Historically low fertility in the Maghreb

Article

Three countries of the Maghreb region (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) have experienced simultaneous and extremely rapid falls in fertility: the total fertility rate (TFR)2 in these countries fell from 7 to 8 children per woman in the 1970s to around half that figure by the early 1990s [1]. What developments have we seen since then? How do fertility patterns differ among the three countries and why?

^{Divergent fertility trends in the 2000s}

During the 1990s, fertility continued to decline at a sustained pace, particularly in Tunisia, where the rate dipped below the replacement threshold of 2.1 children per woman in 1999, with Algeria and Morocco headed in the same direction (Figure 1). This convergence seemed to confirm the hypothesis of a demographic transition across the region. However, developments since then have challenged this interpretation [2].

From the 2000s, this pattern of simultaneous decline was disrupted, starting in Algeria, which saw a clear rebound in fertility to over 3 children per woman in the mid-2010s. Tunisia experienced a similar upturn, albeit later and less marked: after a decade of remarkable stability at around the replacement threshold, its total fertility rate increased to more than 2.4 children per woman in 2014, before starting to fall once again. Conversely, fertility in Morocco has seen consistent and progressive decline, with no rebound, leading to a historically low total fertility rate of 1.98 children per woman in 2024.

The 2014–2024 period marked another turning point. Fertility in Tunisia began falling steadily once again. It reached an historic low of 1.58 children per woman in 2023 and, according to author calculations, will have reached 1.53 in 2024. Morocco fell below the replacement threshold of 2.1 children in 2024, while the rate in Algeria has been in decline since 2017. All three countries are now heading towards low (Algeria) or very low (Morocco and Tunisia) fertility levels.3

^{Falling fertility with varying timelines}

While fertility levels are currently falling across these three countries, fertility timelines are quite different. In Algeria, the rebound in fertility of the mid-2010s was observed at almost all ages (Figure 2). In 2019, births were concentrated among women aged 25–29, with a fall in fertility rates for women over the age of 30. Consequently, mean age at childbirth fell from 32.0 to 31.4 years between 2005 and 2019. 

In Morocco, the consistent decline in fertility has occurred without any notable change in fertility timeline: peak fertility remains concentrated in the 25–29 age group for all 3 years observed. However, the fall in fertility is driven by a reduction in the intensity of births to mothers in the 30–34 age group initially, then in the 25–29 group, resulting in a decline at all ages over 20 years. Mean age at childbirth remains stable (between 30.3 and 30.6 years).

Unlike its two neighbours, Tunisia was the first country to stabilize under the replacement threshold of 2.1 between 1999 and 2009. The rebound then observed was partly due to a temporary fall in age at childbirth: births for mothers aged 25–29 were comparatively more frequent between 2004 and 2014. The subsequent decline was, however, all the more rapid. It concerned all ages and led to an increase in mean age at childbirth, which rose from 31.0 to 31.4 years between 2014 and 2023.

^{Differing mechanisms behind recent fertility decline}

These trends are driven by factors connected with fertility—such as marriage and contraception—, which are themselves closely linked to changes in the socio-economic context.

The relationship between marriages and births is particularly close in Algeria. Between 2000 and 2014, the crude marriage rate rose from 5.8‰ to over 10‰. This marriage boom was followed by an exceptional increase in births in the mid-2010s. Such dynamics can be partly explained by the concomitant occurrence of large generations born in the 1980s reaching marital age and a relative improvement in economic conditions (employment and housing). More couples were able to marry and have children, often earlier than their ­predecessors.

In Tunisia, mean age at first marriage among women has evolved in two stages. We can observe a slight fall in age, from 29.1 years to 28.6 years between 2004 and 2014, followed by a slight increase to 28.9 years in 2024. The recent decline in fertility has taken place in the context of sustained postponement of marriage. The proportion of single women among the 20–24 and 25–29 age groups increased by 8 percentage points between 2014 and 2024, as did the proportion of single men among the 20–24 age group (+9 points), and, even more so, among the 30–34 and 35–39 age groups (+13 and 11 points, respectively). This manifests as a longer period of singlehood across both sexes, which partly explains the acceleration of the fertility decline observed since the mid-2010s.

In Morocco, on the other hand, the impact of marriage appears to be more limited, with fertility in decline despite women entering marriage at relatively early ages. Census data even show that the mean age of women at first marriage is falling, from 26.3 to 24.6 years between 2004 and 2024, while the figure for men continues to climb, from 31.2 to 32.4 years over the same period. Early marriage among women has not halted the fertility decline, thus highlighting the key impact of other factors, foremost among which is contraception.

