contributed to reshaping Congolese migration patterns. Increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Europe, along with the opening up of new opportunities in Africa in the 1990s, have probably both led to the growing share of migrants heading to African countries. Migration policies in Europe have also contributed to the complexification of migration to Europe, and probably to the decrease of returns from Europe. Since the 1990s, the routes of migration and the strategies of migrants have become increasingly complex. The combination of high uncertainty in economic and political conditions in Congo, and the increasing difficulties to enter Europe, makes returns very unlikely. Currently, not only very few Congolese migrants living in Europe return, but most Congolese intend to stay for long.

The feminization of migrations to Europe – as well as the growing share of less educated migrants – are other signs of the transformation of the Congolese migrations over the last decades. These developments are also related in part to the instability in Congo: The changes in education profiles result from the larger share of asylum seekers among Congolese migrants since the 1990s. The increasing percentage of female migrants partly reflects the transformation of Congolese migration to a settlement migration. The diversification of the migrants' profiles may also result from the facilitating effect of the growing Congolese

population in Europe. As predicted by the network theories, Congolese migrants are now more likely to have relatives and friends in Europe than they were in the 1970s. Relatives have become increasingly important in the choice of destination.

How will Congolese migration evolve in the future? Political and economic conditions in DR Congo have been very unpredictable over the last decades, and their impact on future departures and returns is necessarily speculative. An improvement of the living conditions in DR Congo may facilitate returns, but will not necessarily translate into less migration to developed countries. As is widely shared in the migration literature, more development usually goes hand in hand with more migration (de Haas, 2006). Improving economic and political conditions in DR Congo may thus lead to more migration to Western Countries. Where? While Europe has lost some of its attractiveness in the eyes of Congolese migrants and would-be migrants, its relative proximity, the historical ties, the language facilities, and the presence of a large Congolese community in Europe will probably continue to make it an important destination, if not by choice, at least for convenience.

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## ANNEX TABLES

TABLE ANNEX 1: TOP 5 DESTINATIONS FROM DR CONGO (1975-2008), BY PERIOD

1975-1989		1990-1999		2000-2008		1975-2008	
Country	% of migrations						
Congo	24.4%	Angola	32.8%	Angola	35.3%	Angola	33.0%
Angola	19.6%	Congo	21.1%	Congo	20.9%	Congo	21.8%
Switzerland	11.4%	France	10.2%	South Africa	14.9%	South Africa	9.1%
Belgium	10.9%	Canada	5.1%	France	4.8%	France	7.0%
France	7.0%	Belgium	4.5%	Belgium	4.3%	Belgium	5.3%
Europe	43.0%	Europe	26.6%	Europe	12.1%	Europe	20.9%
Africa	55.8%	Africa	64.4%	Africa	80.9%	Africa	72.1%
Other countries	1.2%	Other countries	9.0%	Other countries	7.0%	Other countries	7.0%
N	164	N	330		565		1059

Sample includes first migration of heads of households, their spouse(s) and their children, who left at age 18 or older, in 1975 or later.  
Household data. Weighted percentages.

TABLE ANNEX 2: TOP 5 DESTINATIONS OF MIGRATION ATTEMPTS FROM DR CONGO (1975-2009), BY PERIOD

1975-1989		1990-1999		2000-2007		1975-2007	
Country	%	Country	%	Country	%	Country	%
France	(33.4)	USA	20.9	USA	17.7	USA	16.2
United Kingdom	(25.6)	Belgium	20.9	Canada	17.1	Canada	13.0
Belgium	(21.7)	France	18.8	South Africa	7.6	France	11.4
Italy	(14.4)	Italy	10.3	Angola	7.2	Belgium	9.5
USA	(3.0)	Canada	6.9	Tunisia	6.9	Italy	7.5
Europe	92.9	Europe	64.7	Europe	42.3	Europe	50.8
Africa	1.2	Africa	14.3	Africa	22.0	Africa	30.5
North America	5.9	North America	21.0	North America	35.7	North America	18.7
N	16		47		111		174

Migration attempts were calculated among people living in DR Congo at the time of the study.  
Biographic data. Weighted percentages.

TABLE ANNEX 3: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS INTENDING TO STAY LESS THAN 10 YEARS AT FIRST ARRIVAL IN THE MAFE COUNTRIES, BY PERIODS.