^{Differences in contraceptive practices among the three countries}

Until the early 2000s, all three countries followed relatively similar trajectories of contraceptive practice, with the use of contraceptive methods in Algeria and Tunisia climbing to levels of around 60 to 65% (all methods combined) among married women aged 15–49 years (Figure 3). From the 2000s onwards, patterns of use diverge. In Algeria and Tunisia, contraceptive use fell to between 50 and 55% in the 2010s. Conversely, Morocco has seen increasing use of contraception, with the proportion of married women using contraception rising from 40% to 70% between 1990 and 2020. Figure 3 also shows an increase in the use of modern methods—the pill, IUDs, injections, implants, and sterilization—as opposed to traditional methods such as periodic abstinence. In Morocco, the increase has been particularly sustained; in the context of relatively early marriage among women, this use of birth control echoes developments observed in Iran and Egypt, where the rapid and widespread adoption of contraceptive use has led to a very swift decline in fertility [3, 4,].

 

^{Difficult labour market integration for women}

All of these demographic changes have occurred within a socio-economic context characterized by longer academic trajectories and later entry of young adults into the labour market, women in particular. In the three countries, levels of female education have risen sharply. In Tunisia, for example, women aged 25–34 years now represent close to 60% of the country’s university students (INS, 2025). However, this increase has not led to improved labour market entry.

Unemployment rates among young adult graduates remain high and occupational trajectories are particularly fragile among women: in Morocco and Algeria, economic activity rates among women increase strongly until their late twenties and then gradually decline after age 30, at the very moment when the parental burden is heaviest. They remain low for the subsequent age groups, at 24% for women aged 35–44 in Morocco and 25.9% for women aged 40–44 in Algeria. In Tunisia, where the female economic activity rate is much higher at all ages, labour market exit is less significant. The female participation rate is higher there among women aged 25–29 (59%) but stabilizes just above 50% for age groups up to 44 years (INS, 2025). These challenges of labour market integration and work–life balance may therefore delay plans for marriage and children and contribute to the postponement of births.

^{Changing family norms}

In addition to these economic and institutional pressures, recent changes in fertility also reflect developments in family norms. In Maghrebi societies, as elsewhere, parenthood is becoming a more demanding project [5]. Parents now place greater importance on children’s academic success, well-being, and living conditions, with the result that more emotional and financial investment is concentrated on fewer children. These new family norms spread via multiple channels (schools, the media, social networks, and international mobility) and help to explain why the reproductive behaviours described here are becoming more closely aligned with those observed in other regions of the world, despite their specific social and cultural contexts [6].

^{Imminent population ageing}

Population pyramids clearly demonstrate recent changes in fertility in the Maghreb (Figure 4). Comparison of the pyramids at three dates reveals the profound and rapid transformation that has occurred within these three countries: the broad and steadily expanding base of the 1960s pyramids reflects very high fertility in that decade; the “rectangular” profile of the late 1990s pyramids shows the completion of the transition; and, finally, the marked narrowing of the base of recent pyramids results from declining numbers of births since the late 2010s. In parallel, the expanding population at adult ages is due to higher fertility levels in previous decades, while the peak of the pyramid is also widening due to increases in life expectancy.

In Tunisia, the country leading the way in this transition, the proportion of people aged under 20 years is in sharp decline, while the proportion of individuals aged 60 and over increased from 8% to 17% between 1997 and 2024 (INS, 2025). Population ageing remains more moderate in Algeria (10.5% aged 60 and over in 2023) and Morocco (13.8% in 2024), but it will accelerate over coming years as fertility rates continue to fall.

Continuation of the rapid decline in fertility will gradually reduce natural population growth. As smaller generations reach reproductive age, the number of annual births will automatically decline, irrespective of individual behaviours. If natural population change becomes negative, the population can only grow if net migration is positive. However, unlike many European countries in which immigration flows are still helping to offset natural population change, the Maghreb has historically been a region of negative net migration. As such, population growth will depend on the region’s uncertain and unpredictable migration trends [7].
 

^***

The recent fertility decline in the Maghreb has been significant and, at times, very rapid. It reflects lasting changes in behaviours, with births being postponed, more widely spaced, and fewer in number. While the trajectories differ by country, these significant changes are likely to converge in a sustained period of low fertility, with, at this stage, no sign of any further rebounds comparable to those observed previously.

^Authors

Zahia Ouadah-Bedidi - Université Paris Cité and Université Côte d’Azur, CNRS, IRD, URMIS, F-75013 Paris, France; Institut national d’études démographiques (Ined).

Ibtihel Bouchoucha - Institut national de la statistique (INS), Tunis.

Soumaya Abdellatif - Ajman University, United Arab Emirates.

^{Cite this publication}

Zahia Ouadah-Bedidi, Ibtihel Bouchoucha, Soumaya Abdellatif. 2026. Historically low fertility in the Maghreb. Population & Societies, 644. https://doi.org/10.3917/popsoc.644.0001