Intended duration of stay	Period of first arrival in country		
	1975-1999	2000-2009	1975-2009
No/primary education	5.0	0.0	1.8
N	9	15	24
Secondary education	10.5	5.0	8.6
N	84	80	164
Higher education	55.7	30.8	48.6
N	159	117	276
All migrants	38.1	17.9	31.7
N	252	212	464
<p>Sample includes the first long stay in country, at age 18 or over after 1975 among all migrants in the biographic survey (migrants still living in the country, return migrants and migrants who moved to another MAFE country).</p> <p>Note: people intending to stay forever are included in the category 'more than 10 years'.</p> <p>Periods 1975-1989 and 1990-1999 have been merged</p> <p>Biographic data. Weighted percentages.</p>			

TABLE ANNEX 4: STEPS UNDERTAKEN IN (ACHIEVED) MIGRATIONS TO BELGIUM AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (1975-2009) BY MIGRANTS CURRENTLY LIVING IN THESE COUNTRIES, BY PERIOD OF FIRST ARRIVAL

Category	Period			1975-2009
	1975-1990	1990-1999	2000-2009	
University reg. / scholarship (requested and/or obtained)	18.5	16.6	13.0	14.8
Sponsorship (requested and/or obtained)	8.2	10.5	5.5	7.5
Documents (requested and/or obtained)	78.9	69.2	55.8	62.8
Saved money	8.1	10.8	11.9	11.2
Green card	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	17.6	21.3	27.0	24.1
False or someone else's documents	5.6	13.2	14.0	13.7
Traffickers	0.0	0.0	3.9	2.1
Other	12.0	8.1	9.1	8.3
N	57	147	210	
<p>Sample includes migrants currently living in Belgium and the United Kingdom, who were born in DR Congo and left at age 18 or older, in 1975 or later. The sum of percentages may be greater or lower than 100%. Several steps can be mentioned or no steps may be mentioned in some cases. Only the last portion of the journey is included.</p> <p>Biographic data. Weighted percentages.</p>				

TABLE ANNEX 5: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS BY TYPE OF LEGAL STATUS UPON FIRST ARRIVAL IN BELGIUM AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (1975-2009) AMONG MIGRANTS CURRENTLY LIVING IN THESE COUNTRIES, BY PERIOD

Current residence	Legal status at arrival	Period of arrival			
		1975-1989	1990-1999	2000-2009	1975-2009
Belgium	Residence permit	95.3	82.3	72.7	79.1
	No residence permit	4.7	12.3	17.2	13.8
	No residence permit needed	0.0	1.3	2.5	1.8
	unknown	0.0	4.1	7.5	5.3
	N	50	84	131	265
United Kingdom	Residence permit	-	53.2	43.6	48.0
	No residence permit	-	42.6	44.0	43.3
	No residence permit needed	-	0.0	12.3	7.0
	unknown	-	4.2	0.0	1.7
	N	7	63	79	149
Both countries	Residence permit	89.6	67.6	59.2	65.1
	No residence permit	10.4	27.6	29.7	27.1
	No residence permit needed	0.0	0.70	7.1	4.1
	unknown	0.0	4.1	4.0	3.7
	N	57	147	210	412

Legal status is defined by the type of residence permit during the first year. No residence permit means that, during the first year, the person declared that he/she did not have a residence permit at some point. A person may have had a visa that expired, and be classified as having "no residence permit". No residence permit at arrival is not synonymous with illegal entry.  
Biographic data. Weighted percentages.

TABLE ANNEX 6: TOP 5 ROUTES OF MIGRATION FROM DR CONGO TO BELGIUM AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (1975-2009), BY PERIOD

BELGIUM							
1975-1989		1990-1999		2000-2009		1975-2009	
Trajectory From DR Congo	% of migrants	Trajectory From DR Congo	% of migrants	Trajectory From DR Congo	% of migrants	Trajectory From DR Congo	% of migrants
...-Belgium	80.1	...-Belgium	64.4	...-Belgium	69.9	...-Belgium	69.6
...-Congo-Belgium	4.5	...-France-Belgium	7.0	...-Angola-Belgium	6.7	...-Angola-Belgium	4.3
...-Angola-Belgium	2.9	...-Angola-Portugal-Belgium	3.9	...-France-Belgium	3.0	...-France-Belgium	4.1
...-UK-Belgium	2.0	...-Portugal-Belgium	2.1	...-UK-Belgium	3.0	...-Kenya-Belgium	1.8
...-Canada-Belgium	2.0	...-France-UK-Belgium	2.0	...-Italy-Belgium	2.2	...-Burundi-Belgium	1.5
N	50	N	84	N	131	N	265
UNITED KINGDOM							
1975-1989		1990-1999		2000-2009		1975-2009	
Trajectory From DR Congo	% of migrants	Trajectory From DR Congo	% of migrants	Trajectory From DR Congo	% of migrants	Trajectory From DR Congo	% of migrants
-		...-United Kingdom	54.7	...-United Kingdom	56.8	...-United Kingdom	55.0
-		...-Belgium-UK	13.2	...-France-UK	10.1	...-Belgium-UK	8.0
-		...-Nigeria-UK	7.7	...-Belgium-UK	3.6	...-France-UK	6.7
-		...-South Africa-UK	3.6	...-Kenya-UK	2.7	...-Nigeria-UK	3.1
-		...-Guinea-UK	2.1	...-South Africa-UK	2.6	...-South Africa-UK	2.9
N	7	N	63	N	79	N	149

Sample includes short and long stays outside DR Congo (for settling or transit) after the last departure from DR Congo and before the first long stay in country of destination (current residence), at age 18 or older (after 1975) among migrants still living in the country. The five most frequent trajectories are shown.  
Biographic data. Weighted percentages.

TABLE ANNEX 7: TOP 5 COMBINATIONS OF MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION USED IN THE JOURNEY (FIRST ARRIVAL) IN MAFE COUNTRIES, AMONG THOSE STILL IN THE COUNTRY, BY PERIOD OF ARRIVAL

BELGIUM							
1975-1989		1990-1999		2000-2009		1975-2009	
Combinations	%	Combinations	%	Combinations	%	Combinations	%
Plane	91.6	Plane	82.2	Plane	80.2	Plane	82.5
Plane-Bus/Train-Boat	2.9	Plane-Bus/Train	8.8	Plane-Bus/Train	9.7	Plane-Bus/Train	8.2
Plane-Bus/Train-	2.0	Plane-Car	4.9	Plane-Car	6.9	Plane-Car	5.5
Plane-Car	1.7	Plane-Bus/Train-Car	3.4	Plane-Bus/Train-Car	1.0	Plane-Bus/Train-Car	1.6
Plane-Boat	1.7	Plane-Bus/Train-Boat	0.7	Plane-Car-Patera	0.7	Plane-Bus/Train-Boat	0.7
N	50	N	84	N	131	N	265
UNITED KINGDOM							
1975-1989		1990-1999		2000-2009		1975-2009	
Combinations	%	Combinations	%	Combinations	%	Combinations	%
Plane	-	Plane	83.1	Plane	76.2	Plane	77.3
Plane-Bus/Train	-	Plane-Bus/Train	10.8	Plane-Bus/Train	15.4	Plane-Bus/Train	13.9
Boat	-	Plane-Car	2.0	Plane-Car-Boat	2.7	Plane-Car	2.4
Car-Bus/Train	-	Plane-Car-Boat	1.7	Plane-Boat	1.7	Plane-Boat	1.6
Plane-Car	-	Plane-Bus/Train-Boat	1.7	Plane-Car	1.7	Plane-Bus/Train-Car	1.5
N	7	N	62	N	75	N	144

Means of transportation include all means cited at least once during the journey from DR Congo to the current country of residence (first arrival). Means of transportation used to reach intermediate countries (for short or long stays) are also included. Combinations do not represent the order in which means of transportation were used. Plane-Boat and Boat-Plane are included in the same category (Plane-Boat). Only the five most frequent combinations are shown.  
Sample includes short and long stays outside DR Congo (for settling or transit) before the first long stay in country, at age 18 or older (after 1975) among migrants still living in the country.  
Biographic data. Weighted percentages.

TABLE ANNEX 8: MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION USED AT LEAST ONCE IN THE JOURNEY TO THE CURRENT COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE (FIRST ARRIVAL) IN MAFE COUNTRIES, AMONG THOSE STILL IN THE COUNTRY, BY PERIOD OF ARRIVAL.

Current residence	Means of transportation used at least once during the journey	Period of first arrival in country			All
		1975-1989	1990-1999	2000-2009	1975-2009
Belgium	Plane	100.0	100.0	97.7	98.8
	Bus/train	4.9	12.8	11.0	10.7
	Car	1.7	8.3	8.4	7.4
	Boat	4.6	0.7	1.6	1.8
	Pirogue/Patera	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.3
	N	50	84	131	265
United Kingdom	Plane	-	99.4	94.0	96.3
	Bus/train	-	12.5	18.1	16.4
	Car	-	3.7	5.5	5.3
	Boat	-	3.4	2.4	3.6
	Pirogue/Patera	-	0.0	0.0	0.0
	N	7	63	79	149
<p>Means of transportation include all means cited at least once during the journey from DR Congo to the current country of residence (first arrival). Means of transportation used to reach intermediate countries (for short or long stays) are also included.  Sample refers to the first long stay in country, at age 18 or older (after 1975) among migrants still living in the country.  The sum may be different from 100, because several means of transportation can be used.  Missing values and other means of transportation are not shown.  Biographic data. Weighted percentages.</p>					

TABLE ANNEX 9: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS WHO MADE AN ASYLUM REQUEST DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THEIR STAY IN BELGIUM OR THE UNITED KINGDOM (1975-2009) AMONG MIGRANTS CURRENTLY LIVING IN THESE COUNTRIES, BY PERIOD

Current residence	Asylum request in first year	Period of arrival			1975-2009
		1975-1989	1990-1999	2000-2009	
Belgium	Yes	16.4	32.0	38.7	33.3
	N	50	84	131	265
United Kingdom	Yes	(100)	87.1	69.7	77.7
	N	7	63	79	149
Both countries	Yes	30.2	59.8	53.2	53.3
	N	57	147	210	412

Sample refers to the first long stay in country, at age 18 or older (after 1975) among migrants still living in the country.  
Biographic data. Weighted percentages.

TABLE ANNEX 10: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS KNOWING SOMEONE IN DESTINATION COUNTRY BEFORE THEIR FIRST ARRIVAL, MIGRATIONS TO BELGIUM AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (1975-2009) AMONG MIGRANTS CURRENTLY LIVING IN THESE COUNTRIES, BY PERIOD

Country of residence	Contact in destination country	Period			1975-2009
		1975-1989	1990-1999	2000-2009	
Belgium	Nobody	50.5	41.2	39.7	41.8
	Spouse/partner	12.0	16.2	23.0	19.1
	Children	5.5	2.9	6.8	5.3
	Mother/father	0.0	2.7	6.0	4.0
	Brother/sister	18.8	28.6	21.6	23.5
	Other parents	13.7	22.5	21.6	20.7
	Friend	11.9	10.0	7.2	8.8
	Other people	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	N				
United Kingdom	Nobody	-	55.5	30.8	43.0
	Spouse/partner	-	18.2	17.5	17.1
	Children	-	5.7	11.4	8.7
	Mother/father	-	0.0	6.1	3.5
	Brother/sister	-	13.7	26.8	20.3
	Other parents	-	10.2	26.6	19.4
	Friend	-	0.0	11.1	6.3
	Other people	-	0.0	0.0	0.0
	N				
Two countries	Nobody	58.7	48.5	35.4	42.4
	Spouse/partner	10.0	17.2	20.3	18.2
	Children	4.6	4.3	9.0	6.9
	Mother/father	0.0	1.3	6.1	3.8
	Brother/sister	15.7	21.0	23.8	22.0
	Other parents	11.4	16.6	24.0	20.1
	Friend	10.0	4.9	9.1	7.7
	Other people	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	N				

Sample includes migrants currently living in Belgium Kingdom and the United Kingdom who were born in DR Congo and left at age 18 or older, in 1975 or later.  
The percentage of people knowing someone in the destination country is calculated by comparing the presence of someone in the destination country the year before the arrival in the country.  
Biographic data. Weighted percentages.